by
Thomas A. Pearson

Text and photos copyright © 2004 by Thomas A. Pearson. All rights reserved.

"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."
--Napoleon Bonaparte

For two months after the Chickamauga battle, the two sides jockeyed for position, re-supplying themselves as best they could. The Union Army was bottled up in Chattanooga and Knoxville; Bragg's army was perched atop Missionary Ridge in works considered well-nigh unassailable. ¹ About midway between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge was a large wooded hill known as Orchard Knob (it was also sometimes called Indian Hill). The capture of Orchard Knob was deemed necessary before further operations could be directed against Missionary Ridge. Orchard Knob's elevation and strategic location would have allowed the rebels to observe and enfilade movements against Missionary Ridge. As the situation unfolded, Orchard Knob would serve as Union Army headquarters and afford Union generals Grant, Thomas, and Granger an unsurpassed view of Union operations against Missionary Ridge. ²

Around noon on November 23, 1863, Union troops were deployed to the front of Fort Wood, facing Orchard Knob. Major General Thomas J. Wood's division (which included Brigadier General August Willich's brigade) was out in front. The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment was in the second line of Willich's brigade, behind the 49th Ohio Infantry Regiment. To the right and rear of Wood's division were the divisions of Sheridan and Baird, followed by Howard's reserve division. The division of Major General Richard W. Johnson (formerly Rousseau's division) stood ready in entrenchments in front of Fort Wood, ready to go where directed. ³

Wood was given the go-ahead around 2 PM. The brigades of Willich and Hazen were out in front, while Beatty's brigade followed close on their heels. The assault was over shortly after it began: Willich's brigade carried Orchard Knob with little difficulty, while Hazen's brigade was met with somewhat greater resistance on the lesser hill they carried, which stood a bit to the right of Orchard Knob. General Willich assumed a defensive posture on Orchard knob, while General Howard took a position to his left and General Baird one to his right. In the assault on Orchard Knob Willich had lost four men killed, and ten wounded. The brigade then erected breastworks on the crest of Orchard Knob, as rebel guns on Missionary Ridge dropped shells in the vicinity, which made lots of noise and raised lots of dust, but did little damage to men or animals. ⁴

The brigade remained in its works on Orchard knob until 9 AM, November 25th. On the morning of the 24th, two companies of the 89th Illinois under Lt. E. O. Young had relieved men of the 49th Ohio who had been acting as skirmishers. These skirmishers had been ordered to advance about 1,000 yards in the direction of Missionary Ridge, where they were ordered to halt. Skirmishers from the 89th Illinois maintained this forward line until 2 PM on November 25th, when they were relieved in turn by men from the 49th Ohio (no men from the 89th Illinois were hurt while performing this duty). ⁵

The night of November 24th had brought a rare sight to northern Georgia: a near-total eclipse of the moon. The event was viewed by some men on both sides as a harbinger of bad luck for the defending rebels. ⁶ Union pickets on Lookout Mountain (which Hooker's men had carried on the 24th) discovered on the morning of the 25th that the rebels had withdrawn during the night. Confederate commander General Braxton Bragg had decided (probably correctly) that he didn't have sufficient men to hold both Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and so withdrew his men from Lookout Mountain. Bragg also feared a morning attack on his right flank, and so sent the troops withdrawn from Lookout Mountain to reinforce his right. ⁷

As the sun rose on November 25th, Captain John Wilson and five of his men from the 8th Kentucky Infantry raised the U. S. flag atop the summit of Lookout Mountain. The sounds of cheering and music erupted from Union troops below, including those on Orchard Knob. To rebel troops on Missionary Ridge, the sight of the enemy flag flapping in the breeze was the second ill omen they had received in a period of less than 12 hours. The fall of Lookout Mountain also meant a resumption of the free flow of supplies into Chattanooga: railroad and river delivery of supplies to the Union Army could resume without the threat of rebel interference. ⁸

Major General Hooker and his men were sent by Lieutenant General Grant to find and engage Bragg's left flank near Rossville Gap, while Major General Sherman was under orders to attack and seize Tunnel Hill. Sherman had a numerical advantage over his opponent, rebel General Patrick Cleburne, but Cleburne held nearly all the other aces. To take Tunnel Hill, Sherman's men would have to go down a hill into a valley, advance across an open field, and then climb a steep incline to reach Cleburne's position. The entire advance would take place in full view of Cleburne's men, who were well-protected by sturdy breastworks made from logs and earth. ⁹

Sherman began his advance soon after sunrise on November 25th. Three Union divisions went forward that morning. A division led by Sherman's brother-in-law, Brigadier General Hugh Ewing, moved straight for Tunnel Hill, while a second division followed as his reserve. The third division was sent north in an attempt to turn the rebel right flank. ¹⁰ The advancing Union troops encountered a fierce artillery barrage from well-placed rebel guns. Cleburne's infantry waited until Ewing's men got within about 80 yards of their works and then opened fire. The resulting firefight continued for more than two hours, with combatants on both sides displaying courage and tenacity which amazed their opposite numbers. Sherman's attack finally stalled all along the line, however. The rebels then launched a bayonet charge which sent Ewing's men scurrying back to Union lines. ¹¹

Sherman sent word to Grant that his men were spent, the assault on Tunnel Hill a failure. Grant's reply could not have been a welcome one: "Attack again." Sherman obeyed, but only grudgingly. 200 men of General Lightburn's brigade were sent forward, and were cut to pieces in short order. Sherman ordered Lightburn and his remaining men to dig in. Sherman clearly believed that his men could accomplish no more that day. ¹²

Grant hoped that Hooker's assault on the rebel left would go better than had Sherman's assault on the rebel right, and he was not disappointed. It took Hooker longer than anticipated to get moving: his engineers had to repair a damaged bridge across Chattanooga Creek. By 3 PM, however, Hooker was at Rossville Gap, as ordered, and his men began almost immediately to make progress. Once they had a toehold on the southern slope of Missionary Ridge, Hooker's men proceeded to slowly roll up the Confederate left flank. ¹³

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Grant meanwhile had decided to send General Thomas' Army of the Cumberland against the Confederate center. He believed (mistakenly, as it turned out) that Bragg was funneling reinforcements along the line to Cleburne on the rebel right. Because Grant wanted to relieve some of the pressure on Sherman, who was opposing Cleburne, and because he knew darkness would in several hours preclude all hope of a Union breakthrough, he finally came to a decision: Thomas' men would advance and take the rebel rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge. They would then await further orders from Grant. Grant did not completely trust Thomas or his Army of the Cumberland because of the stinging Union rout at Chickamauga, even though it had been Thomas and his men who had saved the Union Army from utter annihilation on that battleground. That is mainly why Grant's order only extended to the capture of the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. ¹⁴

Grant did not know that Bragg's inept planning had left Missionary Ridge much less formidable an objective than it appeared. Bragg's first error had been to attempt to defend four miles of ridge with three army divisions, which made for much too thin a line. Next, he chose to position fully half his already thin force in the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. Then, to compound that error, he instructed the men in the rifle pits to fire one volley at any oncoming enemy troops and then scramble up the ridge. Lastly, he situated the Confederate breastworks along the ridge line on the true crest of the ridge (its highest elevation), not a bit farther down the ridge at its military crest (the place at which rebel gunners would have the broadest field of fire at an enemy force attacking the ridge). ¹⁵

There was an hour's delay in the execution of Grant's order. It seemed that General Granger, commander of the attacking army corps, had somehow got so caught up in the workings of his artillery that he actually began to sight in and fire some of the guns. He was observed to exult with the men whenever a shot hit its intended target. When Grant discovered the reason that the assault had been delayed, he had Thomas send word to Granger to "leave that battery to its captain" and begin the assault. Once Grant got Granger's attention, the assault proceeded to occur "in an incredibly short time" (Grant's own words in his official report). The men of the Army of the Cumberland were aware that Grant didn't trust them, and deeply resented that fact. They were anxious to show the general just how wrong he was. ¹⁶

The men moved forward to the rear of Orchard Knob in precise formation, with flags flying and musicians playing. It must have been an inspiring sight for Union observers on Orchard Knob, and yet another ill-omen for rebel observers on Missionary Ridge. The men massed behind Orchard Knob in line by division. Baird's division was on the far left flank, while to his right were the divisions of Thomas J. Wood, Philip Sheridan, and Richard W. Johnson. The 89th Illinois (which was commanded this day by Lt. Colonel William D. Williams) was part of Willich's brigade, which was in the first line of Wood's division in the Union center. ¹⁷

At the sound of a pre-arranged signal (six successive cannon shots), the Union advance proceeded at quick-time. The brigade passed to the left of Orchard knob and then headed straight for the ridge. The 89th Illinois was in formation in double column directly behind the 49th Ohio. As the great blue mass came ever closer to the rebel rifle pits at the base of the ridge, cannoneers on both sides opened fire. Rebel guns firing explosive shells and spherical case shot began ripping holes in the Union line. The order went out to advance at the double-quick, and the great blue line surged forward. No riflemen on either side had fired a shot as yet. ¹⁸

At a point about 500 yards from the rebel rifle pits, the men of the 89th switched from double column to single line of battle. The rebels in the rifle pits waited until their advancing foes were between 200-300 yards distant, and then opened fire. The volley was accurate, and tore more holes in the Union line, which was now advancing at a dead run. Most of the rebel riflemen in the pits now began scrambling up the ridge as Bragg had instructed. Some of these waited too long to begin their escapes, however, and were captured at bayonet point by advancing Union soldiers. The Union troops paused for a moment in the rifle pits at the base of the ridge, tired but pleased. But their situation had now changed somewhat. Their own artillery had ceased fire, for fear of hitting Union men. Rebel artillery and small arms on the ridge, however, continued to fire on the Union soldiers below (the rebels had artillery positioned at both ends of their line). ¹⁹

It seemed to occur suddenly to Union troops all along the line that they faced greater danger staying where they were than they would if they were to continue their forward movement up the face of Missionary Ridge. Brigadier General Willich put it this way in his official report: It was evident to everyone that to stay in this position would be certain destruction and final defeat; every soldier felt the necessity of saving the day and the campaign by conquering, and every one saw instinctively that the only place of safety was in the enemy's works on the crest of the ridge. ²⁰

Men at various points along the line more or less simultaneously began to scramble up the ridge on the heels of the rebels who had just vacated the rifle pits. As Captain Frank Hobbs of the 89th Illinois' Co. H stated it in a reminiscence after the war, the men felt "...compelled to go on without orders and not much of an alignment or order about it every man for himself." ²¹ On Orchard Knob, General Grant watched the spontaneous advance begin, then whirled on General Thomas and demanded to know who had ordered the assault. Thomas replied that he hadn't, and didn't know who had. Grant made the same demand of General Granger, who didn't know who had, but added, "When those fellows get started, all hell can't stop them." ²²

Union officers involved in the advance up the ridge were in a quandry. The men had begun an assault that, while daring and heroic, was possibly foolhardy and most certainly a violation of orders. Division commander Philip Sheridan actually sent a message to General Granger asking if the desired objective was to hold the rifle pits or to take the ridge itself. By the time Granger's answer was received, the men were well on their way up the ridge. Sheridan let them proceed. ²³

The men had a tough time scrambling up the ridge. It was only possible in some places to advance by using bayonets as rude pitons, or by grabbing tree limbs or brush for leverage. The 89th Illinois advanced along a crescent-shaped ridge. Captain Hobbs reported that "...there was a ravine to our left with fallen timber, rocks, & c." ²⁴ The Union troops advancing up the ridge were aided by two factors not of their own creation. The first factor was the faulty placement of the rebel breastworks along the ridge line. In many cases, rebel riflemen on the ridge could not fire on advancing Union troops without rising up from their works to do so, thus exposing themselves to return fire. The poor placement of the rebel line along the ridge also meant that rebel cannoneers often could not depress their guns enough to fire on the advancing Union soldiers. The second factor aiding the advancing Union troops was Bragg's decision to have rebel skirmishers in the rifle pits at the base of the ridge fire one volley and then flee up the ridge. In many places Union troops were close on the heels of rebels scurrying up the ridge, and riflemen and gunners on the ridge could not fire without hitting their own returning men. ²⁵

This did not mean that Union troops had an easy time of it. Some rebel battery commanders had elected to reposition their guns to afford a less restricted field of fire, and these guns raked the masses of men scrambling up the ridge. Some rebel defenders rolled down artillery shells rigged with a fuse to serve as crude hand grenades. On this day, though, it seemed that nothing could stop the Army of the Cumberland. All along the slopes of the ridge rang shouts of "Forward!" and "Chickamauga!" As the first bluecoats topped the ridge, an odd and inexplicable panic seemed to seize many of the rebel defenders on the crest. Whole gray brigades broke and ran. Men who had faced every hardship war had to offer with stoic good humor threw down their arms and skedaddled like green troops. Even the personal entreaties of General Bragg himself barely slowed down his fleeing men. ²⁶

Dozens of Union regiments topped the crest almost simultaneously. General Willich in his official report stated that "the right of the brigade reached the crest first," and that "the advancing right silenced the enemy's lone battery on that part of the ridge," while regiment's on the brigade's left "took one of the two batteries" situated on that part of the ridge. As they topped the crest of the ridge two officers of the 89th Illinois were shot by rebel soldiers. Captain Henry L. Rowell of Co. C died of wounds received on the crest of the ridge on December 3, 1863, eight days after the battle. 1st Lieutenant Erastus O. Young of Co A, having just reached the crest, was shot dead after just having shouted, "Forward and victory!" to the men of his company (according to the official report of Lt. Colonel William D. Williams of the 89th). Also killed outright in the assault were Pvt. Jacob Wagmen of Co. G, Pvt. George E. Phipps of Co. H, and Pvt. William L.Buffington of Co. H. 31 men of the regiment were wounded in the assault, three mortally. Watchers on Orchard Knob were treated to the stirring sight of 53 Union regimental flags fluttering in the breeze atop Missionary Ridge. Union soldiers on the crest shouted, danced, wept, and threw their haversacks in the air. The attack that shouldn't have happened had succeeded beyond all expectations. ²⁷

The day's work was not done as yet, however. Some rebels were still holding their ground, and had to be dislodged from the ridge. While several of Willich's regiments secured rebel batteries, the 89th Illinois and several brother regiments pursued the fleeing rebels for a distance of 1,000 yards beyond the crest of the ridge. At that point they were halted and their prisoners secured, while they awaited further instruction. ²⁸

A modest pursuit of the enemy was mounted by other elements of the Union Army. Captured cannon were turned on their former owners and used to deadly effect, the guns in at least one case being set off by a soldier who fired his shoulder arm near the gun's touchhole, thus igniting the gunpowder within. A number of fleeing rebel batteries were captured when their horses were shot dead. Numerous prisoners, cannon, and rebel regimental flags were taken in the pursuit, although a majority of the fleeing rebels did manage to escape down the road to Chickamauga Station. Rebels under General Cleburne at the northern end of the ridge hadn't fled yet, partly because they didn't know as yet that the rest of the rebel line had collapsed. Cleburne's men had broken each of Sherman's attempts to advance, and were astonished to learn from General Hardee himself that they would now have to retreat or be flanked. ²⁹

Darkness was falling when the 89th Illinois received orders from General Willich to stack arms and bivouac for the night atop Missionary Ridge. The regiment remained in that place until the evening of November 26th, when orders came for the brigade to return to its previous camp at Fort Wood near Chattanooga. ³⁰ General Grant attempted on November 26th and 27th to chase and catch the fleeing Confederate army. A force under Major General Hooker did catch up with a force under General Cleburne near Ringgold, Georgia. Cleburne lured Hooker's men into a trap, however, and inflicted 442 casualties on the bluecoats, while himself suffering only 221 casualties. ³¹

Grant finally called off the Union pursuit because he didn't wish to range too far from his supply base at Chattanooga. He was also under pressure from his political bosses in Washington to bail out Major General Burnside, who was besieged at Knoxville, Tennessee by a rebel force under General James Longstreet (Longstreet had been detached by Bragg from his force guarding Missionary Ridge, a move Bragg later regretted). A force under General Sherman was sent to rescue Burnside and his "starving" men. Sherman discovered that, while Burnside was certainly under siege, he and his men were most definitely not starving. Burnside in fact treated Sherman and his staff officers to a turkey dinner. Sherman was annoyed at having been forced to drive his men hard for no apparent reason. But his arrival did serve to motivate Longstreet to break off his siege of Knoxville. ³²

The Chattanooga campaign was a solid Union victory. The rebels suffered approximately 6,700 casualties (of whom 4,100 were captured, most of them after the rout on Missionary Ridge). The Union Army suffered 5,800 casualties, of whom 350 were men captured by the rebel army. The Union Army had done much more than merely inflict casualties on its opponent, however. It now had clear possession of Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. The stage was thus set for a Spring 1864 Union Army campaign against Atlanta and the Southern heartland. ³³

Notes:

¹ Michael H. Fitch, The Chattanooga Campaign, with Especial Reference to Wisconsin's Participation Therein (Madison: Wisconsin History Commission, 1911) 188-189.

² Battle Chronicles of the Civil War: 1863, ed. by James M. McPherson (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989- hereafter cited as Chronicles) 224; Fitch 191-192; Hicken 224; Francis F. McKinney, Education in Violence: the Life of George H. Thomas and the History of the Army of the Cumberland (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961) 286; United States. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901- hereafter cited as O.R.- all citations are to Series I, Volume XXXI, Part II, unless otherwise noted) 252-253, 255; Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army, 1861-1865: Organization and Operations, vol. 2: the Western Theater (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) 516.

³ Fitch 190-191; O.R. 254, 263, 269.

⁴ Chronicles 224-225; Henry Cist, The Army of the Cumberland (1882; Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2002) 247-248; Fitch 191; McKinney 288; O.R. 254-255, 263-264, 269; Welcher 516.

⁵ O.R. 257-258, 264, 269, 277.

⁶ Chronicles 229; Jerry Korn, The Fight for Chattanooga (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985) .

⁷ McKinney 289-290; Welcher 516-517.

⁸ Chronicles 225-226; McKinney 290-291; O.R. 78.

⁹ Chronicles 226; Timothy H. Donovan, Jr., The American Civil War (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Co., 1987) 184; McKinney 292; O.R. 574-575; Welcher 519.

¹⁰ Victor Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1991) 225; O.R. 574-575; Welcher 519.

¹¹ Chronicles 230; Cist 252-253; Donovan 185-186; Fitch 202-203; O.R. 574-575; Welcher 518-519.