Civil War, Western Theater, 1864

Atlanta was besieged by Sherman's army for a period of about 28 days (July 28-September 3, 1864).  When the siege began, Federal troops were positioned in an arc that lay roughly one mile west and thee-quarters of a mile north of Atlanta's outer defenses.  To counter the Union threat, the rebels extended their line for about four miles beyond the westernmost edge of their fortifications.  The new line of hastily-dug entrenchments was located two miles west of and roughly parallel to the rail line that ran south from Atlanta.

On July 26th, the 89th's brigade shored up its works with logs and more dirt, abattis and two strong lines of palisades.  The stakes were now high, indeed.  Atlanta was the prize to be lost or won in the next few weeks.  With the presidential election looming in November, Sherman was under terrific pressure to take Atlanta before Election Day.

On the morning of July 27th, the entire division's picket line was advanced.  New rifle pits also had to be dug to protect division pickets, who were also moved forward.  At noon, pickets commenced firing as ordered in an attempt to mask an advance of the Army of the Tennessee (General Howard had replaced the slain General McPherson in that position).  The ruse apparently succeeded, because rebel skirmishers opened fire and kept it up for an hour.

On July 28th, the 89th's brigade took part in an assault on the rebel rifle pits about 500 yards to the front of the Union first line.  The assault (it was an attempt to further advance the Union first line) was a success, although a price was paid in Union dead and wounded.  Twenty-four rebels were captured, along with some new Enfield rifles and several officers' side-arms. 

While this assault was occurring, Hood again attacked the Army of the Tennessee to the right of the position occupied by the 89th's division- this engagement would later be known as the Battle of Ezra Church.  Stephen D. Lee was ordered by Hood to counter Howard's westward flanking movement.  Lee would ultimately fail, in a battle that cost Hood more irreplaceable men.

About this time, Sherman sent part of his cavalry on a movement south of Atlanta.  This thrust met with much less success: Sherman's troopers were defeated in engagements at Brown's Mill, Sunshine Church, and Jug Tavern.  Union artillery, however, was now close enough that a steady and continuing rain of shot and shells could be loosed into the city proper.    Many civilians in Atlanta erected shelters that they called "bomb-proofs."  Soldiers on both sides called them "gopher holes."  These shelters were earthen pits six to eight feet deep and eight to twelve feet square.  Sturdy boards were laid across the top of this shelter, and the boards were then covered with three or four feet of dirt.  The entrances to these shelters always faced south, the only direction Atlantans were certain that the Yankees wouldn't arrive from. 

While the soldiers made fun of the civilians in their hidey-holes, the soldiers also labored to make themselves safer.  The 89th's brigade worked on July 29th and 30th to make its line stronger.  Trees were chopped down, and their branches sharpened.  The resulting stakes were then driven into the ground, business ends towards enemy lines. 

A steady rain on July 31st kept the men (those not on picket duty) in their tents.  A rumor passed through the ranks that Union cavalry had torn up the Macon railroad tracks near Jonesboro, south of Atlanta (Sherman's cavalry was in fact finding its little excursion rough going). 

On August 1st, the 23rd Corps was moved to the right, leaving the 4th Corps (the 89th Illinois's corps) on the Union extreme left.  On this day the 25th Illinois, one of the 89th's brother regiments. left for home, its term of service expired.  At this point Hood had no more than 37,000 men while Sherman had approximately 85,000 men. 

The 89th's division on August 1st had orders to move out at 7 AM.  They were marched to the house that had been used as division headquarters, then ordered to tear down the house and its outbuildings and use the boards to construct breastworks.  On August 3rd, the 89th's brigade was involved in an early morning assault on the enemy's rifle pits.  The advance had been scheduled for 4:30 PM, and proceeded as scheduled.  The enemy was apparently expecting an advance, for the Union men were met by a regular storm of shot, shells, and small arms fire.  The advance failed all along the line.  The 89th lost one man dead (Private David Woosley of Co. G), and four or five men wounded.  Private Nels Christenson of Co. H was among the wounded: a shell fragment pierced his shoulder during the ill-fated advance.

At this point, General Sherman (and his superiors in Washington, DC) desired obvious progress in the contest for Atlanta.  He was noticeably agitated when it wasn't forthcoming- the way he typically expressed agitation was constant nervous pacing.  During this time period, there was much exchanging of rifle and artillery fire.  The rebels on numerous occasions fired their 64-pounder guns, the shells of which sounded in their passage like "the flight of an immense turkey."

On August 6th, Sherman tried to cut one of Hood's remaining rail supply lines by attacking the rebels at Utoy Church, but the attack was unsuccessful.  In spite of setbacks in the ground war, the Union artillery pounding of Atlanta continued with guns large and small.  Sherman here also showed his desire to make something happen.  He had General Thomas send to Chattanooga for two 30-pounder rifled guns and 1,000 shells.  The firing of the guns (at intervals, to keep the incessant bombardment as unpleasant as possible for Atlanta's soldiers and civilians) was kept up day and night.

On August 8th, Corporal William Tomlinson of Co. A was returned to duty (he had been wounded at Pickett's Mill).  The shelling of Atlanta continued.  On August 9th, Union batteries had orders to fire a shell every five minutes.  August 10th and 11th brought daytime lulls in the constant shelling,. although it was resumed each of those evenings and continued into the night.

On August 11th, the rebels received a false report that Sherman planned to attack the rebel left in an attempt to seize the rail line that ran from East Point, Georgia, north to Atlanta.  To counter this supposed threat, a brigade from Loring's division of Stewart's corps was sent to shore up General Cleburne, who anchored the rebel left flank.  Cleburne used these men to extend his line south and east in a fishhook configuration that ringed East Point.  Cleburne's line was too long to be held by the men he had, so while awaiting Sherman's expected attack Cleburne reinforced his line as best he could with artillery and abattis.  But the expected attack never came.

On August 12th, word came to the 89th's brigade that an artillery barrage was to commence shortly.  When it finally began, rebel guns quickly replied.  One shell fell into the 89th's main line- it struck Sergeant Isham Williams squarely and killed him instantly.  Another man near Williams was wounded by shell fragments.  Both men had been lying on the ground when the shell struck.

On August 13th, picket fire killed one brigade member and wounded another.  Shortly after dark, the big Union guns opened fire and kept it up all night.  The artillery barrage caused a fire in Atlanta- the men of the 89th could clearly hear the city's fire bells. 

August 14th was a Sunday, and brought a nice break in the action, although episodic artillery fire did continue.  The day was extremely pleasant- very sunny and cloudless.  On the 15th, a brigade foraging party consisting of two men from each company in the brigade was sent out to commandeer what victuals it could locate. 

The men remained in line on August 16th.  On the 17th, they were given enough ammunition to last two days.  In the afternoon, they were ordered to march to the left in plain sight of the rebels.  Then they were marched back through the woods where (it was hoped) the rebels could not spot the deception.  The brass thought that this might convince the rebels that an attack was eminent on their right flank (the deception was apparently unsuccessful).

Union guns fired at rebel positions at steady intervals on the 18th, while the previous day's deception was again attempted.  It again met with a resounding lack of success.  On August 19th, an advance was attempted on rebel lines.  An artillery barrage and a flurry of small arms fire was unleashed by the Union line in an effort to soften up the rebels, but this effort too was a failure. 

During the evening and night on August 21st, Union pioneers built rifle pits closer to the rebel positions.  Brigade pickets moved into their new positions early in the morning on August 22nd.  Union pickets had not to this point been making use of head logs as did their rebel counterparts.  That afternoon, however, a rebel sharpshooter killed a picket from the 15th Ohio with a Minie bullet to the head.  Union pioneers installed head logs in front of the Union rifle pits that night. 

August 23rd was a quiet Tuesday.  On the 24th, brigade commander Colonel Gibson of the 49th Ohio turned over command of the brigade to Colonel Charles Truman Hotchkiss of the 89th Illinois (Colonel Gibson's term of service had expired).  Colonel Gibson departed on August 25th, after reading a highly complementary address to the assembled brigade.  The men were eating their evening meal later that day when the order came down to be ready to strike the tents and move out once darkness fell.  They were instructed to be as quiet as possible so as not to alert the rebels to the fact that they were pulling out.  The Union pickets would follow shortly thereafter.

The brigade set out about 10:30 PM.  The were marched 2 ½ miles to the right.  Progress was slow, as afternoon downpour had made roads muddy.  The movement was part of Sherman's attempt to break the stalemate by abandoning the siege.  He thought he could seize the two main rail lines that remained open (the Atlanta & West Point Railroad, and the Macon & Western Railroad) somewhere south of Atlanta, thereby forcing Hood to abandon the city by cutting off his last sources of supply.

On the 26th, the men were again on the march, this time moving 14 miles to the right (south and west).  Most of Sherman's army participated in this push to seize Hood's remaining rail lines.  General Howard's Army of the Tennessee made a wide swing south and west, through Sandtown, with Fairburn (a station on the Atlanta & West Point Railroad) as his ultimate objective.

General Thomas and the largest part of the Army of the Cumberland (the 89th was part of Thomas's army) waited on the morning of August 28th while the First and Second Divisions passed their position.  Some men in the 89th's brigade located a quantity of roasting ears of corn that they proceeded to have for lunch.  After waiting all afternoon, the Third Division finally moved out after supper.  The army's destination was Red Oak Station, a stop on the Atlanta & West Point Railroad.

The marchers advanced slowly because of myriad fallen trees in the heavily wooded region.  After advancing about three miles, the men were allowed to stop for the night, although they were ordered to prepare for a sudden enemy assault.  On August 29th, the Second and Third Brigades of the 89th's division were detailed to tear up the Atlanta & West Point Railroad tracks between Fairburn and Red Oak (the 89th was part of the First Brigade).  Their success meant that Hood now had only one supply line left, the Macon & Western Railroad, which ran north through Jonesboro and Lovejoy's Station into Atlanta.

The 89th moved out with its brigade at 6 AM on August 30th.  The men were bound for Jonesboro, their mission to seize the Macon & Western Railroad and tear up the tracks in their vicinity, thus disrupting Hood's last supply line.  A march of three-quarters of a mile brought them to the tracks of the rail line that had been torn up the previous day.  The men detailed for the job had taken their work seriously.  Burning railroad ties had been used to heat up the torn up rails and twist them into unusable shapes.

A day's march along the railroad tracks brought the men to a cornfield near a church, where they were halted.  They were told to dig in, as the enemy was supposed to be nearby.  Needless to say, the men roasted corn for supper.

Hood had up to this point not believed himself to be in any great danger, even though General Hardee (a cool head, indeed) telegraphed him repeatedly about the impending threat to the last rebel supply line.  Hood still thought Sherman's objective was Atlanta itself.  That was true, certainly, but Sherman had realized some time ago that by severing Hood's supply lines he could force Hood to withdraw from Atlanta without needing to order a direct (and costly) assault on the city.

By afternoon on August 30th, Hood was finally convinced that Sherman had his eyes on the Macon & Western Railroad.  Hood still refused to believe, however, that Sherman had not one but two army corps on the march for Jonesboro.  To counter what he still viewed as a dangerous but manageable threat, Hood ordered the corps of S. D. Lee and Hardee south to meet the Union threat to Jonesboro.

Hardee and Lee traveled to their destinations by train, while the men marched to their assignments.  The men set out after dark on the 30th.  They had made it to a point about three miles north of Jonesboro when they encountered entrenched Union troops.  General Cleburne, who was leading Hardee's corps, decided to try and detour around the Union trenches rather than risk a night assault on a force of unknown size and strength.  He knew that he could not survive the loss of his artillery and supply train.  The detour tactic was a success: Cleburne's forward column reached Jonesboro at dawn on August 31st.  S. D. Lee's corps arrived mid-morning on the 31st.

The Union Army marching on Jonesboro arrived in the area on the 30th and 31st.  By early morning on the 31st, most of General Howard's Army of the Tennessee had crossed the Flint River and taken up positions before Jonesboro.  The armies of Generals Thomas and Schofield were positioned northwest of Jonesboro, in readiness to advance on the Macon & Western Railroad tracks between Rough and Ready and Atlanta and tear them up.

Howard's men were positioned approximately ½ mile east of Jonesboro, in an irregular north-south line that roughly paralleled the Atlanta-Fayetteville Road.  The rebels were positioned similarly in a north-south line that lay between Howard's men and the Macon &Western tracks.  S. D. Lee's corps held the northern end of the rebel line, Hardee's corps the southern end.

Hardee had orders from Hood to attack and drive Howard back across the Flint River.  The rebel leadership had little opportunity to examine the potential battleground, because Howard's men were mostly dug in by the time the rebels got there.  The 89th Illinois, meanwhile, had set out with its brigade early on August 31st.  The Union line of march brought some of the men near a hornet's nest, and for a time at least yellow jackets were a bigger problem for the men than gray ones.

Around noon, the men were halted at a point about ½ mile from the Macon & Western tracks.  The 89th's corps connected with General Schofield's right to form a V.  The sides of the V faced in different directions, General Schofield's line being faced towards Atlanta.

Hardee intended to carry out Hood's orders by having Cleburne attack Howard's right (southernmost) flank and turn it.  S. D. Lee's corps would engage Hardee along his center and left (northernmost) flank once Cleburne's assault began.  The attack started about 3:30 PM on August 31st.  Cleburne's corps went forward and almost immediately encountered a brigade of dismounted cavalry guarding a bridge across the Flint River.  This brigade was fairly easily driven back across the river.

In an eerie echo of events at Stones River, some overenthusiastic rebels (actually, several brigades of them) followed the Union cavalry brigade across the bridge.  Cleburne had issued specific orders that none of his men were to cross the river precisely to maintain any momentum gained by his flanking movement. A half-hour was lost while the errant rebels were recalled and Cleburne's line reformed.

Meanwhile, Maney's brigade of Cleburne's corps attempted to continue the flanking movement.  At this point, the lack of rebel reconnaissance came into play.  Just before the Union line was a monster of a gully, approximately ten feet wide and about that deep.  Maney's men (who had been sent forward with fixed bayonets) were ordered to jump into the ditch, an action that would at least get them out of sight of the massed Union guns.  Some did, but some pulled back to a woods and reformed.  Poor Maney, who had been under strict orders to continue the flanking movement, was relieved of his command later that evening (the monster gully had proved a grave of sorts for some of Maney's men and for his military career).

While these events were transpiring, S. D. Lee was readying his own corps.  Lee, on hearing the sounds of a battle in progress, assumed that Cleburne's assault was proceeding as planned and ordered his men to begin their advance on the Union breastworks.  The Union troops positioned on Howard's center and left were not feeling any pressure from the right, of course, because Cleburne's advance had been stalled by the bridge incident and the monster gully.  These troops were thus able to devote their full attention to Lee's men, who were quickly driven back to their lines by a galling Union fire.  For a time it even appeared possible that Howard might send some of his men forward against Lee's line.  Hardee, however, sent Lowrey's brigade of Cleburne's corps to shore up Lee, but Lowrey was recalled once it was clear that Howard would not be advancing.

During this fighting at Jonesboro, Thomas and Schofield were not sitting idly by.  Schofield's men were tearing up the Macon & Western Railroad tracks at Rough and Ready, while part of Thomas's men were tearing up the Macon & Western tracks between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro.  Hood still didn't believe that a huge Union force was massed at or near Jonesboro.  It didn't jibe with his conviction that Atlanta was Sherman's target.  Hood tended to make his plans using the generally incorrect assumption that his opponent was a general much like himself, and Hood's first impulse was always to attack, and then to attack again if the first attack didn't work.  Hood simply put never developed a feel for what Sherman's next move would be (as had General Johnston, the man Hood replaced).

Hood could not be swayed from his belief.  He in fact ordered Hardee to to send him Lee's corps, for he thought that Sherman was preparing to assault Atlanta via East Point.  Hardee had to comply, naturally, even though he knew Lee's departure would leave him unable to resist for long the Union troops massed in the Jonesboro area.

Hardee intended to hold out as long as possible on September 1st, and thus allow Lee's corps at least to escape the Union juggernaut.  Lee's men pulled out that evening, while Hardee's men shifted north in an effort to fill the gap left in the rebel line by Lee's departure.  Hardee's men were yard (in some places two yards) apart.  Thomas's army, meanwhile, had been moving south.  On the morning of September 1st, pioneers from the 89th Illinois's brigade were out early tearing up railroad tracks.  The pioneers had the process down to a fine art.  A section of track was pried up, then the ties stacked and set afire.  The rails were then laid across the fire.  When the rails were sufficiently heated, they were then twisted into fantastic shapes that the rebels would be unable to reverse.

The men were on the march by 8 AM, moving south towards Jonesboro.  Around noon, they stopped near a white house by the railroad tracks.  The men began digging potatoes from the owner's field, and in the process discovered silverware that the owner had buried there.  Some of the men decided to keep this buried treasure, but the officers mad them give it back.  The march was then resumed, and the corps arrived at Jonesboro in time to take part in the Battle of Jonesboro.  When Sherman learned that S. D. Lee's corps had been ordered north, he realized that his men were attacking a single rebel corps.  He ordered Thomas to immediately attack Hardee.

Thomas elected to send in Jefferson C. Davis's 14th Corps to turn Hardee's right flank, while D. S. Stanley was to attack with his 4th Corps once he arrived on the scene.  Davis's initial division went forward at 3 PM on September 1st.  The first assault failed, but Davis sent another division forward after receiving some fresh troops and additional artillery support.  This second assault went forward at 4:45 PM, and was also directed at Hardee's right flank.

The rebels on the right flank (Govan's brigade, the Orphan Brigade, and part of Granbury's Texas Brigade) held their ground gamely, but had to succumb at last to sheer Union numbers.  Part of Govan's brigade and part of the Orphan Brigade were finally forced to surrender, as were several rebel batteries.  Granbury's men (with remnants of Govan's brigade and the Orphan Brigade) fell back about 150 yards and attempted to form a new line.  Cleburne reinforced Granbury with General G. W. Gordon's brigade from the rebel left flank.  Cleburne also rushed additional batteries to the scene and thus prevented the corps of D. S. Stanley from taking Granbury's position. 

Nightfall ended the day's fighting.  Hardee, who had successfully stalled the Union advance, withdrew that night from his positions in Jonesboro.  His new objective was Lovejoy's Station, four miles south of Jonesboro.  While on the march to Lovejoy's Station, Hardee's men heard and felt explosions and saw flames lick the night sky over Atlanta.  This told them that Hood was evacuating Atlanta, and was destroying any munitions and supplies that could not be moved with his army.

Hardee's corps spent the morning of September 2nd constructing breastworks north of Lovejoy's Station.  While Hardee's men were preparing their defenses, the men of the 89th Illinois were again on the march, once again paralleling the Macon & Western Railroad tracks.  At Jonesboro, they saw the ruins of a tannery that had been wrecked during a Union cavalry raid, and an iron Water tower that had been pierced by an artillery shell.

The march continued for eight miles past Jonesboro to Lovejoy's Station.  The 15th Corps was already there, deployed on the right of the railroad tracks.  The 89th's corps deployed to the left of the tracks.  At 3 PM, the 89th's corps was formed up in line of battle.  The order to advance came at 3:30 PM.  With the order to move out came the added instruction to continue the advance against anything save the heaviest opposition imaginable, and to take the enemy's works if at all possible.

The 89th's division advanced along a route that took them through a swampy area and a series of deep ravines.  It took the division an hour-and-a-half to reach the jumping-off point before the enemy's works.  At 5:30 PM, the division was sent forward against enemy's works.  The assault failed to dislodge the rebels, who had had plenty of time to dig in and shore up their defenses.  During the assault General Woods, the 89th's division commander, was shot in the heel. 

This probe of Hardee's line proved to Sherman's satisfaction that only a determined (and bloody) push could dislodge Hardee and his men.  Sherman, therefore, elected to remove to Atlanta, which after all had been his real immediate objective. 

At 6 AM on the morning of September 3rd, the message came down from General Sherman's headquarters: Atlanta was in Union hands!  The men would get some well-deserved rest.  Sherman cabled his superiors in Washington, DC to let them know that Atlanta had fallen, and the gateway to the Deep South was thus in Union hands.  His telegram read as follows:

"So Atlanta is ours, and fairly won!"

Note: I have finished the notes for my account of the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment in the Battle of Nashville, Tennessee (December 15 & 16, 1864).  I plan to write it up and have it on the Web later this year (2006).  That will conclude my account of the wartime career of the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, which has been a 15 year long labor of love.