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THE 89th ILLINOIS VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENT (July 1862-June 1865) |
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HOME FORMATION TRAINING TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT |
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The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, also known as the Railroad Regiment, was formed in July and August 1862. It participated in the battles of Stones River, Liberty Gap, Chickamauga, Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge, Pickett's Mill, the Atlanta Campaign, and Nashville. Its brigade commander for most of the Civil War was August Willich- regimental commander for most of the war was Charles T. Hotchkiss. Major John Farquhar- then Sergeant Major- was awarded the Medal of Honor for heroic service at the Battle of Stones River. The regiment was mustered out in June 1865. Photos of 89th
Illinois Infantry Regiment monuments on the Chickamauga battlefield
by Tom Pearson. "Fight 'Em Like Hell!":
by
"Hell has broke loose in Georgia, sure enough."
Civil War, Western Theater, 1864 At sunrise on the day after the battle at Pickett's Mill, several enemy shells were lobbed into the Union ranks. Two or three men in Gibson's brigade (the 89th Illinois's brigade) were wounded. Pickets fired at one another continuously, although by now most of the men were so used to it that those not on duty had little trouble sleeping through it. During the night of May 28th, the men of the brigade were awakened by the deep voice of Colonel Gibson calling it to arms. A general panic ensued that was punctuated by much shouting and confused rushing to and fro (although very little discharging of weapons apparently took place). The men later learned that the alarm had been a false one, and that it had been the result of a nightmare which had afflicted Colonel Gibson. The men were certainly able to understand Colonel Gibson's frame of mind. Alexis Cope of the 15th Ohio later recalled that Colonel Gibson's was not the only mind in a "wrought up condition after passing through such a hell as we did when we were led into such a slaughter pen [Pickett's Mill]." During the afternoon of May 29th there was a tense moment when the sound of small arms and artillery fire was heard to the right of the Union line. No advance occurred, but both sides fired intermittently all that evening and night. Picket firing on May 30th was unusually light. It was a sunny day, and men to the right of Gibson's brigade had a clear view of the Pickett's Mill battle site. Some of the men got permission to move even further to the right to get a better view. The men wanted to ascertain if all the brigade's dead had been buried. Since the battleground was still in rebel hands, however, it would have been dangerous to take a closer look. At sunset on the 30th Gibson's brigade was marched to the left about a quarter mile, then formed up to the right of Hazen's brigade. Brigade members quickly threw up a log and dirt breastworks. By this point in the war, Sherman's men could erect a makeshift yet effective barricade in five minutes. Part of the men kept watch while the others collected rocks, logs, or other materials strong enough to stop or deflect a Minie bullet. Pickets at the new position traded little fire with enemy counterparts, for the "woods were so dense there our pickets could not see the enemy's pickets and the enemy could not see ours." At this point in the war, Confederate fortifications normally consisted of heavy logs stacked to a height of about four feet and heavily backed with dirt. The top log was raised with sticks so that it stood 10 to 12 inches above the log beneath it. This top log was known as the head-log (because it protected the defender's head), and was the invention of rebel general Joseph Johnston. The men poked their musket barrels through the gap between the head-log and the log beneath it and fired at oncoming Yankees. One ironic consequence of extensive use of head-logs was that wounds to rebel defenders in such fortifications usually involved the head.
On May 31st, the men continued to reinforce the brigade's breastworks. Word had come down that brigade headquarters expected a rebel attack. Work on the breastworks was barely completed when pickets began firing all along the line. Soon Union pickets came back to the Union line on the fly, bullets whizzing past them all the while. The rebels of General Loring's division were on the way. The attack appeared to be concentrated at a point to the right of Gibson's brigade. The attack petered out after an hour or so, although rebel sharpshooters took up positions where Union pickets should have been, and proceeded to "annoy" the Union front line. Some men from the 89th Illinois who had recently acquired Spencer repeating rifles were detached to deal with rebel sharpshooters, and did so in short order. Once the rebel sharpshooters were all dead or driven back, Union pickets were ordered back into place. There was some speculation that the rebels might try a night attack, and nervous pickets at one point let loose with a startled volley, but no further rebel movements in fact took place that night. The rebels were alternately fearful of and fascinated by the Union repeating rifles. One of Sherman's men made this entry in his journal in May 1864: "I think the Johnnies are getting rattled. They are afraid of our repeating rifles. They say we are not fair, that we load up on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week." During the push on Atlanta one Union division was issued the new repeating rifles. They also received waterproof cartridges and took good advantage of them. As they crossed the Chattahoochie River they would fire, duck beneath the water while the rebels returned fire, then rise up and fire again. Many of the rebels were dumbfounded by the spectacle. Nearly two hundred rebels surrendered rather than retreat, then begged their captors for a closer look at the Yankee guns that could be loaded and fired underwater. June 1st, 1864 saw the usual exchanges of picket fire, as well as some artillery fire to the right of Gibson's brigade. One of the 89th Illinois's brother regiments, the 32nd Indiana, suffered a mishap while felling trees to make a road for Union artillery. They misjudged the fall of a large tree they'd been felling, and it fell "on a row of stacked guns, knocking them to pieces." On June 2nd it rained for the first time since May 26th. Just before noon on the 2nd, there was a violent thunderstorm, the passage of which was punctuated by "vivid lightning and loud peals of thunder." Later that afternoon, a report came through that a damaged bridge over the Etowah River had been repaired. The repair of the bridge meant that the men would probably be back on full rations soon (at the time, they were on 3/4s rations due to slight shortages). That night the brigade was awakened abruptly around midnight. After some sharp picket firing, the colonels of the 15th Ohio and the 32nd Indiana regiments (two of the 89th's brother regiments) began shouting, "To arms!" and "Fix bayonets!" The picket firing soon subsided, however, and the men had a good laugh at their officers' expense. On June 3rd, the Union high command decided to try and play a trick on the Johnnies. Shortly after 9 AM, the brigade's tents were struck and the pickets recalled. Instead of withdrawing, however, the men were told to quietly conceal themselves behind the Union main line. The high command hoped that curiosity might draw the rebels out of their fortified positions. After four hours of waiting, however, it was obvious to everyone that the rebels had not been fooled. Union pickets were sent back out to their posts and the Union main line reoccupied. That evening, it rained again. After a quiet June 4th, there was a sporadic exchange of picket fire on June 5th. A probe of the rebel lines at 8 AM, however, revealed that the enemy had pulled up stakes during the night. Details were sent from each company of the brigade to the Pickett's Mill battleground for traces of the dead, wounded, and missing. It was quickly discovered, however, that the rebels had buried all the Union dead. The search parties returned to Union lines, and mail from home was distributed to the men. The brigade set out on the march with the rest of the army on June 6th. The march began about an hour after sunrise. The column was halted about 10 AM to await the completion of a pontoon bridge across Altoona Creek. After the bridge was completed, the division crossed the creek and was placed in camp along Big Shanty Road. The army was about six miles from Ackworth, Georgia. The men were allowed to sleep until after sunrise on the morning of June 7th. Many men were running low on rations, and some of the men objected to performing further housekeeping duties until they had further rations. Luckily supply trains showed up later that day, bringing fresh beef and whiskey (among other items). Some of the men freely partook of their whiskey ration, including most of the regimental band. That evening band members engaged in an impromptu serenade for Colonel Gibson that was continued for some time. General Sherman (they called William Tecumseh Sherman "Uncle Billy") took great pains during the Atlanta Campaign to ensure that the men under his command were well-equipped. He accomplished this in large part by issuing an edict that simply stated that all railroads in the area controlled by the Union Army would be used first for transport of soldiers and military supplies, then for civilian travel and supply (if any cars were available that had not been commandeered for military use). Sherman's move provoked howls of outrage, but in this manner he was able to transport 120 ten-ton carloads of men and supplies every day. While on campaign, his men normally had three days' rations on their persons, and regimental wagons normally carried 20 days' reserve. Mail was also distributed on a regular basis.
William Tecumseh Sherman
On June 10th, the brigade set out (in company with its division) at 8 AM. After marching about a half-mile a hard rain began to fall. The march was halted and the men allowed to rest until about 2 PM. At that time the march was resumed (although the rain was still coming down). The march followed the main road to Marietta. The men finally halted and made camp in an open field. They had marched a total of only about three miles. On June 11th, the men were shifted from one position to another on the Union line. Rebel guns probed the Union line as pickets exchanged fire intermittently throughout the day. The day was warm and rainy. The rain continued on June 12th and 13th. The men were allowed to pitch their tents, then had to labor in the rain helping to strengthen the Union line. HOME FORMATION TRAINING TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT On the morning of June 14th, the brigade was ordered to be ready to march early. They then waited until almost noon before the order came to move out. Skirmishers began exchanging fire almost immediately after the march began (some men from the 32nd Indiana were out front as skirmishers). That afternoon the brigade occupied a line of works that had originally been built to shelter artillery gun crews. Men from the 15th Ohio were sent out to relieve the skirmishers from the 32nd Indiana. They were given orders to advance and clear out rebel skirmishers, but encountered such heavy fire that they took cover and refused to budge. At that point General Howard rode up, accompanied by several members of his staff. The general leapt off his horse and rushed forward toward the reluctant skirmishers. He told them that they were overestimating the enemy's strength, and that they could easily clear the front with a determined rush. The men dutifully started started forward, and found resistance to be as light as General Howard had predicted. There was still a price to be paid for progress, however: two men dead and three wounded. On the morning of June 15th, the rebels were found to have abandoned their works. The order came down for a general advance on Pine Mountain at 2 PM. The brigade was part of Wood's division of the Fourth Corps at this time, and as such was the reserve division during this advance. The advance proceeded slowly, both because of spirited resistance on the part of the enemy and because of the forbidding nature of the northern Georgia terrain. By evening, the Union line had been advanced to within 75 yards of the rebel main lines. General Thomas ordered a halt, and the Union men hastily threw up a line of entrenchments. June 16th was a welcome day of rest for the men. Some of them climbed Pine Mountain and took advantage of the view it afforded them of Kennesaw Mountain and Marietta. They could see the spot where rebel General Polk had been killed by a Union artillery solid shot that had pierced his chest as he stood talking with several other rebel generals. The next morning the men stood for inspection, then packed up their tents and were marched to the left for some distance. After Generals Sherman, Thomas, and Howard rode up to examine the enemy's position, an advance on the rebel line was ordered. The brigade went forward with men from the 89th Illinois out front as skirmishers. After advancing about half a mile, the skirmishers from the 89th came under a galling fire from rebels in the woods at the rear of an open field. The advance was halted for about an hour while a number of guns were brought forward to try and soften up the enemy position. After an hour's barrage, two Union divisions (including the 89th's) were sent forward and rather easily swept the enemy's position.
George Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga
The men were instructed to settle in for the night in the enemy's well-constructed fortifications. Some of the men put up their tents, while others elected to sleep under the stars. Those who slept exposed to the heavens were in for a rude awakening: a hard rain early on the morning of the 18th had them scrambling to get their tents up. The Union line was ordered forward the next morning. Men of the 32nd Indiana were out front as skirmishers. After a short advance the men of the brigade were put to work preparing positions for Union artillery. While the artillery softened up the enemy position, the men built fires to dry their wet tents and blankets. At 6 PM that evening, the brigade was sent by the right flank to a bridge that crossed a slough. Seven companies from the 15th Ohio were sent forward as skirmishers. The Union skirmishers traded fire with their rebel counterparts for several hours, after which time the firing died down to a near halt. The men slept in their places in line, while a steady rain fell nearly all night. At 6 PM on June 19th, the Corps was ordered to make for Marietta, Georgia. General Wood's division (the 89th Illinois's division) was second in line, behind the division of General Stanley. Shortly thereafter (at approximately 7 AM), the leading division encountered enemy pickets on a line of ridges just west of Marietta. General Stanley was ordered to form his division in line of battle, with General Wood in support. The 15th Ohio of the 89th Illinois's brigade went ahead with Wood's division, while the rest of the regiments in the brigade remained behind to draw rations. After the newly supplied regiments rejoined the brigade, the men settled in as Union artillery traded potshots with their rebel counterparts. A steady rain fell all afternoon. That night the men were ordered to spend another soggy evening in line. The men were awakened the next morning at 4 AM. After a hasty breakfast the division moved out, advancing down a road about a mile, at which point it relieved part of General Hooker's corps. The men they relieved had only partially constructed a works in which to reside: Wood's men were put to work finishing the job. In the afternoon, a battery of heavy guns was brought forward and placed on the division's right flank. No sooner had the guns opened fire when rebel guns barked a reply. Skirmishers all the while traded small arms fire: a man from the 15th Ohio was wounded on the skirmish line. The Union works were quite close to the rebel forward position, a string of rifle pits on a rounded hill known as Bald Knob. An open space stood between the Union line and Bald Knob, allowing the rebels a clear field of fire. After a supporting artillery barrage around 4 PM, Kirby's brigade of Stanley's division was sent forward to clear Bald Knob. After some spirited resistance, this was accomplished at approximately 5:40 PM. The enemy seemed loathe to relinquish Bald Knob, however, and launched a counterattack not twenty minutes later. Kirby's men had to scurry back to the Union line. The 49th Ohio was detached from Gibson's brigade (the 89th Illinois's brigade) to support the battery on the division's right. Some men were assigned to sleep in the works. As an attack by the rebels was deemed a strong possibility, some of the men were assigned to sleep in place in the front line. As it had again rained most of the day, for these men it was yet another unpleasant night in northern Georgia. June 21st was a cloudy, dismal day, made even less palatable by a cold drizzle that fell the entire day, At 11 AM that morning, General Howard himself rode up to Colonel Askew, the commander of the 15th Ohio, and his adjutant, Captain Cope, and told them to assault, capture, and hold Bald Knob. The two men thought this a curious order, as a full brigade had failed to hold the knob the previous day, and now General Howard was ordering a single regiment to accomplish the same task. Colonel Askew, however, merely nodded and prepared to get underway. Colonel Askew had noted the previous day that Kirby's attempt to hold Bald Knob had failed because no attempt had been made to clear the woods to the right of the knob. Askew therefore decided to send four companies against the knob, and six companies in a sweep of the woods to the right of the knob. Regimental cooks served coffee to the men in line, who drank it in silence. Oliver Cope, brother of 15th Ohio Adjutant Alexis Cope, asked at this time to be excused from making the assault. Questioning revealed that he had had a premonition that he was to die today. Colonel Askew gently refused Cope's request. It turned out that Cope's dream had been prophetic- he did die during the assault, his jaw shattered and breast pierced by rebel balls. After a brief Union artillery barrage, the men of the 15th Ohio were sent forward. The rebels in the rifle pits on Bald Knob poured a steady stream of lead at the advancing Union men, but most of the bullets were aimed high and did little damage. One ball found Lieutenant William Harkness of the 89th, however. As Isaac K. Young stated in a letter home: "Lieutenant William Harkness of Company K, 89th Illinois, fell in this charge, pierced through by a Minie ball; he was brought back to the rear to the division hospital, and was conscious of the fatality of his wound, and set to work to write a letter to his wife at Platteville, Illinois." The rebel skirmishers on Bald Knob were quickly overrun, and many surrendered. One rebel shot a Union man after his pit mates had surrendered, and was himself shot dead. The Union men on Bald Knob quickly set to work trying to establish a defensive position, while the six companies attempting to clear the woods to the right of the knob encountered two regiments of Confederate General Bates's division. The adjutant of the 15th Ohio was sent to try and secure reinforcements. He failed to locate brigade commander, Colonel Gibson, but did locate Lt. Colonel Gray, commander of the 49th Ohio. Gray's men had pulled duty the night before, but Gray could plainly observe the perilous position of the 15th Ohio, and so agreed to help. The 49th quickly rushed forward and helped secure the woods to the right of the knob. Thus the 15th Ohio (with the assistance of the 49th Ohio) was successful, and Bald Knob remained in Union hands that night. Capturing the knob had cost the 15th dearly, however: 12 of its men had died in the assault, and 42 had been wounded. On the morning of June 22, 1864, the men of the 89th Illinois relieved the 15th Ohio, which was in line in the works to the right of Bald Knob. Part of the morning was spent reinforcing the works and digging rifle pits for the 89th's skirmishers. This position was so close to the rebels that one-third of the men were on duty at all times. There was a constant exchange of fire that day by skirmishers and artillery. On June 23rd, the 89th was relieved of skirmish and first line duty by the 15th Ohio. Orders came down that evening for the brigade to advance its skirmish line at the same time that General Hazen was to advance his skirmish line on the brigade's right. Union artillery opened up on the rebels and poured down half an hour's worth of iron rain. Then the brigade skirmishers (the 15th Ohio) moved out and managed to fairly quickly push back the rebel skirmishers. But General Hazen's men had not advanced as planned, and brigade skirmishers were therefore subjected to a withering enfilading fire that killed one officer and three men, and wounded seventeen men. HOME FORMATION TRAINING TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT On the morning of the 24th, the 89th Illinois again relieved the 15th Ohio on the skirmish line and first line of the brigade's position. The day was quiet; so quiet, in fact, that it almost seemed as if the men had agreed to observe an unofficial truce. A Union artillery battery had been placed atop Bald Knob. On the afternoon of the 24th, General Thomas rode to the rear of Bald Knob and dismounted. He carefully climbed to the peak of the knob and surveyed the enemy's works. Turning to an artillery officer, General Thomas said, "Lieutenant, suppose you fire a shot or two and see if they are still there." The lieutenant did as ordered, and rebel batteries immediately opened up in response. One rebel shot knocked a cannon on Bald Knob off its carriage. General Thomas turned to the lieutenant and said, "Yes, they are still there." Then he laughed. June 26, 1864 was a Sunday. The men of the 89th Illinois relieved the men of the 15th Ohio on the front line and skirmish line. There was a truce that morning during which the rebels buried some recently killed men. The truce ended that afternoon. Picket and artillery fire erupted all along the Union line. The firing of the pickets continued that evening and into the night. The Union advance towards Atlanta had stalled before Kennesaw Mountain. General Sherman could only see two alternatives: wait out the rains, let the roads dry, and then attempt a flanking movement under more favorable conditions; or order a frontal assault on rebel General Johnston's mountain. In the end, Sherman ordered the assault for two main reasons: first, each day brought Lincoln one day closer to the November election. There was a very real fear that a Union Army failure to show progress in the drive to Atlanta could result in a Lincoln defeat in November. Lincoln's main opponent, his former general George McClellan, was a Peace Democrat who could conceivably sue for peace rather than pursue the (mostly won) war to its bitter end. Sherman and his boss, General Grant, therefore had a strong desire to capture Atlanta before election time if at all possible. Sherman was also somewhat sensitive about the reputation he was gaining as a general who would rather flank than fight. He felt that his men might be getting too cautious, too accustomed to flanking movements rather than straight-ahead pushes against the enemy's lines. He finally decided on a frontal assault as a way to teach both his critics and his men a hard but necessary lesson. The rebels on Kennesaw Mountain had prepared the usual firing trenches by throwing up earth on their front, leaving a step on which to kneel behind this cover, and topping the embankment with the ubiquitous head-log. Traverse trenches went back at right angles from the main line. In front of their trenches rebel soldiers had felled trees and trimmed and sharpened the branches. In some places they drove stakes into the ground, points angled toward advancing Union troops.
Chevaux de frise photographed during Atlanta Campaign
Before the Union assault on Kennesaw, Union artillery mounted a furious but largely ineffectual bombardment of the mountain's impressive breastworks. The grand display did greatly impress men on both sides. One rebel turned to his fellows and said: "Hell has broke loose in Georgia, sure enough." One June 27th, 1864, the assault on Kennesaw Mountain began. The assault was spearheaded by General Newton's division (the 89th Illinois was held in reserve to the right of the mountain). During the storming of Kennesaw, the rebels quite literally fought with everything they had. In addition to the expected Minie balls and canister shot, startled Union soldiers had to dodge rocks, dirt clods, and even some entrenching tools thrown at them from above. One soldier from Illinois had his hat knocked off by a rock. He recovered his composure just in time to see a boulder the rebels had pushed down the mountain approaching his position in an all-fired hurry. The boulder knocked the dumb-founded soldier back down the mountain. The assault on Kennesaw proved to be a costly Union defeat. The high cost in human lives and suffering produced next to no gain for the army. Captain Alvah S. Skilton of the 57th Ohio said in his reminiscences: "The charge at Kennesaw cost us the lives of many, many brave men and inflicted but little injury on the enemy. It was barren of any good results, and I believe General Sherman has been more severely criticized for this charge than for any other order he ever issued." On June 28th, the 89th Illinois stood duty on the front line and picket line. The 8th Kansas Infantry Regiment, which had been separated from the brigade at Chattanooga previously, rejoined the brigade on this date. It was a hot, dusty day, and the next day brought more of the same. The northern Georgia heat added to the misery of the men wounded on Kennesaw Mountain, and the heat was swelling and blackening the bodies of the unburied dead. A seven-hour truce was agreed upon so that the dead could be buried (and the area's horrific stench thus somewhat alleviated). Soldiers of the two armies shared in the chore of burying the dead, and many took advantage of the chance to swap coffee for tobacco. Some Union soldiers even took the opportunity to get the autograph of rebel General Cheatham, who had rode up to get a better view of the work in progress. The 89th Illinois had been on picket duty when the day started. They were relieved in the afternoon by the 15th Ohio. Once the seven-hour truce ended, Union artillery again opened fire on Kennesaw. Picket fire began somewhat later. During the night a concentrated burst of picket fire drew everyone from their tents to the line: there was no advance, or even any sign that one had been in progress. It was put down to a case of nerves on the part of a jumpy picket. June 30th was another quiet morning all along the line. Picket and artillery fire resumed that afternoon, as did the rain. Union gunners were puzzled by the failure of the rebel guns to return fire. Were they "playing possum," or had they been removed? On July 1st, Union gunners were again puzzled by lack of response from their rebel counterparts. The next day Union pickets were ordered to open fire and continue firing for half-an-hour. At that time McPherson's men pulled up stakes on the Union left and swung around the Union rear as part of an effort to gain the rebel left flank. The 89th Illinois's brigade was marched about one mile left of its previous position. There it took the place of one of McPherson's vacated brigades. During this movement bullets zipped past the men's heads (although one bullet found its mark, the head of Corporal P. James Reedy of Company E). The men gratefully slid into already dug trenches at march's end. The next morning the men learned that the rebels had withdrawn from their positions on Kennesaw Mountain the previous night. Rebel General Johnston felt that McPherson's change of position on the previous day had compromised his own position and so led to the withdrawal. The brigade received orders to be ready to move out quickly on the morning of July 4th. Other parts of the corps began to move forward at the conclusion of a Union artillery barrage. But the 89th Illinois's brigade didn't get the order to move until noon that day. At that time they were moved to the left, to a position in the Union Army's second line. The men were told to camp at that place. Blackberries grew wild in the area, and the men ate their fill. After several days of rest, the brigade was on the march again at 7 AM on the morning of July 9th. They were marched to a railroad tracks, which they then followed toward the Chattahoochie River. It was an intensely hot and humid day, and the enemy was known to be close enough that action could ensue at any moment. Artillery was heard in the distance. Word came down that Union artillery was shelling the rebels, who were crossing the Chattahoochie at Pace's Ferry. The rebels were using a pontoon bridge, which they cut and released as their last men crossed to dent its use to the Union Army. The brigade camped that night near the Chattahoochie. From a hill near camp, some of the men climbed a tall tree and used a spyglass to peer at Atlanta. Their goal was in sight! At this point, the Union Army was within about 11 miles of Atlanta. General Sherman knew that the relatively speedy capture of Atlanta was an absolute necessity if Lincoln was to be reelected, and said so in a letter to his brother John in Ohio. If Lincoln was not reelected, it was widely feared (although not especially likely) that new President George B. McClellan would sue for peace even though the end of the Confederacy was plainly in sight. Rebel General Johnston had on July 4th taken up a position before the Chattahoochie River. When General Schofield managed to cross the Chattahoochie upstream from Johnston's position on July 9th, Johnston withdrew across the river. With Sherman's army in hot pursuit, Johnston next fell back to Peachtree Creek, the last real obstacle the Union Army had to master in its drive to Atlanta. General Johnston in his usual thorough fashion had ordered the preparation of two separate lines of defense for Atlanta. The first was about two miles south of and more or less parallel to Peachtree Creek. The second, inner line encircled Atlanta just outside city limits. At Atlanta buckled down for the siege it knew to be coming, the streets of the city went crazy on July 10th with the news that a company of Walker's cavalry had captured Sherman. The elation didn't last long, of course- the Sherman in question turned out to be Colonel Frank Sherman of Chicago, a member of General Howard's staff. On July 10th, the 89th Illinois's brigade moved out with its division at 11 AM up a road that ran parallel to the course of the Chattahoochie. They marched for six miles in the July heat and humidity. A number of men were done in by the heat, and fell out along the line of march. A thunderstorm that afternoon cooled things down for a while. The men at last reached a pontoon bridge that General Schofield's men were using to cross the Chattahoochie. The men were ordered to set up camp at that point. HOME FORMATION TRAINING TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT
On July 11th, the brigade
had no marching orders, so the men watched as other troops crossed the
pontoon bridge. Some men bathed in the river as a herd of beef cattle
was driven across. A lot of fraternization took place along the banks
of the Chattahoochie. Rebels and Federals stripped and took their
first good bath in weeks.
The 89th's brigade was ordered to be ready to pull out by 10 AM on July 12th. They actually started out at 10, but didn't cross the river where Schofield's men had done so. Instead they were marched down the road to Power's Ferry. The men waited there while a pontoon bridge was completed. While waiting there, many of the men again bathed and swam. There was a great deal of laughter, shouting, and a fair amount of profanity. General Howard, a pious man, had ridden up and sat watching the men and the construction of the bridge. Angrily he said, "Men, I think you should be afraid to use such language if the water is deep." The swearing stopped-- at least while the general remained in earshot. The brigade was able to cross the river late in the afternoon on July12th, and pitched camp to the left of General Stanley's division. The next morning the brigade was ordered to move a mile down the river and occupy a ridge there. Rations were issued that afternoon. At 5 PM, the 15th Ohio was sent out on a reconnaissance mission. Enemy pickets were encountered, but the way to Pace's Ferry was found to be clear, which was information that the Union brass had been waiting to hear. That night the brigade camped on the ridge that it had occupied earlier in the day. On the morning of July 14th, clothing and equipment were distributed to the men (they received new shirts, trousers, socks, and canteens). That evening a violent downpour began. It was accompanied by a powerful wind that blew over some tents and subjected the unhappy occupants to a thorough soaking. After two days in that place resting and performing routine housekeeping duties, the 89th's division was ordered to move out at dawn on July 17th. Each man was issued 60 rounds of ammunition. The 89th served as river crossing guard while the 4th Corps crossed the Chattahoochie. Once the 4th Corps completed its passage, the rest of the Union Army followed suit. The army's goal loomed before it: Atlanta! Sherman ordered Generals Thomas and Schofield to make straight for Atlanta. General McPherson was ordered to veer east towards Decatur, Georgia. The men were issued rations in the evening on July 17th, with an eye towards an early start on the 18th. Orders received dictated an early start at 5 AM. As the 89th's division had the last place in line, the men did not actually set out until 10 AM. After a halt for lunch at noon, the men set out again, this time following a weathered road that led them in a southeasterly direction. A halt was called at 4 PM, and the men were allowed to pitch their tents. After a brief rain shower, mail was distributed. The men had marched about 5 miles that day. On July 18th, President Lincoln was authorized by Congress to call up 500,000 men for 1, 2 and 3 year terms of enlistment. The threat of a draft was again used as a cudgel, and worked very well as an incentive to get reluctant men to enlist. All together, the Union Army received only about 46,000 conscripts and 118,000 substitutes into its ranks (compared to 2 million Union Army enlistments). The threat of the draft wasn't the only incentive used to get men to enlist, however: bounties by this time could be substantial, and in some places recruits collected a bounty from the federal government, their states, their counties, and sometimes from their townships or towns of residence. Bounties in late 1864 in some localities totaled $1,000 or slightly more. On the morning of July 19th, the division was ordered to make a reconnaissance in the area of Peachtree Creek. The men halted for several hours while skirmishers scouted the area. They determined that the rebels had crossed the creek and then burned the bridge behind them. Enemy fortifications were in plain view across the creek. Division pioneers were ordered to cut timbers for a makeshift bridge. In a few hours the bridge was ready. At 5 PM, the division advanced across the creek (after an artillery barrage that was matched shell for shell by the rebels). After a brief exchange of gunfire, Union men took possession of the rebel works (they found five dead Johnnies in the works). Possession of the works was turned over to General Newton's division, and then the 89th with its division marched back to their camp. Rebel General Johnston had been replaced by General John Bell Hood on July 17th, after a report critical of Johnston had been transmitted to Jefferson Davis by his on-scene advisor, Braxton Bragg. Hood, who knew he had gained command of the Army of Tennessee mostly by constantly harping in secret reports to Davis on Johnston's penchant for strategic retreats, knew that he had to take the offensive if he were to remain in charge. He decided to make his army's presence felt as the Union Army crossed Peachtree Creek. Hood's plan (that rather ironically followed closely a plan devised by Johnston shortly before his ouster) called for the corps of Stewart and Hardee to position themselves north of Atlanta. There they would attack Thomas and Schofield as they crossed Peachtree Creek. In the meantime, Cheatham's corps (presently posted east of Atlanta) would block McPherson's corps from coming to the aid of Thomas and Schofield. The plan might have succeeded had it been executed properly, but started badly. The main attack, that had been scheduled to begin at 1 PM, was held up until 4 PM. Thomas by then had managed to get most of his men across the creek, and was already mostly entrenched on high ground. Five rebel divisions in the attack force would thus be assaulting seven Union divisions in good position on easy-to-defend ground. The advancing rebels in addition had to negotiate thick timber, several ravines, and generally heavy undergrowth, and one rebel division for a time was actually lost in the woods and had to find its way to the proper place by following the sounds of conflict (Peachtree Creek was in many ways the rebels' Pickett's Mill). Once the tired rebels had regrouped before the Union works, they were sent forward in a series of poorly coordinated attacks that were not properly supported by artillery fire (once again, shades of Pickett's Mill). The well-entrenched federals were never seriously threatened, and Union rifle and artillery fire inflicted heavy casualties on their rebel counterparts. Two hours of fighting resulted in 1,780 Union casualties and 4,800 rebel casualties. The rebel Army of Tennessee had nothing at all to show for its losses. On this day the 89th Illinois's division had set out about 5 AM. After a fairly short march, the men were told to finish work on some entrenchments that had been started by Stanley's division. Pioneers cut trees in front of the entrenchments to clear a field of fire. In the late afternoon and evening, the sounds of a spirited engagement could be heard to the division's right (it was the ongoing battle of Peachtree Creek). After his misadventure at Peachtree Creek, Hood pulled his men back inside Atlanta's considerable fortifications. He figured he could repel any direct attacks by Sherman on the city's defenses, while emerging with parts of his army to take advantage of any Federal lapses in judgment. Sherman, on the other hand, had no intention of assaulting Hood's formidable fortifications. He knew he didn't have to beat Hood in a big pitched battle to win the ultimate prize, Atlanta: all he had to do was cut Hood's lines of supply. Four railroads led into Atlanta: Sherman had already cut two of them (the Augusta Railroad and the Western Atlantic Road). His plan was to flank Hood and cut the two railroads that ran north into Atlanta from southern Georgia. Then Hood would have to either withdraw, come out and fight, or surrender. General McPherson left Decatur on July 21st, headed for Atlanta. His immediate goal was to capture several positions from which his artillery could threaten Atlanta. To that end, he sent R. R. Leggett to capture Bald Hill, a ridge to the east of Atlanta that had a commanding view of the city. Union possession of the hill would truly put Atlanta "under the gun." Leggett managed to capture the hill after a ferocious assault that involved 750 Union casualties. On the 21st, the 89th's brigade was told to be ready to move out at daylight. The enemy was located in entrenchments about three miles outside Atlanta. While awaiting instructions, some men climbed trees from which they could gaze into Atlanta city limits. Orders finally came that resulted in the 89th's brigade moving about a half-mile to the right. There they dug works and acted as support for an artillery battery. The battery promptly began lobbing shells towards Atlanta, while rebel batteries attempted to return the favor. Hood barely rested after the Peachtree Creek debacle. He had a plan to envelop McPherson, who was still maintaining a position to the east of Atlanta. Hood's plan involved sending Hardee south and then east, so that he would be in a position to assault McPherson's left flank. Cheatham would meanwhile assault McPherson along his front, while Wheeler's cavalry was to engage McPherson's rear, and destroy his supply train if possible. While this action (that would in the future be known as the Battle of Atlanta) was occurring, Stewart would hold Atlanta with a little help from the Georgia militia, and keep Thomas and Schofield busy so that they could not aid McPherson. Hood's plan was actually a very good one-- it might have worked had it not followed so closely on the heels of the Peachtree Creek debacle. Because it did, however, Hardee's already tired men were expected to forgo needed rest and march 15 miles in the dark, so that they could be in position to attack the next day. Conditions in the field doomed the plan almost from the start. The terrain Hardee's men had to traverse was formidable: heavy timber and undergrowth alternated with deep ravines and marshy areas. It was also extremely hot, and the marching men raised clouds of dust that choked the marchers and clearly marked their progress for the enemy. To top things off, Hardee's guides were not especially familiar with the terrain to be traversed. At one point the guides marched Hardee's lead columns into a pond. After Hardee's men reached their assault starting point, they began to deploy for action. As they did so, a Union sharpshooter shot Confederate General William Walker dead. The attack began six hours after it had been scheduled to get underway. Hardee's men certainly pursued the assault with a vigor that men in their position should not have been expected to possess. They went forward sounding the famous rebel yell. On another day, under slightly different conditions, the attack might well have succeeded. McPherson, however, knew the attack was coming and had had the time necessary to both extend his line and strengthen his position. Hardee's men, therefore, were not hitting McPherson on his vulnerable left flank: they were going forward against dug-in soldiers backed by twelve Union guns. During Hardee's initial assault the guns savaged his onrushing rebels: an estimated 1,000 cannon rounds greeted the first rebel wave. HOME FORMATION TRAINING TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT Hardee was reinforced by Cleburne's division, and the extra help even allowed a temporary penetration of the Union forward line. But Union guns again made the difference: a battery of ten guns was rushed forward to help seal the breech in the Union line. Rebel General Cheatham had meanwhile been hitting McPherson hard along his center. Cheatham's attack proceeded more smoothly than had Hardee's: Cheatham's men tore a hole in the Union center and threatened for a time to roll up the entire Union line. McPherson rode forward to observe the scene and direct the Union response: unfortunately, he rode into an area threatened by the rebels. Rebel soldiers called on him to surrender: when he attempted to ride away, the soldiers fired a volley at his back. A ball pierced the general's lungs: General McPherson, commander of the Army of the Tennessee, was dead. General Sherman was deeply affected by McPherson's death, as the two men had been close friends. Grief had to take a back seat, however, to a more urgent matter: the Union line was still in jeopardy. Sherman ordered General Schofield to bring up twenty guns and train them on the hole in the Union line. General John "Black Jack" Logan was placed in temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman's orders were to the point: "Fight 'em, fight 'em, fight 'em like hell!" Logan went forward with the men, who were shouting, "For McPherson and revenge!" The Union counterattack managed to mend the breech in the Union line: a last rebel attempt to reopen the gap was thwarted by the massed Union guns. The close and bitterly contested Battle of Atlanta was costly for both sides. The rebels lost 8,000 men, and the Union 3,700. More men fell on this day than in any other day in the long Atlanta Campaign. A good plan of battle had been hastily executed and poorly coordinated. Hood blamed Hardee, but Hardee and his men had not been the major problem. Hood was all ferocity and no cunning, while Sherman was (in large part) a case-study in tenacity tempered by self-discipline. Hood, as Robert E. Lee remarked, was "all wolf and no fox." While the Battle of Atlanta was transpiring to the east of Atlanta proper, skirmishers of the 89th Illinois's brigade to the north of Atlanta discovered that the rebels directly before them had abandoned their works. The Union line was thus moved forward, and skirmishers sent out in advance of the new line discovered that the rebels had occupied an even stronger line of trenches closer in to Atlanta proper.
Captured Confederate position before Atlanta
After a halt for lunch, the Union line was moved forward again. Some time after this advance had begun, word came down that the Army of the Tennessee had been engaged by General Hood's forces. Not long after that, word came down (first to officers only, later to the men), that General McPherson had been killed by the rebels. The 89th's brigade was shortly thereafter ordered to relieve a portion of General Newton's division in the Union front line. While digging entrenchments in which to rest, small arms fire and shells from enemy pickets and batteries tried the nerves of the men. That evening, the 89th's brigade commander, Colonel Gibson, had a close call. He was inspecting the line with division commander General Thomas Wood when a cannonball struck the horse of one of Gibson's aides and knocked off its head. A piece of the projectile fragmented and struck a second aide's foot, passing all the way through it and piercing his horse's side. Neither Colonel Gibson nor General Wood was injured, although the headless horse fell on one of its rider's legs and fractured it. The 89th's division spent the next three days holding its place in the Union line. Much time was spent strengthening entrenchments, as heavy mutual picket fire was making life in the trenches a hazardous proposition indeed. A number of men were wounded by picket bullets, including a man in the 15th Ohio who was hit by a bullet that struck a tree branch and then ricocheted downwards, piercing the unfortunate soldier's leg. The life of a soldier could be a hard (and sometimes brief) one, indeed. End: Part One of the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment in the Atlanta Campaign Click below for Part Two
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