General Thomas sensed weakness on the rebel left.  Thomas's scouts had detected a three-mile long gap between the rebel left flank at Hillsboro Turnpike and the Cumberland River that was only thinly guarded by a skeleton force of rebel cavalry and infantry.  Thomas decided on a plan involving subterfuge and stealth.  He would send Steadman's division against the rebel right as a diversion, while artillery in the Nashville works would fire on S. D. Lee in the rebel center, keeping him braced for a potential assault.

While these events transpired, Wilson's cavalry and the corps of Smith and Wood would swing to the Union right and charge through the gap on the rebel left between the Hillsboro Turnpike and the Cumberland River.  Once in position, they could fall on the rebel left flank and roll up Hood's entire line.

The Union attack was scheduled for 6 AM.  A heavy fog delayed Union action until 8 AM.  At that time Steedman's men began their show of force on the rebel right, while Union artillery kept S. D. Lee guessing at the rebel center.  Wilson's cavalry led the way for the corps of Wood and Smith on the Union right (rebel left flank).  Wilson's men had to contend with ground made muddy and slick by precipitation and cold, but still made short work of Hood's skeleton crew guarding the gap between the Hillsboro Pike and the Cumberland River.

By midday, the corps of Smith and Wood were in position, formed in a continuous line that flanked the rebel left under Stewart as Thomas had planned (Schofield's corps was in reserve).  Stewart's men slowly gave way under the Union assault.  Help came from Hood in the guise of Edward Johnston's division (lent from S. D. Lee's corps).  But Johnston's men quickly gave way before superior numbers.  By nightfall, only Bate's division (on loan from Cheatham) and Ector's brigade were holding the rebel left.

The rebel line that Thomas's army faced on the morning of December 16th consisted on S. D. lee on the right, Stewart in the center, and Cheatham on the right.  Because the Union Army had not expected to be facing a rebel army when day broke, there was no specific Union Army plan of action.  Union infantry and artillery were moved into position hastily to prepare for an assault.  While this was being done, Thomas sent Wilson's cavalry around the rebel left.  These men then blocked the Granny White Turnpike, leaving Hood with the Franklin Turnpike as his only escape route.

The rebel right was the focus of the first Union assault.  Troops under Steedman and Wood were sent against the rebels under S. D. Lee.  lee's men held, but Cheatham's corps on the left were then threatened by a line of Wilson's dismounted troopers.  Meanwhile, troops under Generals Schofield and Smith were poised on the rebel left and center respectively.  In the late afternoon, Brigadier General John McArthur (Douglas McArthur's father) asked General Smith for permission to storm Shy's Hill (which anchored the rebel left).  Smith by his silence gave McArthur the go-ahead.

McArthur told his men to fix bayonets, and to remain quiet unless and until they had taken Shy's Hill.  The hill was held by Bates's division.  The breastworks on the hill, however, had been laid out improperly.  In an eerie echo of conditions on Missionary Ridge, the works was situated on the hill's geographic crest, rather than properly on its military crest (placing the works on the geographic crest foreshortened the defenders' field of fire, both infantry and artillery, and meant that Union attackers could use the hill to cover their advance until they were within about twenty yards or so of the rebel defenders).

As McArthur's men advanced, the rebels began firing on them.  But the poor placement of the rebel works (and the fierce determination of McArthur's men) combined to greatly favor the Union attackers.  McArthur's men were breaking the line on Shy's Hill just as Schofield's men began to advance on the Union right (rebel left).  Rebels of Colonel William Shy's 37th Tennessee Infantry stood their ground on the hill until Colonel Shy was shot in the head and killed instantly.  At that point, rebel resistance began to crumble due to the sheer weight of Union numbers on their front and pressure from Wilson's dismounted cavalry on their far left.

The rebel left finally collapsed as the men sensed the hopelessness of their situation.  Fleeing men headed south along the Franklin Turnpike, their only escape route (since some of Wilson's troopers blocked access to the Granny White Turnpike).  The success of the assault on the Union right seemed to inspire Wood's men on the Union left.  They finally broke through S. D. Lee's line, although Lee managed to put together an orderly retreat that proved to be be the only thing preventing an utterly complete rebel rout.  Even so, as darkness came down that day, only a rebel rear-guard action by well-disciplined Arkansas troops held up Union pursuit long enough to save what remained of Hood's Army of Tennessee.

Wilson's troopers (all back on their mounts again) chased Hood's retreating army all the way back to the Tennessee River (it took the rebels ten days to get there).  General Thomas and his men had ended for all time the threat of concerted rebel military action in the Western Theater.

Note: I am planning to expand this chapter with more 89th Illinois Infantry info, and to add footnotes, in 2007, but wanted to get a Nashville chapter on my site by the end of 2006 as promised. 

HOME    FORMATION    TRAINING    TACTICS    BATTLES    ROSTERS    RESEARCH    SITEMAP    CONTACT