THE 89th ILLINOIS VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENT (July 1862-June 1865)
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THE 89th ILLINOIS VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENT (July 1862-June 1865) |
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The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, also known as the Railroad Regiment, was formed in July and August 1862. It participated in the battles of Stones River, Liberty Gap, Chickamauga, Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge, Pickett's Mill, the Atlanta Campaign, and Nashville. The regiment was mustered out in June 1865.
Photos of 89th
Illinois Infantry Regiment monuments on the Chickamauga battlefield
by Tom Pearson.
“Let Me Alone, and Hold That Fence!” by Text and photos copyright © 2004.
"If you are very valiant, it is a god, I think, who gave you this gift."
Civil War, Western Theater, 1863 The two
armies of the Civil War's Western Theater spent the first six months of 1863
approximately 30 miles apart. Rosecrans and the Union Army were in camp
around Murfreesboro, while Bragg and his army were camped along the Duck
River to the southeast. Fifty miles southeast of Bragg's position lay the
objective Rosecrans had to take and Bragg had to hold: Chattanooga. Chattanooga
was a small place, really, in 1863: it had at that time about 3,500 residents.
But it wasn't its people that made Chattanooga so important, anyway: it
was Chattanooga's role as intersection for several of the most important
railroads in the south. The Nashville & Chattanooga, the Memphis &
Charleston, and the Western & Atlantic railroads all ran through Chattanooga.
Rosecrans and his superiors in Washington were well aware that, should Chattanooga
be taken, the Union Army would both control Tennessee and have a base of
operations for further actions against Atlanta and the southern heartland.1
Rosecrans
did not move against Bragg as quickly as his superiors in Washington (or
his own men) wanted him to. Rosecrans insisted he needed more time: time
to resupply, time to strengthen his lines of communication, and time to rest
the men. He also pestered Washington for more men, especially more cavalry.
Rebel cavalry raids were preventing the steady flow of supplies he felt
needed. Repairs were continually necessary for bridges, depots, railroad
cars and engines, all of which were targeted by rebel raiders.2
Washington
didn't give Rosecrans the troopers he wanted, but it did allow him to
convert a brigade of infantrymen to mounted infantry. Horses weren't readily
available for all 1,500 men of the brigade, so for a while some of them
had to ride mules. The new mounted brigade was led by an Indiana man, Colonel
John T. Wilder. Colonel Wilder decided to arm his men with the new Spencer
repeating rifle (he'd seen a demonstration of the rifle's effectiveness
given by its inventor, Christopher Spencer). Colonel Wilder was ready to
take out a personal loan to pay for the guns, after the men of the brigade
agreed to repay him through payroll deductions, when Washington decided
that, since they were to be mounted infantry, that the men could be equipped
with Spencers at government expense.3 Even
the addition of this potent new fighting force, however, did not stir Rosecrans
to action. He told Washington that his failure to move was a positive aid
to General Grant, who was then besieging Vicksburg. As Rosecrans saw it,
a successful push against Bragg would then free Bragg to reinforce Pemberton
at Vicksburg. Thus, at least to Rosecrans' mind, the inaction of the Union
Army in Tennessee was helping ensure the success of Grant's army in Mississippi.
Needless
to say, Rosecrans' reasoning did not amuse either General Grant at Vicksburg
or General Halleck in Washington. They were unanimous in their desire to
get Rosecrans moving. By June of 1863, Rosecrans had managed to build up
his supplies, strengthen his lines of communication, and get some of the
reinforcements he felt he needed. He in fact outnumbered Bragg 70,000 to
40,000 (a nearly two to one advantage). Even the weather seemed to favor
an advance: the first two weeks of June were bright and sunny, the temperature
mild.4 Finally,
on June 16, 1863, Halleck wired to Rosecrans the following message: "Is
it your intention to make an immediate move forward? A definite answer, yes
or no, is required." Rosecrans replied that, if "immediate" meant the next
day or two, no. But if it meant as soon as he was ready (say five days),
then his answer was yes. Five days later, Halleck was no doubt annoyed to
learn that Rosecrans hadn't as yet budged from his hidey hole in Murfreesboro.
Halleck was ready to send Rosecrans another (less subtle) message when,
on June 24th, this message arrived from old Rosey: "The army begins to
move at three o'clock this morning." 5 Between
Bragg's line along the Duck River and Rosecran's army in Murfreesboro
lay a long ridge. There were four passes through the ridge: Guy's Gap, which
lay furthest west; Bellbuckle Gap; Liberty Gap; and finally, lying furthest
east, Hoover's Gap. Hoover's Gap (because of terrain and the condition of
roads) was considered least suitable for large-scale troop movements. Bragg
positioned his men as follows: his largest corps, General Polk's, was detailed
to guard the entrances to Bellbuckle and Guy's Gaps. General Hardee guarded
the entrance to Liberty Gap. Since it also seemed possible that Rosecrans
might choose to bypass the ridge entirely, Bragg also stationed General Forrest's
cavalry west of the ridge (west of Guy's Gap), where such a manuoever seemed
most likely. 6 The Union
Army left Murfreesboro on June 24th, 1863. It didn't leave at 3AM, as Rosecrans
had informed General Halleck, naturally: delays prevented departure before
8AM. As the army left Murfreesboro a hard rain began to fall. It continued
(with occasional let-ups) for the next 17 days, making it extremely difficult
to move men, horses, cannon, and supplies, and also made routine chores like
pitching tents and building fires all but impossible to accomplish. 7
Rosecrans'
plan involved putting Union soldiers everywhere at once, to keep Bragg
guessing as to where the main Union thrust would occur. The first federal
attack came where Bragg thought it would: on the rebel left (the Union right).
Rosecrans sent General David S. Stanley's cavalry and General Gordon Granger's
reserve corps through Bellbuckle Gap down the road to Shelbyville, Tennessee,
where General Polk's corps was waiting. Rosecrans next sent a single Union
division toward McMinnville, Tennessee, on the rebel right. These troops
did not attempt the arduous task of actually moving through Hoover's Gap.
Instead they marched all the way around it. Bragg clearly thought this Union
manuoever a ruse, because he still felt the big federal push would come at
Bellbuckle Gap (Shelbyville). 8 Rosecrans
was playing a game of divide, confuse, and conquer (a game he would play
again during the upcoming Chickamauga campaign). The main Union push wasn't
coming at Bellbuckle Gap, as Bragg supposed; it wouldn't even be on the rebel
left, at Guy's Gap. No, the main federal pushes were to be directed against
the rebel center (Liberty Gap) and right (both through and around Hoover's
Gap). The "lone" federal division sent against Bragg's right at Hoover's
Gap was actually not alone. Close behind it were General Crittenden's XXI
Corps and General Thomas' IV Corps. General Crittenden was to rout the rebel
cavalry screen around Hoover's Gap, then advance to Manchester. This would
position Crittenden to the rear of the rebel right flank. General
Thomas, meanwhile, had (as usual) the thankless but necessary job of proceeding
through Hoover's Gap. A successful drive would place Thomas' men in Manchester
with Crittenden's soldiers. The two corps could then fall on the exposed
rebel right flank and roll it up. Meanwhile, General McCook's XX Corps (after
making a feint towards Bellbuckle Gap for Bragg's benefit) was to advance
to Liberty Gap, push back any rebel resistance, and then head straight for
Hardee's corps at Wartrace, Tennessee. 9
HOME FORMATION TRAINING
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RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT During
this campaign the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment was part of Willich's
brigade of McCook's corps. The brigade led the 2nd Division of McCook's corps
in its march from camp at Murfreesboro on June 24th. The men took the Shelbyville
Pike for about 7 miles (this was the feint to confuse Bragg), then turned
left onto the road to Liberty Gap. Five companies of Colonel Harrison's 39th
Indiana Mounted Infantry were acting as advance scouts for the brigade. In
his after-action report Willich noted that:
At about 2 PM Colonel Harrison informed me that he was skirmishing with
some 800 infantry. I ordered him to halt, advanced with the brigade and,
reaching his skirmish line, I deployed the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, Liet.
Col. Frank Askew commanding, to the right of the road; the Forty-Ninth Ohio
Volunteers, Col. William Gibson commanding, to the left of the road; skirmishers,
with support companies, in front; the Eighty-Ninth Illinois, Col. C. T. Hotchkiss,
commanding, on the right; the Thirty-Second Indiana Volunteers, Major Glass
commanding, on the left; and the First Ohio Battery, under Captain Goodspeed,
in reserve, beyond the reach of the enemy's fire.10 The
hills which marked the northern entrance to Liberty Gap were open at their
bases, but became rocky and heavily wooded about halfway up their slopes.
The rebels were dug in, and appeared to be prepared to fight. A probe by Willich's
skirmishers confirmed these facts:
There the enemy had a very strong and, in front, easily defended position.
The hills are steep, to half their height open, then rocky and covered with
woods. I felt the enemy in front to ascertain whether he would make a decided
resistance, and found him in force and determined. A mere front attack was
out of the question, as we would have to pay for it 10 for 1. 11 With
this in mind, Willich ordered the 49th Ohio to probe the rebel left flank,
and the 15th Ohio to probe the rebel right flank. These regiments were charged
with determining if the rebels could be flanked on either end of their line
of battle. Colonel Gibson of the 49th Ohio said in his after-action report:
Our advance was resisted by a brisk fire from the enemy, concealed behind
fences, in ravines, and behind rocks and trees on the hill slopes. Under
orders from the general commanding brigade, I detached three companies to
occupy the hill to the left of the wood. Moving to the left, this detachment
rushed up the slope, and found the enemy in force, who opened with heavy fire.
12 Gibson moved up the remainder of his men, who were soon engaged in a furious
fire fight with the rebels occupying the hill. General Willich quickly rushed
two companies of the 32nd Indiana Infantry under Captain Mank to Gibson's
aid:
These forces quickly came into position, Captain Mank holding the right
of our line on the hill. They advanced rapidly and, with heroic courage,
drove the enemy from his position, capturing one prisoner and the camp of
one regiment, with tentage, mess chests, blankets, &c. 13 The advance was threatened at one point by a galling fire on the line's
left flank, but General Willich sent a squadron of Colonel Harrison's 39th
Indiana Mounted Infantry to deal with that threat. Colonel Harrison and his
men arrived at full gallop and forced the hasty retreat of about 200 rebel
infantry. Colonel Harrison's men continued their flanking movement while
the 49th Ohio and two companies of the 32nd Indiana advanced up the hill
towards Liberty Gap. These advancing men managed to drive the enemy back
from his positions near the crests of the hill. 14 In the meantime division commander General Johnson had placed the regiments
of the Second Brigade at General Willich's disposal. General Willich deployed
the 29th Indiana and the 77th Pennsylvania to the extreme right of his line,
with instructions to find the end point of the enemy's line and turn him.
The two regiments were shortly able to do as directed. Willich in the meantime
had ordered the 89th Illinois and the remaining companies of the 32nd Indiana
forward along the Liberty Gap road. This advance continued until General
Willich was ordered by division commander General Richard W. Johnson to halt
near Liberty Meeting House. While the First and Second Brigades rested, the
Third Brigade under Colonel Baldwin was ordered forward to form a picket line
to the front of Liberty Meeting House. While the picket line was forming,
the Third Brigade was engaged by rebel reinforcements which had been rushed
forward in an attempt to keep a retreat from becoming a rout. 15 General Willich ordered a section of artillery under Lieutenant Belding
forward to assist the Third Brigade. Belding was to engage the enemy if an
opportunity presented itself. Belding noticed that the rebel skirmishers
were clustering behind a fence rail. He ordered his men to fire on a knot
of crouching skirmishers, and rebels and fence rails both were sent flying
by the initial blast of Belding's guns. While Willich's other soldiers settled
down for the night, artillery of the Third Brigade under Captain Goodspeed
exchanged fire with some guns the rebels had brought forward. During the
fighting on the 24th Willich's First Brigade lost 2 officers and 9 men killed
in action, and 1 officer and 29 men wounded. The 89th Illinois suffered only
one casualty this day, which Colonel Hotchkiss mentioned in his after-action
report:
The only casualty in this regiment during this day was Corporal Henry H.
Warner, Company H, wounded in the leg and arm severely. 16
HOME FORMATION TRAINING
TACTICS BATTLES ROSTERS
RESEARCH SITEMAP CONTACT On the morning of June 25th, Willich's brigade was ordered forward to act
as pickets for the federal camp. Willich was told that the enemy was still
present and might attempt to probe his line. Willich posted the 89th Illinois
and the 32nd Indiana to the left of his advance line, the 30th Indiana to
his right. The 15th Ohio was posted to the left in reserve. The pickets held
positions to the right and and to the left of Liberty Gap Road. About 10AM
a rebel skirmish line of infantry and cavalry appeared ahead and a bit to
the right of the 89th Illinois' position. Both sides exchanged a few pot shots
at lone range, but it was merely an exploratory probe and not a serious attempt
by the rebels to breach the Union line.17 It was noon when a stronger, more determined rebel skirmish line appeared
to the left of the 89th's position. The 89th was then deployed in this manner:
Enemy Skirmish Line Co.C Co.A Co.G Co.K Co.H Co.E Co.D Co.F Co.B Co.I
In a few minutes his repulsed skirmish line, now reinforced with supporting
companies and reserves, and they in turn by a heavy column of infantry, again
rapidly advanced, with yells, giving to and receiving a heavy fire from our
men, and although his advance was checked at every step by a continuous fire,
the enemy temporarily secured a lodgment at the foot of the hill on which
was our position. 19 Companies D, F, and K of the 89th Illinois were sent forward at this point
(under the command of Captains Blake and Spink and Lt. Dimick) to reinforce
the Union skirmish line. The rebels managed to advance within twenty yards
of the Union line, but heavy small-arms fire prevented them from advancing
further.20 After falling back to regroup, another rebel advance was attempted
around 3 PM. Colonel Hotchkiss noted in his report:
About 3 PM, after reinforcing his line, the enemy with a yell again attempted
to advance but, from behind each tree, stump, log, and fence, the rapid fire
and almost unerring aim of my men sent him back down the hill, to again advance,
with a like result. 21 The rebels then brought forward additional infantry and artillery. Two cannon
were posted in the center and a battery was posted to the right of the rebel
line. Colonel Hotchkiss of the 89th Illinois at this time sent Company E (commanded
by Captain Bruce Kidder) forward to further reinforce the Union line. Kidder
and his men noticed two rebel regiments advancing steadily on the Union right.
Captain Kidder moved his men further to the right (under cover of a low hill)
and had the men take positions behind a fence. The company held its fire
until the rebel regiments had advanced within about 60 yards of the fence,
then opened up on them. The initial volley killed seven rebel enlisted men
and one officer, and stopped the advance cold. 22 Colonel Hotchkiss in his
report said:
The enemy immediately broke and ran, and did not stop until they had reached
the woods on the opposite side of the open field. Captain Kidder gave them
a second volley, but they having reached the opposite side of the willow copse,
the result was not seen or ascertained. 23 By this time, most companies of the 89th Illinois were running low on ammunition.
Colonel Hotchkiss sent back word of the regiment's predicament to General
Willich. It took 45 minutes for the 15th Ohio to arrive with more ammunition,
during which time the men had made do with ammunition gathered from the dead
and wounded. Shortly after the 15th Ohio arrived and distributed ammunition
(they brought some for the 32nd Indiana, which had also run low), the rebels
began another advance. The 15th Ohio was ordered to advance on the rebels,
and the 49th Ohio was sent forward to stand in reserve behind the federal
front line. Another spirited exchange of gunfire resulted in the rebels
being once again driven back to their own lines. Sporadic firing between picket lines continued throughout the day. By this
time there were also some fairly regular exchanges of artillery fire. Captain
Goodspeed's battery was posted on a hill close to the front lines. The battery
exchanged fire with rebel gunners, and also fired on some buildings which
the rebels had occupied. Some federal artillery shells during this time period
fell short of their marks and landed on the federal skirmish line. General
Willich stated in his after-battle report that he believed the errant shots
were caused by faulty powder:
This deficiency is not the fault of the officers, or of the men, or of the
splendid pieces we were supplied with, but has its cause in the Ordnance
Department, which does not make it impossible that a neglect in the fabrication
of the cartridge still exists, which had already been discovered at the beginning
of the war, but appears not, as yet, to be corrected. The powder used for
the cartridges is of different quality, so much so that the best officers,
with the most superior arms, and served by the most skillful men, can never
become certain of the exact range of their guns. 24 By 6 PM the three forward Union regiments were again running low on ammunition.
General Willich ordered the 21st Illinois forward, where they were to relieve
the men of the 89th Illinois. As the men prepared to vacate their places in
line, the rebels began their final advance of the day. The 49th Ohio was ordered
forward by General Willich, where they were to form up in four columns and
then charge the rebels. Men from other forward regiments (including the 89th
Illinois) joined the advance, even though some of the men only had two to
four rounds of ammunition left. The advancing men were cheered by other federal
regiments. When the advancing Union line had come sufficiently close to the
advancing rebel line, Colonel Gibson of the 49th Ohio gave the order for
the four columns to volley in turn, a tactic which he had dreamt up while
confined for a time as a prisoner of war at Libby Prison in Richmond, Virginia.
By the third volley the rebel skirmishers had fallen back across the open
field to their forward lines. The Union skirmishers took up positions behind a fence that ran across the
open field. At this point the Second Brigade under Colonel Miller arrived
at the front and distributed additional ammunition to the men of Willich's
brigade. Additional artillery pieces were also brought to the support of Goodspeed's
battery, in case the rebels were able to field another advance (they could
not). Willich reformed his brigade in double column behind the hill occupied
by federal artillery. 25 The brigade lost 50 men during the day's fighting: 1 officer and 11 enlisted
men were killed in action, and 38 enlisted men were wounded in action. One
of the casualties was Captain Herbert M. Blake of the 89th Illinois (Company
K). Colonel Hotchkiss in his report said:
Captain Herbert M. Blake, while gallantly performing his duties, fell mortally
wounded by a musket ball through the abdomen, and died the following morning.
in his death the service loses a gallant and excellent officer, and society
a Christian and accomplished gentleman. 26 Sergeant George G. Sinclair of the 89th (Company C) was one of the wounded.
Colonel Hotchkiss made special note of it in his report:
Sergt. George G. Sinclair, Company C, conspicuous for gallantry, while in
advance of the line fell severely wounded by a musket ball through the chest,
but refused to be carried from from the field or even from under fire, saying,
"Let me alone, and hold that fence," and then cheered the men on. 27 Division commander Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson in his report on
the action at Liberty Gap noted:
The affair at Liberty Gap will always be considered a skirmish, but few
skirmishes ever equaled it in severity. 28 Johnson's division had lost 231 men killed and wounded during the two days
of action at Liberty Gap. As to rebel casualties, he stated that:
The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained. About 75 dead were left
on the ground and 57 prisoners captured. From rebel sources it has been ascertained
that their loss was very heavy. 29 In his after-battle report, Colonel Hotchkiss managed to cite nearly all
his officers (and Sergeant Sinclair) for gallantry in action. He made special
notice of the actions of Lt. Colonel D. J. Hall, Captains Henry Rowell and
Bruce Kidder, and Lt. George F. Robinson. He also made note of the prompt
and efficient care for the wounded effected through the efforts of Surgeon
H. B. Tuttle, Assistant Surgeon P. R. Thombs, and Chaplain T. O. Spencer.
30 The Confederates under General Cleburne sensed the danger of being flanked
and retreated, leaving Liberty Gap in the hands of McCook's corps. At the
same time, Hoover's Gap was falling to General Thomas' corps, due to some
inspired fighting by Colonel Wilders' mounted infantry brigade. With their
Spencer repeating rifles they held off the rebels under General Bates for
hours, killing and wounding three times as many men as the rebels were able
to dispatch. 31 General Polk at Shelbyville was preparing to go to the aid of General Cleburne
at Liberty Gap when Bragg realized that Thomas' corps (led again by Wilders'
brigade) was on the road for Manchester. Thomas' advance threatened to cut
Bragg off from the rebel supply base at Chattanooga, an eventuality which
Bragg could not allow. He therefore ordered a Confederate withdrawal to Tullahoma,
Tennessee. The march to Tullahoma was not a pleasant one for the Confederate army or
its Union army pursuers. Major General Pat Cleburne, who commanded the rebel
division which opposed Union forces at Liberty Gap, noted in his official
report on the retreat that:
At night I received orders to retreat on Tullahoma, via Schoefner's Bridge,
at daylight on the 27th, which I did without any loss, although my men were
much wearied by the watching and fighting in front of the gaps, for it rained
incessantly during most of the time. The men had no changes of clothing, no
tents, and could not even light fires to dry themselves. Many had no shoes,
and others left their shoes buried in the deep mire of the roads. My entire
loss in the several fights amounted to 121. 32 Bragg met at Tullahoma with his corps commanders, Generals Polk and Hardee,
to try to decide what to do next. Before a decision could be made, however,
word came that the federal corps of Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden had reached
Manchester. Bragg therefore ordered a further withdrawal to Dechard, Tennessee,
south of the Elk River. After only a few hours at that place, Bragg decided
that the Confederate position was untenable and ordered a full retreat to
Chattanooga, as he noted in his official report:
The enemy established himself again in strong position on the defensive,
and moved another heavy column against our bridges over Elk River, now swollen
by heavy rains. By making a rapid march and using the railroad successfully,
we saved all our supplies, and crossed the Elk just before a heavy column
appeared at the upper bridge. We were now back against the mountains, in a
country affording us nothing, with a long line of railroad to protect, and
half a dozen passes on the right and left by which our rear could be gained.
In this position it was perfectly practicable for the enemy to destroy our
means of crossing the Tennessee, and thus secure our ultimate destruction
without a battle. Having failed to bring him to that issue, so much desired
by myself and troops, I reluctantly yielded to the necessity imposed by my
position and inferior strength, and put the army in motion for the Tennessee
River. 33 Bragg reported to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper on July 7th that his whole
army had made it across the Tennessee River. Union General Rosecrans had,
by means of masterful planning and manoeuvering, managed to reclaim most of
the state of Tennessee for the Union with minimal losses in men, animals,
and supplies (though Rosecrans received little acknowledgment of his achievement
from his superiors in Washington, due in part to the fact that far more dramatic
and bloody victories were being won by Union armies at approximately the same
time at Vicksburg and Gettysburg). The Middle Tennessee campaign was over,
the middle Tennessee country in Union hands again. 34
HOME FORMATION TRAINING
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2 Brandt 162-163; Geer 284; Jerry Korn, The Fight for Chattanooga (Alexandria,
VA: Time-Life Books, 1985) 18; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom:
the Civil War Era (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988).
3 Geer 284; Korn 21.
4 Brandt 162-163; Korn 18-19.
5 Korn 21-22.
6 Brandt 160; Fitch 40-41; Korn 22-23.
7 Brandt 159; McPherson 669; Donn Piatt, General George H. Thomas: A Critical
Biography (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1893) 355.
8 Brandt 163; Cist 156-157; Fitch 41; Geer 285; Korn 23-24; Piatt 353-354.
9 Brandt 163-164; Fitch 43-44; Korn 23-24.
10 Alexis Cope, The Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers and Its Campaigns, War of
1861-5 (1916; Columbus, OH: The General's Books, 1993) 286; United States.
War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1880-1901- hereafter cited as O.R.- all citations are to Series I,
Volume XXIII, Part I, unless otherwise noted) 483, 486.
11 O.R. 486.
12 Cope 286-288; O.R. 495-496.
13 O.R. 496.
14 Cist 158; Cope 286-288; O.R. 486.
15 Cist 158; O.R. 484, 487.
16 O.R. 487, 490, 496.
17 O.R. 487.
18 O.R. 491.
19 O.R. 491.
20 Cope 288-289; O.R. 491.
21 O.R. 491.
22 Cope 289-290; O.R. 491.
23 O.R. 491; Piatt 353.
24 Cope 289-293; O.R. 484, 488.
25 Cope 290; Fitch 42-43; O.R. 488, 491.
26 O.R. 488, 492.
27 O.R. 492.
28 Cist 159; O.R. 485.
29 Cist 159; O.R. 485; Piatt 354.
30 O.R. 492.
31 Brandt 163-164; Korn 24-28; Piatt 353-354.
32 Brandt 166-167; Geer 285; O.R. 587.
33 O.R. 584.
34 Brandt 164-167; Geer 285; Korn 29-30; The Library of Congress Civil War
Desk Reference, ed. by Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher, and Paul Finkelman
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) 287; O.R. 584, 587; Piatt 355.
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Text and photos © copyright 2004 by Thomas
A. Pearson. All rights reserved. Last revised: 22 March 2006. |
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