by

Thomas A. Pearson

"You can't say that civilization don't advance, for in every war they kill you a new way."
-Will Rogers

WHEN war broke out in April 1861, neither side was blessed with an overabundance of trained military officers. At that time, there were 1,105 officers in the Federal army. 270 of these officers resigned their commissions to join the Confederate army: most of the others went on to serve with the Union army. ¹ ( Having more than 800 Regular Army officers should have worked to the advantage of the Union army, but (at least initially) it did not. These men could have been used to assist in the training of new volunteer regiments raised by the states, but for the most part they were not so used. ²

Many officer commissions in regiments raised by the states were political plums passed out to cronies of the governor, or were used to reward wealthy men who had been able to scare up a full company or more of volunteers (a company consisted of 100 men). ³ Such men rarely had knowledge of military drill and tactics. Lucky regiments had veterans of the Mexican-American War who could teach the men (and sometimes the officers) the fundamentals. The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment had Sgt. Charles Arenschild of Company F, a Mexican-American War veteran. ⁴

In a few isolated cases, Regular army officers were loaned out to help train volunteer regiments from the states. It appears that Captain John Christopher of the Regular army was for a time assigned to help train the 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, and was listed as its commanding officer, although he apparently did not accompany the regiment into the field at any time. ⁵ Many officers of volunteer regiments had little or no knowledge of military drill and tactics. These men were often detailed to attend "night schools" taught by an experienced officer- or non-commissioned officer, if an experienced officer was not available. Non-commissioned officers (corporals and sergeants) were sometimes also detailed to attend such classes, although men were often chosen to be corporals or sergeants because they had some prior military experience. At these "night schools" the students often learned lessons that they would be expected to teach to their own men the following day. ⁶

It is possible that loaning out Regular army officers to help train state volunteer regiments might not have made much difference anyway. For one thing, it was hard to keep good officers healthy. In the Civil War (but not in later wars), the proportion of officers killed in battle was nearly 15 ( higher than the proportion of enlisted men who died in battle. Even more amazing to persons familiar with today's U.S. Army is the fact that generals faced the poorest survival odds of all Civil War soldiers (brigadier generals were 50( more likely to die in battle than were privates). ⁷

Many political appointees were simply not good officers. Some were drummed out of the service for cowardice, drunkenness, or loose morals (one Illinois lieutenant had sex with a black prostitute in his tent, then watched while an enlisted man did the same). One officer of the 89th Illinois Infantry, George W. White of Aurora, was cashiered from the service on June 8, 1863. ⁸ The Union Army later in the war took steps to weed out incompetent officers. Officers were tested on their knowledge of regulations and tactics, and those scoring below a certain level were allowed to resign their commissions. ⁹

The men had their own way of weeding out incompetent or hated officers. "Fragging" of hated officers by their own men occurred during the Vietnam conflict and was widely publicized at that time, but documented cases exist of Civil War soldiers killing hated officers. It would have been relatively easy to do so, since Civil War regiments were generally opposed on the battlefield by enemy regiments using the same or similar weapons- only a blatant case of fragging would have caused much suspicion. Even more common than fragging incidents were cases of enlisted men threatening to beat up or otherwise harm hated officers. ¹⁰

Greater mixing of Regular Army officers with state volunteer regiments might not have increased the fighting ability of the state regiments in any case, because the training of many West Point-educated officers was being rapidly rendered invalid by continuing advances in weapons technology. Officers prior to the Civil War had studied the manuals of strategy and tactics then in vogue, most of which were modeled on Napoleonic strategy and tactics. Napoleonic strategy and tactics, in turn, assumed the existence on both sides of the conflict of awkward, slow-loading, and relatively inaccurate firearms. When two armies using such weapons converged within about 200 yards of one another, the commanding general on one side would send his men forward with bayonets fixed. The advancing soldiers would expect to fire one shot, and to be shot at once in turn by soldiers of the defending army, before the gap was closed and the armies engaged one another with bayonets and musket butts. In Napoleon's day such tactics were often effective (especially if the attacking general had his cavalry poised and ready to follow up any successes achieved on the battlefield by his infantry).

By the time the Civil War began, however, rifling of musket barrels had increased a shoulder arm's effective range by three to four times (from 100 to 300-400 yards). Technological advances also made it easier to load a shoulder arm- an experi-enced Civil War soldier firing a single-shot muzzle loading weapon could load and fire two to three times per minute. Soldiers defending a position during the Civil War could thus fire five or more rounds during the same time period that a defending Napoleonic soldier could have fired one, possibly two rounds at best. Naturally, this "new math" in infantry tactics greatly decreased the life expectancy of Civil War soldiers asked to attack well-fortified positions. The cold equations were proved in human lives time and again at battlefields such as Marye's Heights and Cold Harbor. It didn't take the enlisted men long to realize that direct assaults against an enemy who'd had plenty of time to dig in and fortify his position were a fool's game (although some officers on both sides took a long time to realize that times had changed). Union General Sherman was one of the pioneers in achieving objectives by stealth and manoeuver rather than by direct assault. ¹¹

Civil War armies served in a particular theater of operations. The Eastern Theater was comprised of those states east of the Appalachian Mountains. The Western Theater was comprised of those states west of the Appalachian Mountains and east of the Mississippi River. The Trans-Mississippi West Theater was comprised of all states west of the Mississippi River. Northerners generally named their armies after the largest navigable river in the army's area of operations, i.e. Army of the Cumberland or Army of the Tennessee. Southerners generally named their armies after the land area in which they served: i.e. Army of Tennessee or Army of Northern Virginia. ¹²

The army was the largest functioning unit in the Union Army. It was normally commanded by a Major-General. The next largest unit was the Corps, which averaged 16,000 men in size. The corps was also normally commanded by a Major-General. The Corps was composed of two or more divisions, each which averaged 6,200 men in size. The typical division was composed of three or four brigades. The brigade was supposed to be commanded by a brigadier general, although as the war dragged on and casualties mounted brigades were sometimes commanded by colonels, lieutenant colonels, or even majors (and occasionally captains). A brigade was composed of four or five regiments, each of which theoretically had 1,000 men under arms. Wounds and sickness could greatly decrease a regiment's manpower complement, however: by the time of the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863, for example, average Union Army regimental strength was 440 men. By the time of Sherman's May 1864 campaign against Atlanta, Georgia, average Union Army regimental strength was an astoundingly low 305 men. ¹³

A typical Civil War attack formation would have consisted of an advance guard of skirmishers, a battle corps forward in two lines, a reserve corps, and a rear guard. The skirmishers were there to help locate the enemy, determine his strength and position on the battlefield, and help prevent the main body of men from being caught by surprise. The rear guard, which usually consisted of a cavalry regiment, was there as much to turn back friendly stragglers as it was to protect the army from attack from the rear. ¹⁴ The Civil War was decidedly a contest of foot soldiers. Artillery and cavalry regiments were important parts of each army, and played vital roles in carrying out the missions of their respective armies, but most of the fighting (and the dying) was done by infantrymen. Of 2,046 regiments raised for Union Army service during the Civil War, 1,696 were infantry regiments, 272 were cavalry regiments, and 78 were artillery regiments. Of every 1,000 Union Army battle deaths, 32 were artillerymen, 123 were cavalrymen, and 845 were infantrymen. ¹⁵ Regiments did not bear the brunt of the fighting equally, however. Of the 2,046 regiments raised for service in the Union Army, 45 regiments lost 300 or more men killed in action or mortally wounded, while 300 regiments never saw combat during the war. Part of role played by a regiment depended upon at what point in the war it was raised, of course, but part of it was also the luck of the draw. ¹⁶

It was no simple task to move and equip the masses of men who served in the Union Army. The North certainly had the advantage of the South from the beginning, both in terms of industrial capacity and transportation. In 1860, factories in the Northern states had produced 97% of the firearms manufactured in the United States, 93% of the pig iron, and fully 90% of all boots and shoes made in this country. Is it any wonder (especially once the Union naval blockade was firmly in place) that many rebel soldiers did a considerable amount of marching in their bare feet? The transportation situation was no better for the Confederacy. The Northern states had twice the South's density of railroads per square mile, and several times as many miles of canals and macadamized roads. The Northern states had also produced 451 of the 470 locomotives built in the United States in 1860. Early in the war, the generally superior quality of Southern military leaders made the average battle a fairly lopsided contest. When men like Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas rose to positions of power, however, the North's unmatchable industrial capacity, superior transportation infrastructure, greater numbers of men of military age, and vastly superior navy made eventual Southern defeat an inevitability. ¹⁷

An army on the march needed lots of supplies. Supplies were generally brought to central supply points by railroad, and then sent on to secondary supply points by rail if possible, by wagon train or by boat if necessary. At its greatest point during the war, the United States Military Railroad Service operated more than 400 locomotives on more than 2,100 miles of track. It took nearly 25,000 men to keep so many trains running. ¹⁸ An army of 100,000 men needed 600 tons of supplies daily. If those supplies had to be moved by wagon, the task would require 2,500 wagons, each with a team of 14 draft animals (horses or mules). Each wagon carried nearly 500 pounds of supplies. Supplies carried could include food for men and animals, medicines, and ammunition.

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A large part of each supply train would consisted of ammunition, however. Civil War soldiers used astonishingly large amounts of it to kill one another. It has been estimated that the Union Army used an average of 900 pounds of lead and 240 pounds of powder to kill each rebel soldier who was killed in action or died or wounds received in battle. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 144 pounds, it can be seen that the Union Army had to let loose an amount of ordnance equal to 8 times the body weight of each rebel soldier it killed (numbers were comparable on the rebel side). ¹⁹ The official records of the war in fact show that prodigious amounts of ordnance were used by Civil War armies in the field. During the period May 4-September 8, 1864, Union General Sherman's army expended more than 22,000,000 firearm cartridges, of which 21,340,226 were the misnamed Minie balls (Minie balls were actually conoidal in shape- they were fired by Springfield and Enfield rifle-muskets). Sherman's soldiers also used 390,322 Spencer cartridges and 127,195 Henry cartridges (the Spencer and Henry were breechloading weapons, not muzzleloaders like the Springfield and Enfield rifle-muskets). During this same period, only 40,633 cartridges for pistols of various makes and caliber were used (pistols were mainly a weapon used by officers). The cartridges not accounted for thus far were used by a wide variety of other shoulder arms, including 84,000 cartridges for the carbine (lighter, short-barrelled shoulder weapon intended for use by cavalry troopers) which was designed by Union General Ambrose Burnside. ²⁰

Artillery batteries also used prodigious amounts of ammunition. A typical artillery regiment consisted of 8 to 12 batteries (each battery had 144 officers and men). Civil war cannon were typically made of bronze (or "brass," as it was commonly referred to by cannon makers). Cannons could also be formed from cast iron, wrought iron, and steel, either alone or in combination. Cannon designations were determined by the weight of the solid shot the weapon was able to fire. A 32-pounder cannon, therefore, fired a solid shot which weighed approximately 32 pounds. The 32-pounder cannon itself weighed 2,700 pounds. A cannon used much more frequently during the Civil War, the 12-pounder, fired a 12 pound solid shot (the gun itself weighed 880 pounds). Ammunition for field artillery consisted of five main types of projectile. Long-range gunnery called for use of solid shot, explosive shells, and spherical case shot. Solid shot received the most use, because of its simplicity and reliability. ²¹ Solid shot could also be quite deadly: 1st Lieutenant Peter G. Tait of Company G was killed at the Battle of Nashville on December 16, 1864, when a solid shot pierced his chest. Private Elijah Youlin was killed during the opening assault at Stones River when a cannon ball struck him in the head. A bouncing solid shot could knock down and incapacitate numerous men; the shock wave from a solid shot landing close by a man lying on the ground could knock him unconscious or even kill him. Sgt. Isham Williams was killed in that manner during the siege of Atlanta on August 12, 1864. ²²

Spherical case shot was the most deadly, if not the most reliable, type of long-range ammunition. A standard Union Army 6-pounder case shot consisted of 41 .69 caliber lead balls; a standard 12-pounder case shot consisted of 78 .69 caliber balls. A projectile of this sort exploding a little above and to the front of an advancing column of troops showered them with a densely packed swarm of .69 caliber balls. The reason case shot was not employed more frequently is that fuse technology had not been perfected, so case shot could not be depended upon to explode when and where desired. Confederate fuses were even less reliable than Union fuses. ²³

Close-range gunning called for canister or grape shot. Each type of close-range projectile functioned like a super-sized shotgun shell, throwing numerous iron or lead balls at the enemy. Canister shot was smaller than grape shot (grape shot was used more often by naval vessels than in land warfare). A regulation stand of 12-pounder canister shot consisted of 148 .69 caliber balls. A regulation stand of 12-pounder grape shot consisted of 9 lead or iron balls ranging in diameter from 2.06 inches to 2.02 inches. A 12-pounder stand of grapeshot measured 5.8 inches in length and weighed 14.8 pounds. A 24-pounder stand of grapeshot was even more formidable. A regulation stand of 24-pounder grape consisted on 9 lead or iron balls ranging in diameter from 2.60 inches to 2.64 inches. It measured 7.5 inches in length and weighed 30.6 pounds. ²⁴

The Confederate army was employing similar ordnance against federal soldiers. While it suffered shortages of nearly everything else except tobacco, after the summer of 1862 the Confederate army usually had enough ordnance, although the quality of its guns and ammunition was always inferior to Union Army cannon and ammunition. The Union Army, especially in the last two years of the year, had enough quality guns and ammunition on hand that captured munitions were rarely utilized. ²⁵

Occasionally necessity dictated the employment of less-conventional types of projectile. During the storming of Kennesaw Mountain in northern Georgia in June 1864, startled Union troops found themselves dodging shovels, rocks, and even clods of dirt. One unfortunate Illinois soldier (who had already narrowly avoided injury when a rock knocked off his hat) looked up in time to see a boulder Confederates had rolled down at him. He was hit by the boulder, and was swept back down the mountain. Another projectile used by desperate rebel soldiers consisted of rags rolled into a ball and dipped in turpentine. To make things interesting, these "rag balls" were set on fire before being tossed at advancing Union soldiers. ²⁶

It certainly requires courage to face the enemy's weapons. This was especially true in the Civil War, since soldiers usually knew a day or more in advance that they would be assaulting the enemy or resisting his assault on their position. The night before a regiment was to engage in battle, company commanders gathered at the tent of the regiment's colonel to receive their marching orders. The company commanders then returned to inform their companies. The men's equipment would then be inspected to ensure that it was all there, and in good working order. Then the men were given 40-60 bullets and a marching ration of salt beef and hardtack. The men would be awakened earlier than usual on the morning of their march to the front. It was not unusual for reveille to be sounded at 2 or 3 AM. At that time roll was called, and men unable to march went on surgeon's call. The men were allowed to eat breakfast, then gathered their possessions for the day's march. At this time many men would discard their uncomfortable knapsacks and roll up their possessions in a blanket. The blanket was then tied off at each end worn around the neck as a sort of human horse collar. ²⁷

A regiment marched with its brigade. It also normally attacked with or faced attacks in company with its brigade. The average attacking brigade had a frontage of about 1,300 yards: it was normally preceeded by a line of skirmishers which was usually made up of one company from each of the brigade's regiments. The advance towards the enemy normally proceeded at a rapid pace, although not at a run. Soldiers marching at quick-time travelled 86 yards (110 steps) per minute. Double quick-time meant a rate of advance of 109 yards (140 steps) per minute. Firing of rifle-muskets normally began when the advancing men were about 200-300 yards from their stationary opponents. ²⁸

One thing about a battle noted by nearly all participants was its noise level. In addition to the sounds of musket and cannon fire, men on both sides often shouted and cursed at the enemy (and on occasion at one another). Many men who rarely swore in camp were heard to "swear like teamsters" when the lead began to fly. ²⁹ Both sides also had their distinctive battle cries. The famous "rebel yell" was a wild, piercing cry that, once heard, was never forgotten. The standard Union battle cry, by contrast, was a more restrained, deeply intoned hurrah or huzzah. The mouths of men who were biting open black powder cartridges throughout a battle were soon ringed with dark circles, giving them the appearance of Indian braves or demons. At Antietam, a Union colonel ordered his men to "put on the war paint," that is, actually smear their faces with black powder in Indian fashion. He then ordered the men to accompany him in an Indian war whoop. Because the regiment achieved its objective that day, any potential scoffers were effectively silenced. ³⁰

When the screams and moans of the wounded were added to the existing noises of the battlefield, it can only be imagined what a bedlam a major Civil War battle must have seemed to the average foot soldier. Add to these noises the "music" of muskets and cannon rounds, and the absolute bedlam of the scene becomes painfully obvious. The flight of musket rounds through the air was variously described by Civil War soldiers as a whistle, whine, shriek, whiz, or hum; it was also sometimes compared to the buzzing of thousands of bees. A Union soldier in the Atlanta campaign compared the noise of a passing Minie ball to the meow of a kitten. ³¹

A variety of emotions came into play in men engaged in battle. An initial feeling of fear or dread often gave way to more complex emotions. Many men told of being overcome with anger during a fight, and that the anger overcame their fear. Fear normally manifested itself as a dryness of the throat and/or lips, a sense of heaviness in the region of the chest that could make breathing seem labored, and sometimes as heavy perspiration. ³²

An emotion men in battle sometimes felt but less often discussed was excitement. Many men on both sides looked forward to situations in which they could do a disproportionate amount of killing. A Confederate captain at Missionary Ridge reported in his diary about what fun it had been "..to lie here and shoot them down and not get hurt." For some men on both sides, the killing of other men was merely sport hunting in another guise. ³³ Of course, being in a battle sometimes involved being hurt oneself. The Confederate captain cited above was later wounded during that same engagement. He made the following entry in his diary: Several cried out, "Captain, you are hit," "The Captain's hit," and several came to help me down. At first I could not realize that I was shot. It felt like someone had struck my leg with the side of a ramrod or a stick and had benumbed it somewhat." ³⁴

232,271 Union soldiers suffered gunshot wounds during the war. Of these, 67,058 were killed in action. 29,980 gunshot cases resulted in amputations, and 22,430 of these unfortunate soldiers did survive the procedure. ³⁵ Death was not the final indignity suffered by many men who died in battle. The degree of indignity yet to come varied, depending on whether a dead man had belonged to the side that had won the battle or lost it. The dead on the victorious side were normally buried in their blankets, often by men from their own regiment. Their graves were then marked by boards on which was inscribed the man's name, regiment, company, and state. The corpses of enemy dead, on the other hand, were first robbed of any items of value, including clothing, and were then buried stacked like cordwood in mass graves with no identification to tell the world who they had been or how they had died. ³⁶

¹ Beyond the Battlefield: the Ordinary Life and Extraordinary Times of the Civil War Soldier (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), ed. by David Madden, 29-30.

². Madden 31-32.

³ Madden 34-35.

⁴ 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, Regimental File, Illinois State Archives, Springfield, Illinois; Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, rev. by Brigadier General J. N. Reece (Springfield: Phillips Brothers, 1901) vol. 5, 275 (hereafter cited as RAGI- volume is assumed to be unless otherwise noted).

⁵ RAGI, vol. 5, 287.

⁶ Madden 42-43.

⁷ Madden 53-54.

⁸ Arms and Equipment of the Union (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1991) 14; RAGI, vol. 5, 272.

⁹ Madden 64-65.

¹⁰ Madden 64-65, 201-204.

¹¹ Arms 26-27; Bryan S. Bush, Civil War Battles of the Western Theatre (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company) 118; Herman Hattaway & Archer Jones, How the North Won: a Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991) 705-720; Mahon 235-265.

¹² Bush 120.

¹³ Bush 123-124; Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1962) 21; Mahon 256.

¹⁴ Coggins 23; Mahon 256-257.

¹⁵ Frank E. Vandiver, Civil War Battlefields and Landmarks: a Guide to the National Park Sites; with Official National Park Service Maps for Each Site (New York: Random House, 1996) 141.

¹⁶ Coggins 234.

¹⁷ James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988) 32-33.

¹⁸ McPherson 49.

¹⁹ Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928) vol. I, 139.

²⁰ Coggins 30.

²¹ Arms 296-309; Bush 105, 109-114; Vandiver 151.

²² RAGI, vol. 5, 265, 277.

²³ Arms 305; Bush 113; Vandiver 151-152.

²⁴ Bush 109-110; Warren Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970) get page; Vandiver 151.

²⁵ Ripley 220.

²⁶ Ronald H. Bailey, Battles for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985) get page.

²⁷ Arms 195-196; Delia Ray, Behind the Blue and Gray: the Soldier's Life in the Civil War (New York: Puffin Books, 1996) 34.

²⁸ Coggins 57; Mahon 260.

²⁹ Ray 37-38; Wiley 212.

³⁰ Ray 38-40; Wiley 243.

³¹ Wiley 199.

³² Ray 34.

³³ Samuel T. Foster, One of Cleburne's Command: the Civil War Reminiscences and Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster, Granbury's Texas Brigade, CSA (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980) 84-85.

³⁴ Foster 87-89.

³⁵ Wiley 200.

³⁶ Guide to the Battle of Chickamauga (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), ed. by Matt Spruill, 246-247.