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The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment, also known as
the Railroad Regiment, was formed in July and August 1862. It participated
in the battles of Stones River, Liberty Gap, Chickamauga, Orchard Knob and
Missionary Ridge, Pickett's Mill, the Atlanta Campaign, and Nashville. The
regiment was mustered out in June 1865.
Photos of 89th
Illinois Infantry Regiment monuments on the Chickamauga battlefield
by Tom Pearson.
Click on a photo to see a larger version of it.
"We
Found Ourselfs in It for Earnest:"
The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment at
Pickett's Mill
by
Thomas A. Pearson
Text and photos copyright © 2004 by
Thomas A. Pearson. All rights reserved.
"One
owes respect to the living, but to the dead one owes nothing but the
truth."
--Voltaire
The unexpected success of the
Missionary Ridge attack made possible the spring 1864 offensive
against Atlanta, but in the interim between the late November assault
and the May 7th, 1864 beginning of the Atlanta offensive, the Union
Army had to endure a particularly harsh winter. Periods of gloomy
skies and bitter, biting winds alternated with periods of freezing
rain, sleet, and even snow. 1 Private Charles Capron said of this
time: "...we was on the move all winter and the suffering
that our division was exposed to is more than my pen can describe."
2 General Sherman's army spent part of that winter in rude log cabins
which measured six feet square. There were bunks on one side and a
fireplace on the other (the fireplace was connected to a chimney
outside the cabin). The cabin roofs were covered with the men's
tents, which helped keep the inside (somewhat) warm and dry. 3
The Federal advance which
everyone knew was coming had to wait until the weather broke, which
finally occurred during the first week of May 1864. Sherman's order
to advance came on May 7, 1864, and the 89th Illinois advanced with
its division (Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood's Third Division) to
Tunnel Hill, Georgia, as light skirmishing occurred throughout the
day. (Spirited skirmishing could use up astonishing amounts of
ammunition. The 92nd Ohio Infantry "during one day of ordinary
duty" used 24,000 rounds of ammunition.) 4 The sight of
thousands upon thousands of blue-clad troops marching south inspired
Private Capron to write: "...you could see long lines of
infantry winding their way over hill and valley like the large Boa
Constrictor rushing with irristible force on to their intended
victim." 5
May 8th was occupied with
skirmishing and reconnoitering, and on May 9th General Sherman
ordered an assault on Rocky Face Ridge, Georgia. Brigadier General T.
J. Wood described Rocky Face Ridge in his official report:
Rocky Face is a bold ridge rising
some 500 feet above the general level of the country, and running from a
little east of north, to west of south. The crest of the ridge is a sheer
precipice of solid rock, varying in height from twenty to sixty feet. To carry
the crest by a direct movement, when occupied by the enemy, was an impossible
undertaking, hence the demonstration was ordered to be made with a single
skirmish line, supported by solid lines. 6
The skirmish line began its
forward movement about 6 AM, and a short while later on the right of
the Union line there was heard the sound of "...musketry and
cheering by our men which indicated a charge." 7 At 9 AM Willich's brigade began a forward movement against the ridge with the
89th Illinois out front as skirmishers. The men moved down a fill,
then across an open field to the base of the ridge, and then began
their ascent of the ridge. After making some forward progress, the
men were ordered to lie down and await further orders. At this point
Alexis Cope of the 15th Ohio Infantry reported that company cooks
served coffee to the men as they lay awaiting further instructions.
The day ended with rebel skirmishers driven back up the ridge as
requested by General Sherman. The 89th had lost 16 men in the
process: 15 were wounded in action and one (Pvt. Jacob Craig of
Company G) was dead. 8
On May 10th the 89th was held
in reserve, then was back on picket duty the evening of May 11th
(there had been continuous exchanges between skirmishers all that
day). On May 12th, the 3rd Division of the Army of the Cumberland had
to quickly change front to the north and erect breastworks as a rebel
attack was expected from that direction. (During the Atlanta Campaign
Sherman's men became exceedingly skilled at the construction of
breastworks. They could throw up a makeshift but serviceable
barricade in five minutes. Part of the men kept watch while others
gathered rocks, logs, and other materials solid enough to stop Minie
balls and other projectiles. If there was time, the barrier was then
covered with dirt. Spades were utilized for earth-moving when
available, but the men also used tin cups, forks, spoons, and their
bare hands when necessary. Sherman felt that the men's skill and
speed in the construction of breastworks "...is wonderful and
is something new in the art of war.") 9
Despite all of the Union
preparations, the enemy was not planning an attack. Rebel General
Joseph Johnston was well aware of both the northern Georgia terrain
and the movements of the Federals. He knew that McPherson's Army of
the Tennessee was engaged in a flanking movement around the rebel
army (which was dug in near Dalton, Georgia) and making for Resaca,
Georgia, well to the rear of Johnston's present position. 10 Johnston
knew that McPherson would have to proceed through Snake Creek Gap if
he wished to bypass Johnston's position at Dalton, and it would take
a federal army corps a long time to advance through the narrow gap.
With this point in mind, Johnston stayed at Dalton until the last
possible moment, leaving it on the night of May 12th and arriving at
Resaca the next morning.
The Federal Army spent May
13th in pursuit of the fleeing rebels, and the 89th Illinois'
division camped that night eight miles south of Dalton. 11 On May
14th a Union advance was ordered by General Sherman on the rebel
works near the Coosa River. The assault was unsuccessful, and
resulted in numerous Federal casualties (three members of the 89th
were wounded on the 14th). Heavy firing occurred all along the line
on the 15th, and brigade commander Brigadier General August Willich
was severely wounded, shot by a rebel skirmisher through the right
shoulder and side (he never regained full use of his right arm). 12
Colonel Charles T. Hotchkiss described the incident in his official
report on the Atlanta Campaign:
On the afternoon
of the 15th Brigadier General A. Willich, commanding this brigade, while
observing the enemy from the parapet of the Thirty-Fifth Illinois, was
severely wounded in the arm and side by a rebel sharpshooter, and the command
of the brigade was assumed by Col. William H. Gibson, Forty-Ninth Ohio Veteran
Volunteers. 13
General Willich was very well
liked and respected by his men, and as he was being carried away they
crowded around his stretcher to see him off. 14 Private Capron liked
his brigade commander so much that when one of his relatives had a
baby in early 1865, he suggested: "...call it August Willich
he used to command our brigade and a better or braver man never
lived." 15 Later that afternoon the rebels made a tentative
probe of the Union line. The rebel advance caught the bluecoats by
surprise, and the Union adjutant had to scurry along the line
admonish-ing the men not to fire until the Union skirmishers were
back in line. A heavy fire then erupted all along the line, but the
rebel advance (if it had actually been an advance and not a mere
feint) soon petered out.
The next morning it was
discovered that the rebels had once again withdrawn during the night.
They had been in such a hurry to evacuate that some of their wounded
were left behind. Union forces advanced through Resaca that day,
capturing five artillery pieces and a large quantity of corn meal.
The Federals spent the night of May 16th near Calhoun, Georgia. 16
Pursuit of the enemy was the order of the day for Union soldiers on
May 17th. For seven miles they chased the rebels, with skirmishers
exchanging fire more or continuously throughout the day. That evening
Union forces caught up with the Confederates, and an exchange of
small arms and artillery fire ensued. The Union line threw up hasty
works of rails and logs, and slept behind it in line of battle that
night.
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In the morning it was
discovered that the rebels had again beat a hasty retreat during the
night. Rebel General Johnston had learned that Sherman had sent
McPherson on another flanking movement, this one an attempt to cut
deep into Johnston's rear via the Oostanula River. Johnston was
worried that a successful flanking movement might cut his supply
line, the, Western and Atlantic Railroad to Atlanta. 17 On May 18th
the Union forces again set out in pursuit of Johnston's rebels. After
managing to advance through Adairsville, Georgia, the army spent the
night at a point about four miles south of the city. The next day
(May 19th) the army managed to advance 12 miles. The passage of the
first seven miles brought it to Kingston, Georgia, where Union
skirmishers encountered their rebel counterparts. For the next five
miles they exchanged fire that was at times heavy before the Union
Army finally halted near Cassville, where it encountered enemy
entrenchments. 18 Third division commander Brigadier General T. J.
Wood noted in his report that:
Within a mile and
a half of Cassville the enemy was afresh encountered in an intrenched
position. Our order of battle was promptly reformed, and the advance
resumed with a view to forcing our way into Cassville, but darkness
falling suddenly upon us rendered it necessary to desist from a
farther advance against an intrenched position over unexplored
ground. 19
Union forces remained near
Cassville May 20th- May 22nd. While there the men were able to
accomplish some routine housekeeping, and were able to both reduce
baggage and replenish necessities. Sherman's army during this
campaign had 52 supply wagons per 1,000 men: Johnston had 26 wagons
per 1,000 men. To feed his huge army and keep the men well-supplied
with equipment and ammunition, Sherman needed about 65 boxcars of
supplies per day brought down the Western and Atlantic Railroad from
Chattanooga. To try and build a reserve, Sherman put pressure on his
head of transportation to increase that figure to 130 cars per day.
20
During the break Sherman also
had his map-makers and topographical engineers sent out before each
advance. They charted and photographed the terrain, then rushed their
photographic plates and drawings back to "dark wagons" for
developing. Sherman's engineers even developed a process for
utilizing photosensitive paper as a kind of primitive photocopier. 21
During the Union Army's stay
outside Cassville the rebels again withdrew. Prior to the withdrawal
Johnston, who had previously shown no desire to stand and slug it out
with Sherman, announced that he intended to stand and fight at
Cassville. All of Johnston's corps commanders were horrified at the
prospect (except Hardee), and managed to talk old Joe out of it (a
decision Johnston later admitted he deeply regretted). Johnston and
his men therefore left Cassville on May 20th for the rugged country
near Allatoona Pass. Here Johnston hoped to goad Sherman into a
full-scale assault which the out-gunned rebels would repel with ease,
given the forbidding nature of the territory in the vicinity of
Allatoona Pass. Sherman, meanwhile, had decided on another end run
around Johnston's flank, this time around the town of Kingston,
Georgia. Johnston anticipated this move (by now Johnston and Sherman
were no strangers to one another's ways of thinking), and
force-marched his men to New Hope Church, a pre-selected defensive
position about five miles north of Dallas, Georgia. 22
On May 23rd Sherman's army
resumed its advance, covering twelve miles and crossing the Etowah
River. May 24th brought a
march of 15 miles over a poorly-marked, dusty road which stretched
across what seemed to Private Joel Chambers of the 89th Illinois and
his fellow soldiers to be an unending succession of hills. Great
clouds of dust raised by the men obscured vision and caught in their
throats and nostrils. Private Chambers in his diary called it
"...very disagreeable marching." 23 A light rain that
evening helped to tamp down the dust and made the next day's march
much more agreeable. The men covered twelve miles on the 25th, and
managed to link up that evening with Hooker's corps, which was
engaged with the enemy near Dallas, Georgia. The fighting was intense
during the hour or so before nightfall. This engagement, fought near
New Hope Church, was a minor disaster for the Union Army. It should
have taught Union commanders several valuable lessons, but apparently
taught them nothing, as events on May 27th would make all too clear.
24
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On May 26th the men were moved
to the front line (the 89th Illinois was positioned on its stomach in
line of battle directly behind Union skirmishers). Two regiment
members were wounded that day, one mortally, and one man in Company A
accidentally shot himself in the hand. The following day (May 27th,
1864) the 89th Illinois was shifted with the rest of the 3rd Division
to the extreme left of the Union line, a distance of five miles.
Sherman had ordered General Howard to find the rebel right flank,
maneuver around it, and roll it up. Such a maneuver (if successful)
would cut Johnston and most of his army off from their supply line
(the Western and Atlantic Railroad line to Atlanta). 25 While General
Howard was attempting to accomplish this assignment, General
McPherson was to "...move straight toward the enemy at New
Hope Church, and make connection with General Hooker's right."
Howard selected General Wood's 3rd Division (the 89th Illinois'
division) to lead the coming assault on the rebel right. Wood was
somewhat miffed at Howard's decision, for his men had just spent
several hours constructing elaborate breastworks after the division
halted. Now the men would be expected to quietly abandon their hidey
holes, which would then be occupied by General Stanley's division. 26
The suspected point of the
enemy's far right flank was a grist mill two miles northeast of New
Hope Church known as Pickett's Mill. The mill was originally owned by
Benjamin Pickett, a rebel who had been killed recently in the battle
of Chickamauga. The Pickett house and the mill (which had been built
on the banks of Pumpkinvine Creek) were now owned by the Widow
Pickett. 27 Howard's 14,000 man IV Corps set out about noon on May
27th to locate and turn the rebel far-right flank. Movement through
the rugged northern Georgia hill country was extremely difficult.
Alexis Cope of the 15th Ohio Infantry (which, like the 89th Illinois,
was part of General Willich's brigade) noted in his memoirs that
"...the country we moved through was quite rough, thickly
wooded and covered with a thick growth of undergrowth, which made our
progress difficult and laborious." 28
The men of Willich's brigade
(Colonel William Gibson had replaced the injured Willich) were
mystified and annoyed to learn that Gibson had elected to have all
orders transmitted by bugle call. Gibson was most likely concerned
with the difficulties the terrain would present his staff couriers,
but as Alexis Cope noted, "...this gave the enemy immediate
and continuous notice of our movement every step of the way."
As the men of the advancing column knew only too well, for their
attack to succeed the element of surprise was vital. Cope noted
bitterly that "...more than one officer and man exclaimed,
'If we are expected to surprise the enemy, why don't they stop those
d--d bugles?' " 29
After more than two hours of
thrashing through the north Georgia jungle, General Howard decided
that he had located the Confederate extreme right (he was wrong: he
had not went quite far enough). He next spent more than two hours
forming up the brigades to be used in the attack, which was to
proceed in a southeasterly direction. 30 Colonel Hotchkiss described
the enemy's works at Pickett's Mill in his report:
Moving to the left and front
successively for a distance of about two and a half miles to a point near
Pickett's Mills, we arrived there by 2:30 p.m., finding the enemy in
considerable force, protected by barricades hastily but strongly built with
logs on the crest of a considerable ridge and supported by artillery, planted
so as to enfilade the approaches and ravines in his immediate front, through
which a force attempting to dislodge him would have to pass. 31
Brigadier General T. J. Wood,
commander of the Third Division, noted the preparations for the
assault on the enemy's works in his official report:
A minute and
critical examination of the enemy's intrenchments rendered it evident
that a direct front attack would be of most doubtful success, and
would certainly cost a great sacrifice of life. Hence, it was
determined to attempt to find the extreme right of the enemy's
position, turn it, and attack it in flank. In conformity with this
determination my division was moved entirely to the left of our line
and formed, by order of Major- General Howard, commanding the corps,
in six parallel lines, each brigade being formed in two lines. The
order of brigades in this grand column of attack was, first, the
Second Brigade, Brigadier General Hazen commanding; second, the First
Brigade, Colonel Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, commanding, third, the
Third Brigade, Colonel Knefler, Seventy-ninth Indiana, commanding. 32
Howard did not realize it yet,
but he was throwing his men against Pat Cleburne's veteran rebel
division, which had been in position since 2PM on May 26th. Cleburne
had emplaced his troops with Polk's brigade on a ridge and Hotchkiss'
Battalion of artillery to Polk's right. Hotchkiss' Battalion
consisted of four Napoleons, four Parrott guns, and four howitzers,
and was supported by a regiment of Govan's brigade. To the rear of
these positions Cleburne placed Lowrey's brigade, Granbury's brigade,
and the rest of Govan's brigade. Cleburne's position was
well-protected by a natural screen of trees and underbrush. The area
around Pickett's Mill was a heavily-wooded tangle, the ground hilly
and uneven, factors which in combination would make any Union advance
difficult at best. Cleburne's men spent the afternoon of the 26th and
the morning of the 27th digging a line of breastworks in which to
await the Yankees (Howard saw the signs of recent digging on the
afternoon of the 27th and mistakenly assumed that the rebels had only
recently begun to dig in). 33
Cleburne sent Govan's brigade
north to reconnoiter about 7AM on May 27th. They returned about 11AM
that day, and Govan reported that a Union column was beginning its
advance on Cleburne's position (the bugling of Gibson's brigade would
leave no doubt that the Federals were on the way in force). Some of
Govan's men were left out about 3/4ths of a mile as skirmishers, and
the rest were placed to the right of Polk's brigade and ordered to
dig in. On Govan's right were nearly a thousand of General J.P.
Kelly's dismounted cavalrymen. 34
Close observation by General
Howard determined that an assault according to Sherman's original
plan would force Wood's division to advance across an open field
while exposed to a withering rebel cross-fire from small-arms and
artillery (although it didn't convince him that advancing in narrow
columns was unlikely to prove successful). Therefore Wood's men were
shifted slightly to the left, which it was hoped would both avoid
most of the cross-fire and allow Wood's men to successfully envelop
the rebel far-right flank. Wood's men were ordered, as noted
previously, to form into an assault column, i.e., each of the three
brigades formed in a double line and stacked one atop the other.
Johnson's division, positioned to the left and rear of Wood's men,
was to deploy in similar fashion, while McLean's brigade of the Army
of the Ohio was to be positioned to the right of Wood's division
(there was bad blood between Howard and McLean, stemming from the
time of the disastrous Union outing at Chancellorsville in May 1863).
Wood's men quickly got into position to attack. It took both Johnson
and McLean much longer to do so, in spite of the fact that McLean was
only readying a brigade, not a division. As the attack columns
aligned themselves, General Howard sent to General Thomas the
following curious message: "I am ... now turning the enemy's
right flank, I think." 35
It is not known what reaction,
if any, General Thomas had to the painfully tentative character of
Howard's note. It is known that Howard's courier returned from
General Thomas' headquarters with this message: "General
Thomas says that Major General Sherman wishes us to get on the
enemy's flank and rear as soon as possible." With these
words from Thomas the fateful die was cast: General Howard felt
compelled to launch his attack as quickly as possible. 36
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Unlike the situation at
Missionary Ridge, where omens had all gone the Union way, there were
at Pickett's Mill numerous ominous signs that the Union attack was
foredoomed. The rebel artillery already had the range on Wood's men:
shells were falling in the ranks, causing casualties before the
advance had even begun. A rebel sharpshooter picked off one of
General Howard's staff, and a rebel prisoner had let slip the
unwelcome news that the tough divisions of Cleburne and Hindman lay
ahead, dug in and well aware of the coming assault. 37
Once the men were ready,
General Wood personally asked Howard if the attack was to proceed.
Howard of course had already received his orders from General Thomas.
"Attack!" was his only reply to Wood. 38 Wood's
assault column was headed by Brigadier General William B. Hazen's
brigade, a veteran outfit that had already seen battle at Stone's
River, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge, and could be counted on in
a tight situation. Hazen's aide and topographer was Lieutenant
Ambrose Bierce (who would after the war become a famous journalist
and author). Bierce later said that:
General William B. Hazen, a born
fighter, an educated soldier, after the war Chief Signal Officer of the Army
and now long dead, was the best hated man that I ever knew, and his memory is
a terror to every unworthy soul in the service. 39
At approximately 4:30 PM Wood
ordered Hazen to advance, then turned to General Howard and said, "We
will put in Hazen, and see what success he has." It was only
at this point that Hazen realized that his brigade was meant to go
forward alone, even though Wood's division was already organized into
columns by brigade and could easily have been sent forward en masse.
Lieutenant Bierce, who would later write an article about the coming
battle titled "The Crime at Pickett's Mill,"
recalled that as Hazen listened to Wood's remark to Howard, Hazen
glanced penetratingly at Bierce. Bierce took this glance to be
Hazen's signal that a "criminal blunder" was being
perpetrated by Generals Howard and Wood. A single Union brigade
unsupported by artillery or other infantry was being ordered forward
against a rebel force of unknown size or strength. 40
Hazen's brigade began its
advance, and the men moved forward through undergrowth so thick that
regimental flags were kept furled to keep them from being ripped to
shreds. Mounted officers had to send their horses to the rear and
advance on foot like everybody else. There was not much order in the
advance, for it was nearly impossible to maintain formation in that
hellish wilderness. Hazen used a compass to try and stay on course,
but his second line veered off to the left in spite of his best
efforts. 41 Lieutenant Bierce recalled it thusly:
We moved forward. In less than one
minute the trim battalions had become simply a swarm of men struggling through
the undergrowth of the forest, pushing and crowding. 42
Hazen's brigade also
immediately encountered J.P. Kelly's dismounted cavalrymen situated
to their left where no rebels were supposed to be, hidden behind
heaps of stones. What's worse, Kelly's men were armed with carbines,
and poured a deadly fire into the ranks of Hazen's men. The fact that
the troopers weren't protected by breastworks temporarily buoyed the
spirits of Hazen's men: they thought they had at last caught a rebel
brigade without its ordinarily elaborate log and dirt breastworks. 43
Hazen's men managed to slowly drive Kelly's troopers back to a rocky,
heavily wooded ridge overlooking a ravine. The Union men realized
that, if they could take the ridge, they would be in position to
flank the rebels as ordered by Howard. Hazen's men moved forward
through the ravine, suddenly believing that they might not be on a
fool's errand after all. At that point rebel reinforcements arrived
on the ridge top in the form of Hiram Granbury's Texas Brigade. The
brief lifting of Union spirits ended as Granbury's men opened fire,
downing dozens of Hazen's men. The Union soldiers kept going,
however, some of them shouting, "Ah! Damn you! We have caught
you without your logs!" (a reference to the omnipresent
breastworks of logs and dirt favored this point in the war by both
sides). 44
The advance of Hazen's men
stalled about 30 yards from the crest of the ridge, the cause of the
halt being rebel bullets which were flying "like hail in
sheets." 45 Instead of retreating, however, Hazen's men took
what cover they could and continued the attempt to push the rebel
defenders off the ridge. Bierce recalled that:
Most of our men fought kneeling as they fired, many of them behind
trees, stones, - and whatever cover they could get, but there were
considerable groups that stood. Occasionally one of these groups, which had
endured the storm of missiles for moments without perceptible reduction, would
push forward, moved by a common despair, and wholly detach itself from the
line. In a second every man of the group would be down.
46
Kelly's cavalry and Granbury's
infantry on the ridge were taking heavy casualties, as it truly was a
grave disadvantage for a defender to be caught in the open. Granbury
sent to his left for help, and General Govan sent him Baucum's
Arkansas regiment, which arrived to reinforce Kelly's troopers just
as the continuing Union push threatened to overwhelm them. Some of
Hazen's men had actually begun to bypass the rebel extreme right when
Lowrey's Alabama-Mississippi brigade arrived to further shore up the
rebel right. Their arrival, in fact, threatened to flank Hazen's
left. Johnson's division and McLean's brigade, which by now should
have been supporting Hazen's assault, had not yet advanced. 47
Hazen's proud but overmatched
brigade soon began to waver. Casualties were extremely high (Hazen
later reported losing 500 men killed or wounded in 45 minutes or
less), and ammunition was running low. Hazen had sent back numerous
pleas for support, all of which went unanswered. 48 His men finally
had no choice but to fall back, making for the relative safety of the
ravine through which they had just advanced, as General Wood
scathingly noted in his official report:
It was from this fire that the
supporting and covering division should have protected the assaulting column,
but it failed to do so. Under such a fire no troops could maintain the vantage
ground which had been gained, and the leading brigade, which had driven
everything in its front, was compelled to fall back a short distance to
protect its flanks, which were crumbling away under the severe fire by the
irregularities of the ground. (It is proper to observe here that the brigade
of the Twenty-Third Corps which was ordered to take post so as to cover the
right flank of the assaulting column by some mistake failed to get into a
position to accomplish this purpose.) 49
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Just as they began to retire,
the order went out for Gibson's brigade to advance (Gibson's brigade
included the 89th Illinois). It was to help cover Hazen's withdrawal
from the ravine, and to help cover the evacuation of Hazen's
casualties. Gibson's men also went forward in narrow column formation
unsupported by artillery. The advancing brigade presented this front
to the enemy:
32nd Indiana ---
15th Wisconsin --- 89th Illinois
Like Hazen's brigade,Gibson's
men were facing veteran rebel troops who were supported by seasoned
artillerists and protected (in many cases) by stones or breastworks.
Gibson's men were subject to fire from Kelly's dismounted cavalry
troopers with their carbines on the left, while Hotchkiss' artillery
posted to Gibson's right swept the Union ranks continuously with
canister and solid shot. 50 Lieutenant Colonel William D. Williams
said that the 89th advanced to within 25 yards of the Rebel works
where "...the fire was so murderous that the column paused,
wavered, and sought such shelter as they could find." 51 At
this point Gibson's division had to fall back into the ravine. Third
Division commander T. J. Wood noted in his report that:
Thence it [Gibson's brigade]
maintained a sturdy contest with the enemy, confining him to his works, till
its ammunition was expended. (I must observe that owing to the circuitous
route through the woods, with no road, pursued by the division, it was
impossible to take any ammunition wagons with the command. After the point of
attack had been selected a road was opened and ammunition brought up, but it
did not come up until after night-fall.) 52
Around this time Scribner's
brigade of Johnson's division was sent forward on Gibson's left, but
was almost immediately stopped short by heavy fire. Scribner's men
fought as Hazen's and Gibson's had, most of them kneeling and taking
what cover they could, others rising and attempting bravely to
advance. None came closer to the rebel works than about 25 yards. 53
Andrew Gleason of the 15th
Ohio Infantry was in the second line of Gibson's brigade. He recorded
in his diary the following curious incident:
I noticed two men
taking shelter behind a medium-sized tree, on the brink of the
ravine, and when one of them was hit in the hand by a Minie ball and retired to
the rear, I crept to his place behind the other. He was leaning against the
tree and would not lie down, although he was not firing. In a few minutes a
ball came from the left and struck him squarely in the temple, with that
peculiar 'spat' which, once heard, is at once recognized as the passage of a
bullet through flesh and bone. It killed him so suddenly that he never changed
his position, and had I not heard the shot strike and been spattered by his
blood and brains, I might have believed him still untouched. 54
Gibson's men had faced the
murderous rebel fire for about one hour before being recalled. A
messenger had in the meantime discovered Generals Wood and Gibson
"laboring under terrible stress." General Howard
rode up at that moment and dismounted. Howard had just assured the
messenger that he would "...have more troops sent in both on
their right and left as soon as I can get them" when a rebel
shell exploded close behind him. The one-armed Howard covered his
eyes with his stump and cried, "I am afraid to look down!"
The shell had in fact only ripped off Howard's left boot heel, but
had so bruised his foot that he had to sit on the ground the rest of
the day. 55
As the men from the brigades
of Hazen and Gibson drifted back into Union lines, they complained of
being "sold out" (they had, in fact, been badly
mismanaged). Some of them were reorganized and posted to the right to
guard against a rebel counterattack, while others were sent back into
the ravine to try and bring in as many wounded as possible. McLean,
whose brigade had been posted to support the assault on the right,
had not only failed to advance, but was at that time marching his
brigade to the rear. His explanation was that the men had to be fed! 56
While the attack was in
progress, General Howard received an order to cancel the attack.
General Sherman had decided (correctly, if a bit tardily) that an
attack at Pickett's Mill would be ill-advised. Howard had Wood send
Knefler's brigade forward to hold the rebels in place while a
defensive position was thrown up around Pickett's Mill. Knefler's men
advanced to the ravine before the rebel-held ridge and encountered
the same murderous hail of small-arms and artillery fire that had
brought Hazen, Gibson, and Scribner to grief. Almost as quickly as
they had advanced, Knefler's men fell back "in disorder"
to the woods behind the ravine. They hurriedly threw up a hastily
improvised works of stones and wood and began trading potshots with
Cleburne's rebels. 57
The haphazard fire across the
ravine continued until well after dark. At about 10 PM, just as
Knefler was receiving the order to pull back to the Union defensive
line, Hiram Granbury received General Cleburne's permission to use
his brigade to "clear" the ravine of Yankees.
Granbury's Texans, though as blind in the pitch darkness as Knefler's
men and the many Union wounded, went forward with a series of
"demonic yells and shouts," firing their weapons as
they advanced. The totally unexpected advance seemed to unnerve many
of Knefler's men, most of whom randomly discharged their weapons and
then skedaddled as best they could in the darkness. Groups of them
were caught hiding behind logs by Granbury's men, to whom they
shouted, "Don't shoot!" 58
The advance petered out on the
other side of the ravine, after Granbury's men had inflicted numerous
casualties and taken numerous prisoners. A few rebels were left in
the ravine to serve as pickets: the rest returned to their works on
the ridge at the top of the ravine. With them they took 232 Union
prisoners (approximately 1/3 of them wounded: some were members of
the 89th Illinois). 59 One of the soldiers in the 89th Illinois
caught in the ravine when Granbury attacked was Private Charles
Capron. He stated that the rebels
...raised a yell
and jumped onto us as a cat would a mouse but I was watching them and
had my gun to my shoulder and when they rose up I fired into their
ranks the bullet opened a hole in their ranks and I waited to see no
more turning round I started pell mell with 5 thousand bullets whistling round
my ears but they only knocked my tin cup away from me and I got off without a
scratch... 60
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The next morning rebel pickets
in the ravine discovered to their horror that they were literally
surrounded by Union corpses. Captain Samuel T. Foster of Granbury's
Texas Brigade noted that
... they have
nearly all been shot in the head, and a great number of them have
their skulls bursted open and their brains running out, quite a
number that way.
Foster, a veteran of numerous
battles, concluded that
I have seen many
dead men, and seen them wounded and crippled in various ways, have
seen their limbs cut off, but I never saw anything before that made
me sick, like looking at the brains of these men did.
He confided to his diary that,
had he not shortly thereafter been allowed to leave the ravine, he
believed that he "would have fainted." 61
Several days after the
murderous charge at Pickett's Mill, Private Capron, fearing his
parents had heard "that the 89 was all cut to pieces,"
wrote them a letter and gave a harrowing description of the battle
...a brisk fire
was heard from our skirmishers and well we knew that the first
brigade would soon be in action but had no idea off it being so hot a
place but we soon found it out for it was not many minutes as we
advanced before the bullets that came pattering around us told us
that the enemy was near we came to the top of a little hill we found
ourselfs in it for earnest we then charged across a little ravine and up another
hill to within three rods of their breastworks when we could go no farther we
was then reinforced by the 15 Ohio who came up and tried to storm their works
but was compelled to fall back we had lost already 3 killed and 9 wounded in
our company by dark. 62
Union casualties in the Third
Division at Pickett's Mill came to 1,457: 212 killed, 927 wounded,
and 318 missing. The 89th Illinois lost 16 men killed, 71 wounded,
and 67 missing. Gibson's brigade (of which the 89th was a part)
suffered 703 casualties: 105 killed, 484 wounded, and 114 missing.
Nearly 500 of casualties were inflicted on Hazen's brigade, which had
made the initial assault on the rebel works. 63
An disturbing fact about the
battle at Pickett's Mill was its ratio of dead to wounded. In the
average Civil War battle one man was killed for every five men
wounded: Gibson's brigade at Pickett's Mill suffered a ratio of one
man killed for every three men wounded, a very high figure. The
higher-than-average ratio of dead to wounded had four main causes:
Union soldiers were moving uphill on rough, uneven terrain (which
resulted in a greater than normal incidence of wounds to the head),
were advanced in piecemeal fashion by brigade instead of en masse,
were unsupported by Union artillery, and were sent forward not
against the rebel flank but against a solidly entrenched rebel
position with men and artillery on both sides in place to enfilade
any Union advance. Furthermore, commanders at the corps and division
level were aware that there would be no way to re-supply engaged
troops with ammunition for quite some time after the battle began. In
addition, the rebels knew well in advance that the Union men were
coming, and were for the most part well-prepared for an attack. The
poor men of Hazen's and Gibson's brigades never had any real chance
to succeed (they had indeed been "sold out," to put
it in their words, although it was poor tactics and not treason which
had in fact did them in). The bloody affair at Pickett's Mill was in
many ways a textbook example of when and how not to stage an attack.
64 Rebel General Cleburne put his own losses at 448, and felt his men
had won a great victory, when what they had in fact done was repel
poorly coordinated assaults by individual Union infantry brigades
unsupported by Union artillery. 65
Union dead were not buried for
several days after the battle, and the stench generated by the
decaying bodies was simply overwhelming. More than 700 Union soldiers
(a figure which may include as many as 35 soldiers of the 89th
Illinois) were apparently buried in several mass graves. 66 Brigadier
General T. J. Wood noted that
I visited the
battle-field of Pickett's Mills, or New Hope Church, twice after the
evacuation of the enemy, and examined it closely. The numerous single
graves and several lines of trenches (capable of containing from
twenty-five to forty bodies) on the battle-field outside of the
enemy's entrenchments explain where most of the 255 missing of that day went to.
It is known that many of the wounded and killed, owing to the close proximity
of the places they fell to the enemy's works, could not be brought away. It is
also certain from other facts that only a small number of uninjured men and
officers- perhaps 20- became separated, in the darkness of the night and the
denseness of the woods, from their commands when the field was abandoned at 10
p.m. The rebels in their accounts, while admitting the severity of their
attack, have never pretended they made any material capture of prisoners.
67
A federal officer was
dispatched in 1866 to find the location of the mass graves. The
officer knew where the bodies were supposed to be ("8 rods
southwest of the mill"), but discovered no trace of the
graves and no one locally who could enlighten him. 68 General Sherman
was apparently content to allow the Pickett's Mill debacle to be
quickly forgotten. In the future he studiously avoided mentioning in
speeches or written works the battle that a then young Lieutenant
Ambrose Bierce would one day label "The Crime at Pickett's
Mill." 69
Click on an image to see a larger version.
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1 William Key, The Battle for
Atlanta and the Georgia Campaign, rev. ed. (Atlanta, GA: Peachtree
Publications, 1981) 15.
2 Charles S. Capron, Private,
Co. A, 89th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, in a letter to his
mother, Mary Capron, 24 January 1865. All Capron letters cited are in
the collection of the Old Courthouse Museum, Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Thanks to Jeff Giambrone, Archivist, for bringing them to my
attention.
3 Corydon Edward Foote, With
Sherman to the Sea: a Drummer's Story of the Civil War (New York:
John Day Company, 1960) 159-160.
4 Joel R. Chambers, War Fever
Cured: the Civil War Diary of Joel R. Chambers, 1864-1865, Cheryl H. Beneke & Carol D. Summer, eds. (Memphis, TN: W. R. Glasgow,
Citizens Education Council 1980) 33; Charles Royster, The Destructive
War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans
(New York: Knopf, 1991) 297.
5 C. S. Capron, letter to M.
Capron, 12 February 1865.
6 United States. War
Department. The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) Series I, Volume XXXVIII, Part
I, 373, 390. Hereafter cited as O.R. (all citations are for Series I,
Volume XXXVIII, Part I, unless otherwise noted).
7 Alexis Cope, The Fifteenth
Ohio Volunteers and Its Campaigns (Columbus, OH: The General's Books,
1916) 428-429; O.R. 373, 390.
8 Cope 429; O.R. 373-374,
389-390, 401; Report of the Adjutant General of the State of
Illinois, 1861-1865, rev. by Brigadier General J. N. Reece
(Springfield, IL: Phillips Brothers Printers, 1901) vol. 5, 277.
Hereafter cited as RAGI-61-65 (all citations are to vol. 5 unless
otherwise noted).
9 Chambers 34; Foote 183; O.R.
401-402.
10 Chambers 34; Key 15-16; O.R. 390.
11 Key 15-16; O.R. 390.
12 Chambers 35; Cope 435-436;
Key 16; O.R. 375, 391; Charles D. Stewart, "A Bachelor General,"
Wisconsin Magazine of History 17 (December 1933) 149-150.
13 O.R. 391.
14 Chambers 35; Cope 435-436.
15 C. S. Capron, letter to M.
Capron, 25 January 1865.
16 Chambers 35; Cope 436-437; O.R. 374-375, 390-391, 402.
17 Chambers, 35; Key 16; O.R.
376, 391, 402.
18 Chambers 35; Cope 444-446; O.R. 376, 391, 402.
19 O.R. 376. 26 Chambers 36;
Echoes of Battle: the Atlanta Campaign, Larry M. Strayer &
Richard A. Baumgartner, eds. (Huntington, W. VA: Blue Acorn Press
1991) 99-100. Hereafter cited as Echoes.
20 Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of
Modern Warfare (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1988),
277-279; O.R. 391; Royster 300.
21 Foote 178.
22 Ronald H. Bailey, Battles
for Atlanta: Sherman Moves East (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books,
1985) 97-98; Key 5-7; O.R. 376.
23 Bailey 51-52; Chambers
12-13; Key 6-7; O.R. 376, 391, 402.
24 Bailey 50-52; Chambers
12-13; O.R. 376, 391, 402.
25 Albert Castel, Decision in
the West: the Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1992) 231; Key 14-15; O.R. 377.
26 Castel 229; O.R. 392.
27 Roy S. Dickens & Linda
H. Worthy, Archaeological Investigations at Pickett's Mill Historic
Site, Paulding County, Georgia (Atlanta, GA: Georgia Department of
Natural Resources, 1984) 10. Hereafter cited as Investigations.
28 Cope 450; O.R. 377.
29 Cope 450-151.
30 Castel 233-234; O.R.
193-194, 377.
31 O.R. 392.
32 O.R. 377.
33 Bailey 54; Cope 464-465; O.R., Series I, Vol. 38, Part I, 392, and Series I, Vol. 32, Part II,
820.
34 Frank J. Welcher, The Union
Army, 1861-1865: Organization and Operations, vol. 2, the Western
Theater (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993) 436.
Hereafter all references to Welcher are to vol. 2 unless otherwise
noted.
35 Castel 230; O.R. 193-195,
377, 392; Welcher 436.
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36 Castel 235.
37 Castel 235; Jerry Korn, The
Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge (Alexandria,
VA: Time-Life Books, 1985) 134-136.
38 Castel 235; O.R. 377. 39
Ambrose Bierce, "The Crime at Pickett's Mill," in The
Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce, vol.1 (New York: The Neale
Publishing Company, 1909) 283. Hereafter all references to Bierce are
to his Collected Works, vol.1, unless otherwise noted.
40 Bierce 283; O.R. 194-195,
377-378, 423.
41 Castel 236-237; O.R. 423.
42 Bierce 292.
43 Bailey 54; O.R. 423-424.
44 Bailey 56; Castel 237; O.R.
377-378, 392.
45 Bierce 292; O.R. 393.
46 Bierce 292.
47 Castel 237; O.R. 194-195,
378, 423-424; Welcher 437.
48 O.R. 423.
49 O.R. 378.
50 Bailey 56; Castel 238; O.R.
378, 392, 423-424; Welcher 437.
51 O.R. 402.
52 O.R. 378-379.
53 O.R. 194, 423-424, 594-595.
54 Cope 455.
55 Cope 542-453.
56 Castel 239; O.R. 195.
57 Castel 235, 239; O.R. 379,
392, 446-447.
58 Castel 240; Samuel T.
Foster, One of Cleburne's Command: the Civil War Reminiscences and
Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster, Granbury's Texas Brigade, C.S.A.,
ed. Norman Brown (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 87; O.R.
379, 447.
59 Foster 88; O.R. 387.
60 C. S. Capron, letter to M.
Capron, 12 February 1865.
61 Foster 87-88.
62 C. S. Capron, letter to M.
Capron, 30 May 1864.
63 O.R. 387, 393, 403. 60
Bailey 56.
64 Cope 450-451; Jim Miles,
Fields of Glory: a History and Tour Guide of the Atlanta Campaign
(Nashville, TN: 1989) 75; O.R. 379, 388-389, 392.
65 Bailey 56.
65 Bailey 56.
66 Investigations 19; Miles
75; O.R. 402.
67 O.R. 386-387.
68 Investigations 19.
69 Bierce 284; O.R. 66
(Sherman's Atlanta Campaign official report makes no mention of the
Pickett's Mill battle).
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