The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment

The goal of the offensive led by Union Major General William S. Rosecrans in August 1863 was the capture of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Possession of Chattanooga was a necessary first step in any Union action against the Confederate heartland, for Chattanooga was a railway central point, and both Rosecrans and Confederate General Braxton Bragg knew very well of the paramount importance of railroads to modern armies.

Rosecrans had evolved a plan for Chattanooga's capture which involved stealth and deception. Four Union brigades were detailed to make a demonstration upstream from Chattanooga. While Bragg warily observed this Union feint, Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee River in four places well to the south of Chattanooga.

Rosecrans next split his 62,000 man army into three columns, prior to a rapid advance on Chattanooga. In an effort to further distract Bragg, General Burnside was at the same time ordered to march on Knoxville, Tennessee, 100 miles north of Chattanooga. ¹

Bragg, who was outnumbered and well aware of it (he had approximately 50,000 men), withdrew from Chattanooga on September 8th, 1863. He didn't however, elect to flee to Atlanta as Rosecrans had expected (and hoped). Bragg instead settled in with his army near Lafayette, Georgia, and prepared to fight. While he waited for the arrival of reinforcements from Mississippi and Virginia, which would increase his army to a strength of about 65,000 men, Bragg tried and failed on two occasions to defeat isolated portions of Rosecrans' army.

Bragg's actions alerted Rosecrans to the potential dangers of his split columns strategy, who as a consequence ordered his corps commanders to reunite at a point farther north (closer to the relative safety of Chattanooga). General McCook's 20th Corps met up with General Thomas' 14th Corps on September 17th after a punishing march. ²

During this campaign, the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment was part of McCook's Corps, R.W. Johnson's division. The corps had left Tullahoma, Tennessee on August 16th at 4 PM. After marching through Winchester and Salem, Tennessee, it arrived at Bellefonte, Alabama, where the men camped for six days.

Further orders arrived on August 30th. The corps marched up the Tennessee River Road to a point opposite Stevenson, Alabama. On the 31st, it crossed the Tennessee River at Stevenson on a pontoon bridge. Then the men were marched over Sand Mountain to Broomtown Valley, back to Winston and then over Sand Mountain again. From here they were marched along a ridge to Frick's (now Steven's) Gap. They next proceeded to a point opposite the enemy's extreme left. Sixteen days of hard marching had elapsed since the corps left Bellefonte, Alabama. ³

After the corps of Thomas and McCook linked up, they proceeded north along the west bank of Chickamauga Creek. "Chickamauga" means "dwelling place of the Chief" in the language of the Creek Indians, the assertions of so many writers that it means "river of blood" or "river of death" in the Cherokee language notwithstanding (the Chick-amauga Cherokee had in fact chosen as their new home the site of an earlier Creek Indian village). The goal of Thomas and McCook was the 21st Corps of General Thomas Crittenden, which was then located at Lee and Gordon's Mill.

Rosecrans' army now occupied an area bounded by Chickamauga Creek on the east and the foothills of Missionary Ridge to the west. The road from Lafayette, Georgia, to Chattanooga ran through the area, passing by Lee and Gordon's Mill and through Rossville, Georgia. ⁴

Rosecrans was nervous, and ordered Thomas to take up a new position on Crittenden's left flank. Bragg, who mistakenly thought Crittenden was Rosecrans' northernmost corps, sent the bulk of his army to seize downstream crossings over Chickamauga Creek (which was deep enough in most places that it could only safely be crossed at bridges and fords). Bragg hoped to force Rosecrans south, away from the safety of Chattanooga.

Bragg was not aware that Rosecrans had a reserve corps (Major General Gordon Granger's) positioned north of Crittenden and Thomas. Confederate General Bushrod Johnson's division captured Reed's Bridge, which crossed Chickamauga Creek north and slightly to the east of Crittenden's position. The corps of Bragg's generals Buckner and Walker had also crossed Chickamauga Creek, and spent the night of September 18th in the woods east of Lafayette Road. ⁵

The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, in company with its division, spent the night of the 18th opposite the enemy's left flank, positioned approximately 800 yards from the enemy's pickets. ⁶ General Granger sent out a brigade to destroy Reed's Bridge (he didn't know that Bushrod Johnson's men had already crossed the bridge). Granger's men stumbled across Johnson's rear guard near Jay's Mill.

Granger's men thought they had trapped a Confederate brigade on the west side of Chickamauga Creek (they destroyed Reed's Bridge in accordance with General Granger's orders). Brigadier General John Brannan's division was sent by Granger to engage and destroy the enemy "brigade" early in the morning on September 19th.

Brannan's division encountered a rebel Cavalry brigade in the forest west of Jay's Mill. Fighting broke out in an area largely unsuitable for a major Civil War engagement. The land between Lafayette Road on the west and Chickamauga Creek on the east was thickly wooded and uneven ground, with only occasional open fields and farmhouses. Maximum visibility was only 150 yards, much less than the 250 yards effective range of a good marksman using a Springfield rifled musket (in the hands of an expert marksman, the Springfield could deliver a lethal round at two to three times that distance). It would prove nearly impossible for the men to form up and march in good formation under such conditions. ⁷

Bragg decided to use Walker's reserve corps to drive Brannan's division back. Gener-al Walker sent Brigadier General States Rights Gist's division to support the besieged rebel cavalry brigade. General Thomas in turn sent Brigadier General Absalom Baird's division forward to reinforce Brannan. General Walker countered this move by ordering Brigadier General St. John Liddell's division forward to support Gist.

The gunfire from both sides was terrific: trees were methodically stripped of bark and branches as Minie balls coursed from gray line to blue and back again. The fighting in the heavily wooded, uneven area was in the nature of a "big Indian fight", as General Sherman would later characterize the fighting in the north Georgia campaign.

The Confederate cavalry provided the edge necessary to carry the action. Confederate troopers were able to flank the flank the Union line. The Union line finally broke under the strain, and Brannan and Baird and their men fell back to their original positions about a mile east of Lafayette Road. ⁸

Thomas well understood the necessity of retaining control of Lafayette Road, and seriously doubted the ability of Brannan and Baird to hold it without help. He therefore asked Rosecrans for reinforcements. Rosecrans knew Thomas to be a cool head, unlikely to cry wolf at the approach of a mouse. He therefore decided to send the divisions of Brigadier Generals Palmer and R.W. Johnson to support Baird and Brannan. ⁹

The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment was part of R.W. Johnson's division, Brigadier General August Willich's brigade. The brigade was formed into lines as part of the division columns. The 32nd Indiana and 49th Ohio were in the front line, the 15th Ohio and the 89th Illinois in the second line. The 89th Illinois was ordered with the rest of its division to move to the left in support of the XIV Corps commanded by General George Thomas.

The brigade at this point was ordered to lie flat on the ground for almost forty minutes, all the while partially exposed to rebel small arms and artillery fire (five men of the brigade were wounded during this time). Around noon General Willich received the order to advance on the enemy troops to their front. Willich ordered the men to fix bayonets, and the brigade bugler then sounded, "Forward!" The men proceeded at double-time, and managed to advance almost a mile. Company C of the 89th Illinois (Captain Henry Rowell's Cook County Company) captured the gun of a rebel battery during this advance (a 6-pounder Parrott). Willich later wrote with pride,

"The charge was executed in splendid order, and with such energy that everything was swept before it for about a mile." ¹⁰

Confederate General Bragg sensed the potential for a rout, and hurriedly ordered the division of General Cheatham (a hard fighter and, some said, a hard drinker) forward. Cheatham's men were able to halt the Union advance, at which point there began a furious clash of arms in the forest near Lafayette Road, with the trees serving both to protect the men and to obscure their knowledge of what was happening in other parts of the forest. Under such conditions officers were superfluous: it was more a contest of small groups and individuals than a clash of divisions, or even of brigades. The Confederate attempt to flank the Union left had become a furious frontal assault. ¹¹

The three companies on the 89th's right were now fired on by a rebel battery only fifty yards away. It was at this point that Captain Rice of Company A, Captain Spink of Company D, and Lieutenants Ellis (Company B) and Warren (Company E) were killed. Major William D. Williams witnessed firsthand the destructiveness of this fire coming from the right, calling it "...murderous discharges of grape and canister." ¹² Also present at this scene was Sergeant Isaac K. Young of Company H, who later wrote of it:

"Men cheer, but in that awful roar the voice of a man cannot be heard ten feet away. Men fall to the right and left. The line stumbles over corpses as it hurries on. There are flashes in the smoke cloud, terrible explosions in the air, and men are stepped on or leaped over as they throw up their arms and fall upon the grass and scream in the agony of mortal wounds." ¹³

To counter the fire of this battery, Lt. Colonel Duncan Hall ordered the regiment to fall back about 20 yards, firing as they withdrew (Colonel Hotchkiss was on detached duty at the time of this battle).

Brigadier Willich came forward at this moment to calm the regiment, and to instruct them in the best way to advance while maintaining their alignment with the rest of the brigade. According to Major Williams, General Willich

"...by his own inimitable calmness of manner restored order and confidence in the regiment, and after dressing them and drilling them in the manual of arms for a short time, ordered them to advance about 30 paces to the edge of an open space. They did so in good order; lay down and kept the enemy in check for the next two hours." ¹⁴

The Union reinforcements had managed to stall Cheatham's advance, and were actually slowly pushing him back. Bragg decided to send the division of Major General Alexander P. "Old Straight" Stewart north to support Cheatham. Stewart was not pleased by the order. It was characteristically vague about where Stewart was to go and what he was to do. He asked Bragg to be more precise, but the irregular terrain, smoke, and general din of the ongoing battle left Bragg unable to be very specific about his desires. Bragg suggested that Stewart contact General Polk, who might have more concrete knowledge of field conditions.

Stewart, who never did manage to contact General Polk, set out in disgust around 1430 hours. After a hard march north around Hood's men, he ordered an advance westward toward the sound of the guns. Because of his lack of knowledge about conditions on the battlefield, Stewart did not manage to move his division far enough north. He was nearly one mile south of the position Bragg really wanted him in, head-to-head with the resting division of Brigadier General H. P. Van Cleve on the Union center. ¹⁵

Van Cleve's men were finally at rest after two days of hard marching to reach their current position. Just about the last thing they desired or were expecting was a rapidly advancing rebel division. The imprecision of Bragg's orders had finally engendered a positive result: a Confederate division in the right place at the right time. Van Cleve grimly attempted to rally his division, but Stewart had the double advantage of surprise and momentum. His men simply rolled up Van Cleve's stunned and exhausted division.

Stewart's advance carried him all the way across Lafayette Road. He had not only managed to punch a huge hole in the Union center: he was actually in sight of the log cabin General Rosecrans and his staff were using as their headquarters. Thomas was made aware of the immanent collapse of the Union center, and hurriedly sent Brannan's division south to worry at the right flank of the advancing rebel line. ¹⁶

By a stroke of extreme good luck, two divisions Thomas earlier separated from his corps were rapidly advancing on Thomas' position. The division of Major General John J. Reynolds was in the lead, followed at a distance of about a mile by the division General Negley. Both divisions had just arrived on the scene when Stewart's men rolled over Van Cleve's division.

The men under Reynolds and Negley were ordered to face right and advance against Stewart's men. Reynolds and Negley were head-to-head against Stewart, while Brannan's men had position on the right flank of the rebel line. The combination was too great for the rebels to long endure, so they began a grudging withdrawal, continuing to fire as they fell back. They retreated to a position in the woods about a half-mile east of Lafayette Road. They were then able to reform and establish an effective defense against further Union advances. Negley, Reynolds, and Brannan also fell back a bit, content for the moment to have stopped Stewart and to have reestablished the Union line in time to avert disaster. ¹⁷

Stewart, it will be remembered, had to march his division around Hood's men to get to the position he thought he was expected to occupy. Hood's men stood idle while Stewart's men nearly collapsed the Union line. If Hood had been able to advance with his two divisions (and Buckner with his one division) while Stewart's assault was in progress, he might have been able to break Crittenden's line and catch the divisions of Reynolds and Negley while they were still in line of march (and thus vulnerable to attack).

Hood, however, received no orders from Bragg. Bragg was wont to form a plan of battle and stick to it no matter what: let the unexpected happen and Bragg was like "a duck that had been hit on the head" (as Lincoln of say of Rosecrans after Chickamauga). Bragg was slow to react, and loathe to alter a course of action once it was set in motion.

At about 4 PM, still without orders but aware of heavy fire from Stewart's position, Hood formed his divisions in line of battle and headed them westward, toward the sound of the guns. His men emerged from the woods near Lafayette Road, about a mile south of Stewart's former position. ¹⁸

In another of the quirks of fate which followed both Bragg and Rosecrans during this battle like stray puppies, Hood's men emerged from the trees across Lafayette Road from the single division of Union Major General Jefferson Davis of McCook's corps. Davis' men had no help on either side. Hood's men outnumbered them 2-1, and used their numbers to good advantage, spreading out and flanking Davis on his left flank. Davis' line was next enfiladed by rebel small arms fire, and collapsed more or less spontaneously.

Davis' division melted away into the woods on the west side of Lafayette Road, leaving a huge hole in the Union line for the second time that day. The onrushing rebels pursued the fleeing Union division, and again came in sight of the log cabin being used as his headquarters by Rosecrans. Victory was again within Bragg's grasp (luck rarely smiled so frequently on a man so ill-inclined to make good use of good fortune). ¹⁹

The divisions of Buckner and Hindman were within earshot of Hood's advancing men, but neither general had orders from Bragg, and neither man was willing to act without orders and thus risk Bragg's ire. It was probably Bragg's greatest failing: he was not himself capable of improvisation, and his icy demeanor and notorious temper discouraged those of his generals with the slightest gift for it. ²⁰

Bragg in the meantime had decided that he needed to bolster his right wing (Polk's). He therefore pulled General Pat Cleburne's division from Hill's corps and ordered Cleburne to the right to support Polk. Cleburne's men waded across the icy, chest-high waters of Chickamauga Creek. On reaching the west bank of the creek, it was obvious to Cleburne that Hood and his men were engaged in a fierce struggle straight ahead. But Cleburne, like Hindman and Buckner, decided to obey orders rather than risk Bragg's displeasure. He therefore proceeded northward to carry out his assignment to support Polk. Another rebel chance for victory was therefore lost because of Bragg's well-known dislike of independent thinkers. ²¹

Rosecrans, meanwhile, was saved from complete disaster by yet another quirk of fate. The divisions of Brigadier Generals T. J. Wood and Phil Sheridan just happened to be marching north to rejoin their parent corps when Hood's men came surging across Lafayette Road. Wood's men were in position to enfilade Hood's unsupported left flank (this is why the addition of Cleburne's division would probably have made all the difference). But Cleburne's men were not there to support his advance, so Hood had to halt his left flank and realign it to face the threat posed by the enfilading fire. This meant that his entire line had to halt, of course, so as to avoid being flanked themselves.

The delay necessary for a rebel realignment allowed Union General Jefferson Davis to rally his men and rejoin the fight. It also gave Sheridan's division time to reach the scene and deploy for action. The additional Union troops managed to drive Hood's men back across Lafayette Road. ²²

In the meantime, Cleburne's division finally reached Polk's position. Cleburne was immediately ordered up to replace Walker's exhausted division. At this point, many Union men felt that the rebels had played out their hand for the day, and that further attacks were unlikely. Thomas disagreed, however, and warned his division commanders to beware.

The sun had nearly disappeared from sight when Cleburne's men surged out of the dark woods and forward across Lafayette Road. Cheatham's division was right behind Cleburne's. The rebels were sounding their eerie yell, and were pouring a heavy fire into the Union line. ²³ The 89th Illinois (in company with its brigade) was forced by the weight of the attack to give ground, fighting fiercely as they retreated. General Willich said of this time in his official report,

" With dusk the attack looked for took place. The enemy had succeeded in bringing his batteries and masses of infantry into position. A shower of canister and columns of infantry streamed at once into our front and both flanks. My two front regiments were swept back into the second line." ²⁴

Cleburne's twilight attack was also the subject of a paper read to the Colorado Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States 33 years after the battle by Ebenezer T. Wells, who had witnessed the attack as aide to division commander Major General Richard W. Johnson (Wells had previously been Captain of Company F, 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment):

"Here we remained, receiving and replying to a sharp skirmish fire until past six of the evening, when, being then under orders to retire to the general line of battle, the enemy, having brought up Cleburne's division and deployed it upon our left, with Cheatham's division in our front, fell upon us with indescribable fury. The Confederate artillery filled the woods with their bursting shells, which in the twilight made the skies seem like a firmament of pestilential stars. Our line resisted stoutly, but, overwhelmed by superior numbers and overreached by both flanks, the advance fell back in part to the second line, while the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, of the first line, was lapped up like a drop of oil under a flame." ²⁵

Thomas' two flank divisions were pushed back by Cleburne's division, while his center did a somewhat better job of holding its position. The rebel assault had thus bent the Union line into a horseshoe shape, but did not break it.

Cleburne's men (and those of Cheatham), however, were at the last both outnumbered on the field and insufficiently supported by artillery. The assault should probably not have been ordered: it was Bragg's last desperate attempt of the day to stick to a plan that had at a very few points during the day gone according to plan. Cleburne's men suffered much the same fate that Hood's had earlier in the day. ²⁶ General Willich had this to say about the response of his brigade to Cleburne's assault:

"My two front regiments were swept back into the second line. This line for a moment came into disorder. Then they received the command, 'Dress on your colors;' repeated by many men and officers; and in no time the four regiments formed one solid line, sending death into the enemy's masses, who immediately fell back from the front, and did not answer with a single round." ²⁷

The first day's fighting ended at that time. Night fell, and the Georgia ground was soon covered with frost. Random firing continued until 11 PM, when it finally ceased. After dark, Willich had his men fall back from their position to make contact with the brigades on his flanks, which put the 89th Illinois in almost the same spot from which it had begun its final fighting of this day. The regiment (and its brigade) had been severely tested, but its line had held fast against everything the rebels threw against it.²⁸

Whether the blue line could hold fast a second day was up to men like Private Charles Capron of Company A, 89th Illinois Infantry. Chickamauga was Capron's first experience of battle (he had been a soldier for barely one month when the battle began, and was on September 19th one week shy of his 18th birthday). ²⁹Once night had fallen and the moon held sway, Capron carefully picked his way through a field of blue and gray clad bodies. As he explained later in a letter to his mother,

"I took a stroll over the part of the battlefield that our brave boys had been over and to see the ground strewed with the dead and to hear the cries of the wounded was heartrending indeed to me as I never witnessed a battle field before." ³⁰

Bragg attempted that evening to plot a strategy capable of forging a rebel victory the following day (September 20th, 1863). He was well aware that lack of coordination and communications between elements of his army had been a problem. His solution: organize the army into two wings. The right wing would consist of five divisions, and be commanded by General Polk, while the right wing would consist of six divisions, and be commanded by General Longstreet (who was expected to arrive very shortly from Virginia).

While this plan required some confused night-time shifting of men and materials, it was not necessarily a bad plan. It became a bad plan when Bragg decided to use this new organization of his army to attempt to carry out his original plan: to outflank the enemy's left and drive it in, so that Rosecrans would have no choice except to seek out the shelter of McLemore's Cove, where it could be pinned in on all sides by the combination of the mountainous terrain and Bragg's advancing army.

Bragg's plan would involve putting the weakest portion of his own army up against the strongest segment of Rosecrans' line. But Bragg was no Lee, and would not have attempted something really audacious, such as a shift of his entire army northward in a desperate gamble to cut the bulk of Rosecrans' army off from its supply line to Chattanooga. Bragg was never one to gamble. ³¹

Having elected to stick with his original plan, Bragg next did the unthinkable. After issuing verbal instructions to Polk (and the typical imprecision of Bragg's verbal orders has already been remarked upon), Bragg promptly went to sleep. No written orders of any kind were executed before he did so. No instructions of any sort were sent to rebel corps commanders. Longstreet, who was to command the left wing of Bragg's army, had not yet arrived on the scene, but he was in the area. His train had arrived the afternoon of the 19th, but he and his staff had to wait for a later train that carried their horses. Incredibly, Bragg hadn't sent a staff officer to meet Longstreet, the man who would the next day be commanding one-half of his army.

By the time their horses arrived, it was almost dark. Longstreet and two of his staff officers rode off at twilight to try and find Bragg's headquarters. In the darkness, they almost rode into Union lines. The picket who challenged their approach identified his unit by number rather than by name of its commander, however, and Longstreet and his aides immediately knew that they were in danger. They rode away in the darkness before the picket realized they were Confederate officers.

Longstreet finally found Bragg (who had to be awakened), and learned that he was command the left wing of Bragg's army the next day on a battlefield that he had never seen in daylight. Possibly overwhelmed by the enormity of his situation, Longstreet then went to bed without having issued orders of any kind to his two corps commanders. ³²

Bishop Polk also failed to properly prepare his wing for battle. An enlisted messenger sent to inform D.H. Hill of Polk's plans both failed to find Hill and failed to inform Polk of his failure. Polk in turn acceded to Breckinridge's request to allow his men to stop and rest a mile and a half short of their assigned position in Polk's battle line (even though it was Breckinridge's men who were slated to be the first division of Polk's wing to attack the next morning, and Bragg's plan for a continuous wave of attacks all along the rebel line meant that successive divisions could not go forward until Breckinridge's division had done so). Polk even neglected to inform Breckinridge that his division would be leading the next morning's planned assault. ³³

This rebel tragicomedy of errors and omissions should have boded well for the Union Army, but did not. Rosecrans was worried about his left, even though it was his center that had almost given way twice during the day's fighting. Rosecrans held a conference of his corps commanders that night (as Bragg inarguably should have done) where he sought the honest opinions of attendees.

It was perhaps not the best of times to solicit advice. McCook and Crittenden were still smarting from the pushes against the Union center, and were not inclined to refocus the attention of their volatile commander on their failures. It was Thomas, then, who was most vocal that night, and he quite naturally counseled Rosecrans to "strengthen the left."

Nobody was counseling retreat. To attempt to do so at night was exceedingly dangerous: transporting a train of supply wagons at night would leave the army stretched out and vulnerable to attack in detail. On the other hand, nobody was counseling a Union attack, either. For once, the rebels outnumbered their Union counterparts, and everybody knew it. The Union Army had already been badly handled (and had been delivered from disaster twice by a combination of poor rebel communications and coordination, and sheer dumb luck).

Rosecrans finally elected to shorten the Union line and concentrate what forces he had. McCook was shifted northward somewhat (the 89th Illinois Infantry was part of McCook's corps), and bivouacked for the night at a position near the one it had occupied that afternoon. Crittenden's men were pulled from the line, to be used as a reserve for the Union center or left (as circumstances dictated). ³⁴

Thomas, who had had his men hard at work constructing breastworks, arrived back at his headquarters to find an urgent message from Baird. Baird, who'd been ordered to extend his left flank north to the road from Reed's Bridge, told Thomas that he couldn't do so without stretching himself so thin that he would be easy prey for a determined rebel push. Thomas agreed, and asked Rosecrans to send Negley's division north so that the Union left could be safely extended to the Reed's Bridge Road. Rosecrans gave his consent. ³⁵

The ground was draped in a gray haze on the morning of September 20th. The haze was part morning fog, part lingering gunsmoke from the previous day's struggle, and part smoke from numerous fires set by sparks the previous day. 36 Bragg and Rosecrans were both up early on the 20th. Rosecrans rode along Thomas' line, for both he and Thomas were certain that Thomas' line was to be Bragg's main target this day. ³⁷ Bragg, too, was up early, waiting for the assault he had ordered which failed to materialize. He sent a messenger to Polk to see what was holding things up. Polk, who had by now learned that his enlisted courier had never made contact with D. H. Hill, decided not to gamble that Hill could be found. He therefore sent messengers to contact Hill's division commanders (Cleburne and Breckinridge) directly.

Hill (by one of those quirks of fate which simply abounded during this battle) was talking to Cleburne and Breckinridge when Polk's courier arrived. A supply snafu had prevented the feeding of many of Breckinridge's men for several days. Breckinridge didn't wish to attack until the men had been fed. Hill, who was alarmed by the breast-works which had been thrown up by Thomas' men, agreed. ³⁸

A note was sent to Polk informing him of the delay. Hill added that he felt Thomas' breastworks were so strong that they might be breachproof. Polk received the note while reading a newspaper, and was still reading it when a courier from Bragg rode up. When informed of the incident, Bragg was furious, and set out personally to upbraid Polk.

Polk found out that Bragg was on the way, and finally set out for himself to see if there was a way to get Hill moving. He left a message for Bragg, who then set off himself to find Hill (and did so before Polk did). Bragg demanded to know why Hill had not yet attacked. Hill was able to truthfully reply that he had not as yet received a firm order to do so. Bragg then and there ordered Hill to attack. Hill obeyed orders, but saw to it that his division commanders carefully (and slowly) aligned their men for the attack. By the time Hill's men were ready to proceed, it was approximately 9 AM (three hours after Bragg had wanted the initial assault to begin). ³⁹

Thomas, meanwhile, was continuing to prepare for the attack he knew was coming. He was still fretting about being flanked by the rebels. Negley's division had not yet arrived to bolster Thomas' left, as Rosecrans had promised earlier. Rosecrans, who had himself ordered Negley to move his men north to help Thomas, rode off to see why Negley had not yet set out as ordered.

Rosecrans was incensed when he arrived at Negley's position and discovered that Negley and his men had not yet moved an inch. Negley told Rosecrans that he was waiting for McCook's men to arrive and fill the mile-wide gap that his departure would create in the Union line. ⁴⁰

Rosecrans rode off again, this time to tell Crittenden to send Wood's division forward so that Negley could carry out his order to extend Thomas's line. Rosecrans then left Crittenden, and rode north to find McCook and inspire him to get moving.

While looking for McCook, Rosecrans again approached Negley's position, and again observed that Negley had not yet moved. Rosecrans ordered Negley to go ahead and send one brigade to help Thomas. Then Rosecrans rode off in a fury, looking for Wood.

Wood's division had not yet moved an inch when Rosecrans rode up. Rosecrans proceeded to verbally upbraid the embarassed Kentuckian in front of his acutely uncomfortable staff. ⁴¹

Wood was in the act of taking Negley's place in line when gunfire broke out to the north. Hill's assault had finally begun. The breastworks along most of Thomas's line were well-prepared. ⁴² Willich's brigade (of which the 89th Illinois was part) was in reserve that morning, stationed behind two brigades in breastworks which had been constructed during the night at General Thomas' insistence. When the popping of rebel musket fire announced the beginning of Hill's attack, Willich was ordered by division commander General Richard S. Johnson to

"...engage the enemy immediately in our front. I obeyed, and advanced the Eighty-Ninth Illinois and the Thirty-Second Indiana over the lines, not engaged, up to the skirmishers, with whom they mixed, and helped drive back the charging enemy. Feeling sure that the enemy would fall on our flank, I ordered the Fifteenth Ohio back to the support of the battery, where they arrived in the brink of time, the enemy advancing in triple lines on the flank toward the rear. The battery had changed front, and Captain Goodspeed poured double-shotted canister into the enemy, who left some of his dead 50 yards in front of the battery." ⁴³

Private Capron of Company A, 89th Illinois, also remembered that morning's action in a letter to his mother written almost a year later:

"At 9 o'clock while we was laying on our arms the ball opened in earnest by the rebels chargeing one of our batteries the brazen mouthed dogs was once more let loose from their quietude of which they had hardly cooled off from the use of the previous day and once more the hills and mountains was awakened from their slumbers by the heavy roar of artillery but the bugle sounded for us to fall in and charge the rebels which we did and drove them back." ⁴⁴

The attack on that part of Thomas' line stalled. But his two northernmost brigades (Johnson's and the first of Negley's brigades) had not yet had time to throw up adequate breastworks. The two northernmost rebel brigades (Breckinridge's) were therefore able to make rapid progress against the poorly protected Union defenders. The Union men fell back in confusion, and Breckinridge's men reached Lafayette Road. They then turned south to fall upon Thomas's unprotected flank.

Disaster might have quickly ensued for the Union cause if not for the quick thinking of Thomas and Rosecrans. Thomas desperately ordered one of Brannan's brigades to move north to stave off the advancing rebels. Rosecrans had (at the first sign of the attack) sent one of Van Cleve's brigades north to help Thomas. Thomas sped these reinforcements north to augment Brannan's brigade. In the meantime, the brigades of Johnson and Negley had regained their composure and rejoined the battle. They were soon joined by Negley's remaining two brigades. This new concentration of firepower broke the rebel advance and drove them back across Lafayette Road.

The remainder of Breckinridge's division had spent the morning futilely attempting to advance across open ground against Thomas's sturdy breastworks. During these attempts, rebel General Ben Helm (President Lincoln's brother-in-law) had been killed at the head of his brigade. ⁴⁵

Cleburne's division (positioned directly south of Breckinridge) also advanced across open ground, and also suffered grievously at the hands of Thomas's well-prepared men. Part of the problem facing Cleburne this day was the fact that Polk, his commanding officer, had failed to inform him that his troops were to take part in an assault for the second day in a row, rather than be held in reserve as he might have expected. His men, therefore, had not been formed up and prepared for battle as they would have been in Cleburne had received adequate notice. His men, however, though unable to take the Union position assigned them, did manage to keep up a steady fire that prevented Thomas from sending any more masses of men north. ⁴⁶

Polk meanwhile sent Cheatham's division forward to support Hill. Cheatham's men also advanced bravely, but were moving across open ground against dug-in Union troops. The Union fire raked Cheatham's line as it advanced. Cheatham's men walked bent forward, as if they were walking against a strong headwind and not a deadly wall of Union shot and shell.

As Cheatham's men fell back, the divisions of Gist and St. John Liddell went forward. These too advanced across open ground against well-constructed Union breastworks. The result was the same: brave rebel soldiers' lives wasted in a series of hopeless assaults on well-nigh impregnable Union positions.

Polk by now realized that Bragg's plan was not working. The Union line's weakness was its far-left flank, and that was where an assault might succeed. But Polk did not dare to alter Bragg's plan on his own initiative, or even dare to suggest to the still-fuming Bragg an alternative plan. ⁴⁷

The right wing under Polk had now attacked all along its line. It was now the turn of the rebel left wing, under Longstreet's command. Longstreet's assault commenced with Stewart's division. Stewart's division had the misfortune to advance against the southern-most section of Thomas's sturdy line. Thomas's men behind their well-constructed breastworks were able to bring massive amounts of fire to bear on Stewart's men, who were advancing across open ground. Here as elsewhere on this morning, brave rebel soldiers were chewed up by sheets of Union lead. ⁴⁸

Stewart's assault did accomplish one objective, however: it worried Thomas, and reinforced his conviction that Bragg planned to unleash the bulk of his army on Thomas's third of the Union line. Thomas's fears also played on Rosecrans' mind as well. Rosecrans feared most of all being flanked on his left (northernmost) flank. A successful rebel flanking movement would not only enfilade Rosecrans' line, it would cut him off from his supply line to Chattanooga. Rosecrans therefore ordered McCook to send two of Sheridan's brigades north to help Thomas, and told him to send Sheridan's last brigade north after the division still in line (Davis's) had expanded its frontage to temporarily fill the gap left by Sheridan's departure.

Rosecrans sent out two of his aides to inspect the Union line, to make sure that all was in order. The aides did not notice the two brigades of John Brannan, which were well-concealed in a dense growth of woods. Rosecrans' aides saw only what appeared to them to be a gap between the divisions of Reynolds and Wood, and reported this "fact" to Rosecrans.

Rosecrans was thoroughly alarmed by this news. He'd been certain that he'd thought of everything. He fired off an order to Wood to fill the "gap" as quickly as possible. Wood was thoroughly confused by the order. He knew of Brannan's brigades, and knew of no gap to fill there. Rosecrans was, however, the very man who had recently raked Wood over the coals in front of his aides. Wood can hardly be blamed for deciding to attempt to obey Rosecrans' order in spite of its seeming irrationality. Wood therefore did as instructed, and pulled out of line in order to go in search of a "gap" that hadn't existed but now did. ⁴⁹

Before pulling out of line, Wood told McCook of his unusual orders. McCook assured Wood that he would cover the gap by shifting Davis (who was already covering Sheridan's withdrawal from line) still further to the left.

Wood still had a problem. He was supposed to fill a "gap" to his immediate left, yet there was no such gap to fill. He therefore did the only thing he logically could: he fell back, marched around Brannan's brigades, and attempted somehow to link up with Reynolds in such a way as to fulfill Rosecrans' command. ⁵⁰

Before Wood found Reynolds, however, he found Thomas. Thomas was surveying his line, and was thunderstruck (but delighted) to encounter an idle division. Thomas told Wood there was no gap to fill near Reynolds: he could, however, use help on his extreme left flank (northernmost point of the Union line).

Wood readily acceded to Thomas's suggestion, but was still wary of incurring Rosecrans' wrath. He asked Thomas to accept responsibility for the alteration of Rosecrans' order. Thomas thought it a small price to pay for a full division, and readily agreed. ⁵¹

Longstreet, meanwhile, was not standing idle. He was thoroughly disgusted by Bragg's penchant for attacking in unsupported and uncoordinated fashion. He therefore had Hood "stack" his divisions (four of them: nearly 16,000 men) along an attack frontage about a half-mile in length.

As one might have expected in the two-day tragicomedy of error and circumstance that was the Battle of Chickamauga, Longstreet had by a combination of long experience and sheer dumb luck chosen to "stack" Hood's men opposite the weakest point in Rosecrans' line. Hood's men were exactly opposite the point where Brannan's brigades linked up with Davis's northernmost brigade: it was, of course, the exact spot just vacated by Wood's division. The lead rebel brigade (Bushrod Johnson's) encountered minimal resistance as they ran right over Wood's vacant breastworks.

The headlong rush of Johnson's rebels brought them into contact with Wood's rear brigade, which was marching northwards to join Thomas. Johnson's sudden appearance sent Wood's men flying to the four winds. Johnson's rebels had advanced so quickly, however, that they had to pause to realign. A stand of Union cannon was deployed about a half-mile further west. The cannon opened fire on Johnson's men. Hood rode up and told Johnson to go ahead and take the guns, which Johnson's men did easily. ⁵²

Hindman's rebel division, meanwhile, also surged forward against minimal resistance. They caught Sheridan's two lead brigades marching to join Thomas, and Davis's men in the act of shifting to cover the gap left by Wood's departure.

Davis' men couldn't hope to stand against the great gray tide, and so they advanced to the rear with all deliberate speed. Their wild rush through the ranks of Sheridan's men prevented those troops from forming up to counter Hindman's advance. Some of Sheridan's men as a consequence joined Davis' men in their rush for the rear. ⁵³

It was in this way that Rosecrans' center collapsed. Those who wanted to stand and fight could see that such an effort would be akin to throwing a blade of grass into a hurricane. The gap in the federal line continued to widen as Hood's divisions rushed through it into a field near the Dyer place. Panicking Union troops on both sides of the gap ran for the rear, anxious to avoid being enfiladed by the rebels who were then flanking them.

The rebel advance approached Rosecrans' position to the rear of Davis' division. Rosecrans (a devout Catholic) crossed himself and told his staff they had better get away if they cared "to live any longer." To a man, they fled for the safety of Chattanooga. Poor Rosecrans, who thought he'd allowed for sudden shifts of fortune, must have felt as if the very ground had opened beneath him. The armchair generals in Washington, D.C., would be clamoring for someone's head after this debacle, and old Rosey knew full well whose neck would be on the block. ⁵⁴

Luckily for the Union Army of the West, not everyone had joined the headlong flight north to Chattanooga. Two federal brigades (plus bits and pieces of other units) rallied at a place known as Horseshoe Ridge. Horseshoe Ridge (also known as Snodgrass Hill) was a heavily wooded rise northwest of the break in the federal line. At this point, General George Thomas was the ranking Union Army officer on the battlefield, as Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had all joined the headlong rush back to Chattanooga. Lincoln would later say of Rosecrans' evacuation of the Chickamauga battlefield that he had acted "like a duck that had been hit on the head." ⁵⁵

The 89th Illinois had begun the day as part of the Union left. With its brigade, it had advanced in support of the 3rd brigade, which had been engaged by some of Longstreet's advancing men. The 89th Illinois and the 32nd Indiana moved straight towards the enemy, while the 49th Ohio and the 15th Ohio were obliqued to the left. After a fierce exchange of gunfire, the rebel advance was momentarily checked.

The brigade was then ordered to lie down, and remained in that position for the next two hours. At that point, General Willich was ordered to act as support for Goodspeed's Battery, which was located at the northwest corner of a large field (called locally Kelly's Field). The cannoneers of Goodspeed's Battery were cutting bloody swathes through the rebel ranks with every discharge of their guns. It was here, during an exchange of small arms and artillery fire (apparently with Hindman's advancing division), that Lt. Colonel Duncan Hall of the 89th Illinois was mortally wounded by a Minie ball which passed completely through his abdomen. ⁵⁶ Private Charles Capron of Company A, 89th Illinois, who observed the scene, later wrote:

"Maintained our ground till noon when we was ordered to support the Ohio battery [Goodspeed's] it was there that our Lieutenant Colonel was killed by a sharp shooter I saw him when he fell several sprang to his aid and bore him off the field they did not charge our battery as we expected but on our right and left we could hear the heavy roar of musketry and the deep tone cannon told us they was dealing death and destruction elsewhere as well as in our front but our battery had expended all but one round of ammunition and we received orders to fall back which we did while the battery gave them the last round they had and then pulled off from the field as soon as dark came we took up our line of retreat toward Chattanooga." ⁵⁷

Lt. Colonel Hall had to be left lying on the ground, mortally wounded, as the 89th Illinois fell back with the brigade from the advancing rebels. One of the approaching rebels was Captain Benjamin Abbott, aide to General Henry Benning of Georgia. Abbott later wrote of his experience:

"Around us the enemy's dead and wounded lay very thick. I walked among them, while we waited for orders. I came upon a young officer and found he was mortally wounded and suffering very much. I saw at once he would die and asked if I could do anything for him. He replied, 'I am dying. Wash me clean and bury me decently.' I promised him all I could under the circumstances and asked his name. His answer was, 'Lt. Colonel D. J. Hall of Chicago.' I had him moved in the hut and in less than an hour he died. As far as I could, I complied with his request and marked his grave with a board on which I carved his name with my knife."

"In my own heart before the battle I felt very bitter against these men who had invaded our soil, as I believe against every principle of right, and yet in the hour of victory we soldiers were touched with pity for these wounded and dying enemies. It was not the place to discuss right and wrong: it was simply a question of humanity." ⁵⁸

On Lt. Colonel Hall's death, command of the 89th Illinois passed to Major William D. Williams (Colonel Hotchkiss was away on recruiting duty in Illinois). The brigade then joined with the rest of Johnson's division at Horseshoe Ridge, where the 89th was detailed to continue acting as support for Goodspeed's battery. ⁵⁹

The two brigades which first made a stand at Horseshoe Ridge were Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division, and Wilder's brigade. Lytle was soon shot dead, and his brigade then joined the northwards stream of blue uniforms. Wilder's brigade remained. They were armed with Spencer repeating rifles, and were able to make the rebels pay attention. Wilder's men were situated on the southern edge of Hindman's division (Hindman's left flank). The furious fire of Wilder's brigade stung Hindman's southernmost brigade, and drove it back across Lafayette Road.

Longstreet was ready for any reverses, and had a reserve division (Preston's) ready to support the assault. A brigade was sent forward to take up the slack, and Wilder's men were slowly pushed back. At this point, Brannan's men emerged from the cover of the woods, and began firing on the right flank of the rebel advance. Three rebel brigades had to oblique to face Brannan's two brigades. Brannan's men quickly apprehended the numerical disadvantage which they now faced. To their credit, however, they didn't then skedaddle, as had so many others in the Union Army that day. Instead, they refused themselves to Reynolds' brigade, joining his extreme right at a 90 degree angle. ⁶⁰

The rebels of Law's division were meanwhile surging westward, scattering a surprised brigade of Van Cleve's division. Next they encountered Colonel Charles Harker's brigade. Harker, though a young man, was a West Pointer with fairly extensive combat experience. He formed up his men and advanced against Law's dumbfounded division.

The furious fire of Harker's brigade swept along Law's naked right flank. Law's advance stalled in the withering crossfire. Hood had come up at this point and noticed that the advance was being momentarily repelled. As he rode among his men, demanding that they stand and fight, a Minie ball tore into his thigh. Hood, who had already lost the use of an arm to federal bullets, fell from his horse.

His exhortations to continue the advance had evidently inspired Law's men, however, for they changed gears and moved back into the fight. Supported by two of Kershaw's brigades, they finally managed to force Harker's brigade to fall back. ⁶¹

Thomas' line still held firm to the north, but most of the federal center and right were halfway to Chattanooga. Longstreet's men seemed to become confused: things were going too well, and not in the way Bragg's plan had predicted. The breakthrough in the Union line should have been Polk's, not Longstreet's.

Quick-thinking Longstreet had already considered his options. He could pursue the fleeing third of Rosecrans' army and possibly destroy it. That, however, would leave Polk's wing of the rebel army poised against the remaining portion of the Union army, which was now led by General George Thomas.

Longstreet, therefore, approached Bragg with a plan to turn his men to the north and engage Thomas' southernmost flank (Thomas' right), while Polk engaged his center and left. To Longstreet's consternation, Bragg would have none of it. Far from being happy about the collapse of the southern third of the Union line, Bragg viewed the day's struggle as a rebel defeat (!) because the fight had not gone according to his blueprint. He refused Longstreet's request for some of Polk's men: he bitterly told Longstreet there wasn't "any fight" in his army's right wing. ⁶²

While Bragg sulked and refused to act, Thomas rallied his men and the men from other commands who had joined him. Thomas was well-liked by his men. They called him "Old Pap," even though Thomas, like most high Union army commanders, was in his early forties during the Civil War (but, then, two-thirds of Union army soldiers were 22 years old or younger at the time they enlisted). Thomas wasn't afraid of a fight, although he hated incurring unnecessary casualties. He had figured out early on in the war that the new breed of small arms called for a new style of warfare. He embraced early on the philosophy of "dig in and build up," and thousands of his soldiers lived to be old men because of it. ⁶³

Thomas was worried about his right flank. Brannan was positioned there, supported by single brigades of Wood, Negley, and Van Cleve. Thomas commanded a brigade each of Generals Palmer and Johnson to further strengthen Brannan. Because Brannan's men had been roughly handled earlier in the day, Thomas made a point of slowly and calmly surveying Brannan's position. He remarked to several officers that their positions had to be held, which apparently had the desired effect of stiffening a few spines. Nobody wanted to disappoint "Old Pap." ⁶⁴

The first rebel attempt to break Thomas' line was an assault by two of Kershaw's brigades on the Union left. There was a general rebel sentiment that the Union men were rattled, and unlikely to put up much resistance. A few hard pushes and Thomas' ragtag crew would be chasing Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden up the road to Chattanooga.

Kershaw's men had the misfortune of coming up against the brigades of Harker and Hazen, two no-nonsense West Pointers who weren't about to give up without a fight. Three times Kershaw's men started up the hill occupied by Harker and Hazen: three times a withering fire drove them back. ⁶⁵

On the Union far right, the rebel divisions of Johnson and Hindman were massing for a push on the supposed weakest point in the Union line. Thomas' men were dug in behind breastworks facing south and east, but the massing rebel divisions were poised to strike from the southwest. Luckily for Thomas and his men, Major General Gordon Granger was posted with a small reserve corps on the main road to Chattanooga. It was his job to slow a rebel pursuit of the fleeing Union army (should one be attempted).

Granger heard cannon fire on Thomas' front. Bragg's men may have feared Bragg's fearsome temper, but Granger had no fear of Thomas (or, apparently, or anyone else). His instincts told him Thomas was in trouble, and that his (Granger's) place was forward with the rest of Thomas' army.

The thickly wooded terrain prevented Granger from observing what was transpiring. He therefore relied on gut instinct in making his decision: he would take two brigades south, leaving one behind to fulfill his assigned task of guarding the road to Chattanooga. ⁶⁶

After advancing a mile or so, Granger encountered rebel cavalry and horse artillery which was shielding Polk's far-left flank. These rebels had to be neutralized before Granger's men, who had been marching due south, could continue their advance. Granger thus halted his men and reformed them in a battle line facing east.

The rebels were quickly forced back, and Granger again turned his brigades to the south. The rebels began to reform, however, and Granger, never one to deliberate for very long, ordered up his third brigade and left them to subdue the rebel cavalry and horse artillery. He then continued with his other two brigades down Rossville Road. ⁶⁷

E. T. Wells in his speech to the Colorado MOLLUS Commandery said this about Granger's approach:

"About two in the afternoon, Major General Gordon Granger, who had before that been posted at Rossville, marching with the true instinct of the soldier to the sound of the cannon, came opportunely upon the field, with Steedman's division: their ranks were ravaged by the artillery of the enemy's right, as they approached, which disdaining, they continued their proud and beautiful march." ⁶⁸

When Thomas first saw Granger's brigades on the horizon, he thought that he had been flanked and that it was gray doom approaching. He detailed Lieutenant Ambrose Bierce, an Indiana soldier and later to-be famous writer, to go and see who the intruders were when a spyglass proved unable to penetrate the dust and gunsmoke of that hotly contested afternoon. Bierce later wrote:

"This was the way of it. Looking across the fields in our rear (rather longingly) I had the happy distinction of a discoverer. What I saw was the shimmer of sunlight on metal: lines of troops were coming in behind us! The distance was too great, the atmosphere too hazy to distinguish the color of their uniform, even with a glass. Reporting my momentous 'find' I was directed by the general to go and see who they were. Galloping toward them until near enough to see that they were of our kidney I hastened back with the glad tidings and was sent again to guide them to the general's position. It was General Granger with two strong brigades of the reserve, moving soldier-like to the sound of heavy firing. Meeting him and his staff I directed him to Thomas, and unable to think of anything better to do decided to go visiting. I knew I had a brother in that gang- an officer of an Ohio battery. I soon found him near the head of a column, and as we moved forward we had a comfortable chat amongst such of the enemy's bullets as had inconsiderately been fired too high. The incident was a trifle marred by one of them unhorsing another officer of the battery, whom we propped against a tree and left. A few moments later Granger's force was put in on the right and the fighting was terrific!" ⁶⁹

Granger's men had arrived not a moment too soon: at that moment the divisions of Bushrod Johnson and Hindman strode out of the woods, intent on the Union right flank. Both Thomas and Granger knew that a collapse of the Union right would mean utter disaster: Thomas asked Granger if his men could hold the right. Granger grunted his assent. ⁷⁰

Granger's men advanced on the rebel divisions, but heavy fire and their own fatigue from the advance to Thomas' position stalled the advance. One of Granger's brigadiers, Jones Steedman, valiantly attempted to rally the men (Steedman was so certain that he would die on the battlefield that day that he carefully spelled out his name to an aide, in hopes that the newspapers would get it right). He took up the colors of an Illinois regiment and shouted, "Forward!" again and again. Even the loss of his horse (which was shot dead beneath him), didn't stop Steedman: he got up and leaped forward, shouting, "Follow me!"

The rebels of Hindman and Johnson appeared dumbfounded by the resistance they encountered: it had been their impression that all the Yankees were either whipped and on their way to Chattanooga, or needed only a little nudge to point them in the right direction. But the rebel who said any one rebel could whip any ten Yankees hadn't encountered Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Harker, Hazen, or Willich when he said it. ⁷¹

It took twenty bloody minutes, and a fifth of Granger's men, but the rebels were finally pushed back. Longstreet was surprised but not disheartened. It seemed clear to him that the rebel assaults were failing because they were proceeding piecemeal, a strategy which had been proven absolutely bankrupt the preceeding day.

Longstreet therefore had Hindman, Johnson, and Kershaw reform for another assault on the Union right and left flanks. He also ordered up Preston's reserve division, and positioned them for an assault on the Union center. Law's division was formed between the positions of Kershaw and Preston; Stewart was formed up on Kershaw's right.

Two of Kershaw's brigades went forward at about 1600 hours against the Union center. The Union men there had had time to throw up a makeshift breastwork approximately three feet high of fallen trees and stones to shield themselves from advancing rebels. From their protected position, the Union soldiers were able to direct intensive fire against Kershaw's men. Kershaw lost 1,054 men killed or wounded of the 2,879 who participated in the assault. The assault did serve its purpose, however: it kept part of the Union line occupied while other rebel units began their advances. ⁷²

Polk's divisions had renewed their assaults on Thomas' line (which at this point greatly resembled a fishhook, with Thomas' original line nearest the eyelet and Granger's men nearest the hook). Thomas was now under attack along most of his line. There were no further reserves to plug into weak points. There weren't even any quiet sectors from which some men could be shifted to other parts of the line.

But a shortage of warm bodies to plug into his line wasn't the only shortage Thomas was facing: his men were also running dangerously low on ammunition. He had no ammunition train from which he could requisition more ammunition: it had vanished with Rosecrans and the rest of the Union army. He had his men strip the dead of ammunition, until that resource was also exhausted. The men were then ordered to fix bayonets. ⁷³ Ambrose Bierce later said of this moment:

"Granger's men were the only men that had ammunition to make a five minutes' fight. Had the Confederates made one more general attack we should have had to meet them with the bayonet alone. I don't know why they did not; probably they were short of ammunition. I know, though, that while the sun was taking its own time to set we lived through the agony of at least one death each, waiting for them to come on." ⁷⁴

It was at that point that Thomas received word from Rosecrans that he (Thomas) was to withdraw to Rossville. According to the plan Thomas formulated, Reynolds, on the Union left, would pull out of line first, to be followed by the divisions of Palmer, Johnson, and Baird. Baird's men would serve as the rear guard.

Reynolds' division consisted of his own brigades (Turchin and Robinson), Johnson's reserve brigade, and Willich's brigade (of which the 89th Illinois had in the afternoon's confusion become a part- it had begun the day as part of R.W. Johnson's division). Reynolds was instructed to begin his withdrawal at 1730 hours (5:30 PM). He was to proceed west to Dry Valley Road, then north to Rossville and on to Chattanooga. ⁷⁵

Almost immediately, Reynolds encountered an obstacle: men from Liddell's rebel brigades. They had finally flanked the Union left, and were readying a movement intended to collapse the left (which would allow the enfilading of the rest of the Union line). Reynolds (like Granger before him) decided to disregard his orders to withdraw and turned his men north to face the rebel flanking movement (try to imagine two of Bragg's men deliberately disregarding his orders on the same day- but Reynolds and Granger could look to the example of John Wilder, who earlier in the Chickamauga Campaign had actually been rewarded with a promotion after he disregarded an order issued by General Negley to withdraw from a position which Wilder felt he could defend). ⁷⁶ While Reynolds' men held off the assaults of rebel divisions under Cleburne and Breckinridge, the rest of the Union army was able to escape to Rossville Gap (except for three regiments on the Union right, which were overrun when Preston's reserve brigade finished the job of collapsing the Union line- the three regiments were the 89th Ohio, the 21st Ohio, and the 22nd Michigan). ⁷⁷

The rebels were not quite through with Thomas' men, though: at that time some of Bragg's men took up the famous "Rebel yell." Ambrose Bierce, the noted American author, who was on the field that evening as an aide to General Thomas, later wrote of the experience:

"At last it grew too dark to fight. Then away to our left and rear some of Bragg's people set up 'the rebel yell.' It was taken up successively and passed round to our front, along our right and in behind us again, until it seemed almost to have got to the point whence it started. It was the ugliest sound that any mortal ever heard- even a mortal exhausted and unnerved by two days of hard fighting, without sleep, without rest, without food and without hope. There was, however, a space somewhere at the back of us across which that horrible yell did not prolong itself; and through that we finally retired in profound silence and dejection, unmolested." ⁷⁸

Reynold's men thus became the rear guard of Thomas' army, instead of its vanguard. Willich's brigade, which had become attached to Reynold's division during the confusion of that chaotic afternoon, served as rear guard as the remaining elements of the Army of the Cumberland left the Chickamauga battlefield. There has been some confusion as to which regiment served as rear guard for Willich's brigade, but documentary evidence clearly suggests that the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment in fact acted as rear guard for Thomas' army as it withdrew towards Rossville and safety. Major William D. Williams of the 89th, in his official report on Chickamauga, stated the following:

"About 5 p.m. it was observed that regiments and brigades on our right and left were giving way in inextricable confusion; at the same time the enemy was shelling us furiously on our front, right, and rear, mingled with terrific musketry. General Willich ordered the battery to take position about 100 yards to the left of original position. They did so. The Eighty-ninth moved in good order by the left flank, fronted, and laid down, the Thirty-second, Forty-ninth, and Fifteenth doing the same on our left. During this change of front a stream of fugitives was running through and over us, but the brigade stood firm and undaunted. It was during this trying ordeal that the First Brigade of the Second Division, Twentieth Army Corps, earned its sobriquet of the "Iron Brigade of the Cumberland Army."

After the battery had withdrawn and the cloud of fugitives had passed to the rear, the First Brigade about-faced, and halting and fronting every 50 yards, presented a bold front, effectually checking the enemy. The Eighty-ninth, with the other regiments of the brigade, halted about half a mile to the rear of original position in the morning, confronting the enemy and holding him in check, while the balance of the Army of the Cumberland filed by our rear in full retreat to Chattanooga, some 10 or 12 miles distant. The First Brigade formed the rear guard of the Army of the Cumberland; the Eighty-ninth Illinois formed the rear guard of the brigade (my emphasis). We marched about three hours, picking up countless stragglers, and forcing them on to Chattanooga. The enemy did not molest us. We halted with the brigade about 8 miles from the battleground of Chickamauga." ⁷⁹

It might be easy to pass off this version of events as that of a commanding officer proud that his men had not fled a chaotic battlefield, but Major Williams' report is not the only official report which confirms his version of events. General McCook's official report also states that Thomas' force:

"...fell back to Rossville with Willich's brigade forming the rear guard." ⁸⁰

But Major William's version of events is confirmed by an even higher-ranking authority: Major General George H. Thomas. In his official report on Chickamauga, General Thomas states that:

"In a few moments General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the Ridge road. I directed him to report to General Reynolds, and assist in covering the retirement of the troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a half, was reassembled, and took its position on the Ridge Road with Robinson and Willich. These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions." ⁸¹

In addition, at the first annual meeting of the Eighty-Ninth Illinois Volunteer Infantry Reunion Association, held at Yorkville, Illinois on September 4, 1884, John Farquhar, formerly Major and adjutant of the 89th Illinois Infantry and newly elected federal Representative from Buffalo, New York, declared with regard to the Chickamauga battlefield that:

"...Willich's brigade was the last to leave the field, and that the Eighty-ninth composed the rear guard, its flag being the last Federal flag to float over the field." ⁸²

In this way most of Thomas' army was able to escape to Chattanooga. The rebel army felt it had won a clear victory: it wasn't common knowledge yet that, save for pervasive pettiness and ineptitude at the highest levels of Confederate command, Rosecrans' army might with only minor difficulty have been annihilated, not merely routed.

As Thomas' men trudged towards Chattanooga, they felt depressed and humiliated, knowing only that they had been driven from the field (the retreat to Rossville occurred "...in profound silence and dejection," to quote Ambrose Bierce, who was present in the retreating column). It wasn't common knowledge yet in the Union ranks that, save for their determined stand against nearly twice their numbers on the afternoon and evening of September 20th, their beloved Army of the Cumberland would most likely have ceased to exist. ⁸³

The men then marched for about three hours upon final withdrawal from the Chickamauga battlefield, halting about eight miles from the battlefield. The next morning Willich's brigade took up a position about four miles out from Chattanooga, and remained there in line of battle until about 1 AM on September 22nd. At that time, the brigade was withdrawn to a position within a mile of Chattanooga, where it threw up temporary breastworks. ⁸⁴

The Union army had suffered greatly: Rosecrans lost 16,170 men killed, wounded, or missing out of 62,000 troops engaged at Chickamauga (a casualty rate of 26%). The 89th Illinois had lost 14 men killed, 88 wounded, and 30 missing. Rosecrans would also lose his command: on October 17th, President Lincoln would make General Grant commander of all Union forces west of the Appalachians. Grant in turn immediately dismissed Rosecrans and replaced him with General Thomas, who had already received his well-deserved nickname, "the Rock of Chickamauga." Thomas was told by Grant to hold Chattanooga "at all hazards." The 89th Illinois was one of many Union regiments in the vicinity of Chattanooga which awaited Confederate General Bragg's next move. ⁸⁵

¹Henry Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (1882; Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2002) 173-179; David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: a Military History of the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001) 577-580; Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: a Military and Political Hisotry, 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000) 273.

² Eicher 577-580; Weigley 273; W. J. Wood, Civil War Generalship: the Art of Command (1977; New York: DaCapo Press, 2002) 107-108; Steven E. Woodworth, A Deep Steady Thunder: the Battle of Chickamauga (Fort Worth; Boulder: Ryan Place Publishers, Inc., 1996) 23-24.

³ Bryan Bush, The Civil War Battles of the Western Theater (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1998) 58; United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) Series I, Volume 30, Part I, 542-543 (hereinafter cited as O.R. I-30-I).

⁴ Peter Cozzens, This Terrible Sound: the Battle of Chickamauga (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992) 98-99; Creek Indian: an Online Resource on the Historical and Present Day Creek Indians, http://www.creekindian.com/greene/creek_language.htm, 23 April 2003 (the Chickamauga Cherokee did not name the creek they settled on-- they had chosen as their new home the site of an ancient Creek Indian village); Eicher 580.

⁵ Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee: a Military History (Indianapolis & New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941) 257; Woodworth 28-30.

⁸ Patrick Abbazia, Chickamauga Campaign: Great Military Campaigns of History (New York: Galley Books, 1988) 65; Cist 192-193; Cozzens 140-144; Francis Alfred Lord, They Fought for the Union (1960; New York: Bonanza Books, 1988) 270; Wood 141-150.

¹³ Isaac K. Young, "Chickamauga- the Battle as I Saw It," National Tribune (April 22, 1886).

¹⁵ Abbazia 69-72; Cozzens 169-170; Jerry Korn, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985) 47-48; Woodworth 42-43.

¹⁶ Bush 61; Cist 197-198; United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) Series I, Volume 30, Part II, 338-339 (hereinafter cited as O.R. I-30-II); Woodworth 43-44.

²⁰ Chickamauga: Voices of the Civil War (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1997- hereinafter cited as Voices) 10; Tucker 176-177.

²⁵ Ebenezer Tracy Wells, "The Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga," United Service Magazine 16 (1896) 205-233.

²⁹ Compiled Military Service Record of Private Charles Capron, Company A, 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment (Washington, DC: National Archives, Record Group 94, Compiled Military Service Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers From the State of Illinois-- hereinafter cited as Capron, CMSR).

³⁰ Charles Capron, letter to Mary S. Capron, 23 January 1865, Charles Capron Collection, Old Courthouse Museum, Vicksburg, Mississippi (all Capron letter material cited hereinafter is assumed to be part of the Old Courthouse Museum collection unless otherwise noted).

³⁶ Matt Spruill, ed., Guide to the Battle of Chickamauga (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993) 107-108; Frank E. Vandiver, Civil War Battlefields and Landmarks, With Official National Park Service Maps for Each Site (New York: Random House, 1996) 125.

⁵⁴ Ambrose Bierce, Ambrose Bierce's Civil War (1956; New York: Wings Books,1996) 34-35; Woodworth 83-85.

⁵⁸ Benjamin Abbott, letter dated 26 September 1863 (addressee not given), quoted in Vandiver 125.

⁶⁰ Cozzens 392-394; Korn 21, 24-26, 74-78; Voices 23-26, 101; Woodworth 28-30.

⁶² Cozzens 456; Timothy Donovan, The American Civil War (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1987) 180; Spruill 235-236.

⁸² Organization of the Eighty-Ninth Illinois Volunteer Infantry Reunion Association, Together With a Register of Membership, and Report of First Primary Meeting, Held at Yorkville, Ill., Sept. 4, 1884, and First Annual Reunion, Held at the Palmer House, Chicago, January 22, 1885 (Aurora, IL: J. H. Hodder & Co., 1886) 6.

⁸⁵ Cozzens 527-528; Eicher 580; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861-1865 (Albany, NY: Albany Publishing Co., 1909) 373; Voices 141.

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