"I am satisfied that I could not shoot in that direction
without hurting somebody":
The 89th Illinois Infantry Regiment at Stones River

by
Thomas A. Pearson

Text and photos copyright © 2004 Thomas A. Pearson.  All rights reserved.

"So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak."
--Sun Tzu, The Art of War

When the right wing of the 14th Army Corps (Army of the Cumberland) left camp near Nashville on the morning of December 26, 1862, the 89th Illinois Infantry was part of Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson's Second Division, First Brigade. General Johnson was a Kentuckian and a West Point graduate (1849). His appointment to West Point was secured for him by an older brother who later served as a Confederate Army surgeon. Johnson served in both infantry and cavalry regiments before being made a brigadier general of volunteers on October 11, 1861. He was given command of a brigade in the Army of the Ohio, but missed the battle of Shiloh because of illness. On his return to duty he managed to get captured by John Hunt Morgan after having vowed to capture Morgan and bring him home "in a band-box." Johnson was finally exchanged in time for General William Starke Rosecran's December push on Murfreesboro.¹

The 89th Illinois was brigaded with the 32nd Illinois Infantry, the 39th Indiana Infantry, the 49th Ohio Infantry, and Battery A of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery. Brigade commander was Brigadier General August Willich, a 19 year veteran of the Prussian Army who'd had to flee Germany after the failed revolution of 1848. Willich ran a German language newspaper in Cincinnati in the 1850s before being commissioned Colonel of the 32nd Indiana Infantry Regiment when the Civil War broke out. Brigadier General Willich put his Prussian Army training to good use. He trained his brigade to respond to bugle calls which the Confederates did not understand. Willich was oft-times referred to as "the Dutch general" ("Dutch" being a nearly universal 19th century American misunderstanding of "Deutsch," the word Germans use to refer to themselves). Willich's brigade likewise was often referred to as "the horn brigade;" (because they had been trained to respond to the bugle). ²

The 89th Illinois was at the time of the Murfreesboro push nominally under the command of Captain John Christopher. Capt. Christopher, a Regular Army officer, for a time commanded Camp Douglas, and helped train the 89th. He never joined the 89th in the field, however, and on January 7, 1863 was ordered to rejoin his old outfit, the 16th U.S. Infantry Regiment. ³

Lt. Colonel Charles T. Hotchkiss, who had been in field command of the 89th Illinois since it left Camp Douglas in September 1862, became Colonel of the 89th when Captain Christopher departed. Colonel Hotchkiss was born in Virgil, New York, on May 3, 1832. His brother, William, was a West Pointer who left the army in order to take a job with the West Shore Railroad. William got Charles a job as a rodman. During his long life Charles would work variously as a railroad executive, railroad consulting engineer, and a hotel keeper. On December 10, 1855, he married Frances E. Dye in Chicago. Colonel Hotchkiss was 5'8" tall, with brown hair and blue eyes. When war broke out in April 1861, he enlisted as a private in the 11th Illinois Infantry Volunteers, a three month regiment. He then reenlisted for three years' service, and was rapidly promoted from private to Captain, the rank he held when commissioned by Governor Yates as Lt. Colonel of the 89th Illinois in August 1862. While with the 11th Illinois Colonel Hotchkiss saw action at Fort Donelson and Shiloh; during the Union advance on Corinth, Mississippi he served as General John McClernand's adjutant. ⁴

When the 89th left Camp Douglas on September 4, 1862, it was short one company (in October 1862 Company F, a Rock Island County company originally recruited as part of the 126th Illinois Infantry, would join the regiment at Bowling Green, Kentucky). The 89th arrived at Louisville, Kentucky on September 7, 1862. The regiment spent the rest of September and most of October with the main body of General Buell's army as it pursued the Confederate General Braxton Bragg, a former Regular Army officer who had seen service in the Mexican-American War. The regiment's motto (it was stitched into their national flag) was "Clear the track!"; their regimental nickname, of course, was "the Railroad Regiment." The 89th Illinois Infantry spent the first two weeks of November on detached service at Tyre Springs, Tennessee, where it safeguarded the railroad there in company with part of Goodspeed's Ohio Battery. The 89th rejoined its brigade on November 17, 1862. The rest of November and most of December were spent preparing for the coming offensive against Bragg at Murfreesboro. ⁵

When the right wing of Rosecran's army left camp near Nashville on December 26, 1862, it advanced down the Nolansville Pike, arriving at Nolansville at 4 pm. The Union advance was contested by the rebels: Private Alfred D. French of Company A noted that:

Then we did get into it for sure.  Before noon we met with heavy opposition.  Our regiment was ordered to support a battery of light artillery (six cannon) which was planted on a high ridge.  Then they opened on the enemy with grape and canister, and as they fell back, we followed them up through fields and woods until night and how it did rain- not a pleasant experience.⁶

The men were in fairly high spirits in spite of the adverse conditions; cold weather and intermittent freezing rain made the going tough both for Rosecran's army and for Bragg's men, whom they pursued. Bragg had been instructed by President Davis to stand and fight if he could, then fall back if necessary to some point beyond the Tennessee River. Bragg finally chose to stand and fight on both banks of Stones River, which is located to the west of the town of Murfreesboro (the coming battle would be referred to as Stones River by Northerners, Murfreesboro by Southerners). The site Bragg had selected was not an easily defensible one. It was mostly open country with some thick stands of trees, which Bragg realized could serve to protect Rosecran's men as well as his own, and which could serve to hinder movements of the Confederate cavalry. Bragg chose Stones River in spite of its drawbacks because it was a spot where he felt he could fairly easily concentrate his forces and afford protection to his supplies of food, forage, and ammunition at Murfreesboro.

Having made this decision, Bragg could then have tilted the odds in his favor by having his men dig in, thus creating defensible positions where God had failed to provide them. But he elected not to do so, possibly because he didn't think the men would have time to throw up effective defenses (Sherman's men and those of the Confederate general, Hardee, would prove in the Atlanta campaign that it could be done in less than an hour by motivated men). At that fairly early stage of the war, however, many men on both sides felt that manual labor was beneath their dignity, and that the erection of entrenchments could be interpreted as a sign of possible cowardice (this attitude would change quickly as the accuracy and efficiency of weapons employ-ed during the war became widely recognized), Bragg can not truly be faulted for his failure to dig in at Stones River. Burnside's disastrous assault on the stone wall at Marye's Heights had occurred only two weeks previously, and many Civil War generals had not yet come to realize the tactical advantages afforded by earthworks. ⁷

On the 27th of December the 89th Illinois marched to Triune, Tennessee in company with the rest of the Second Division. Division skirmishers traded gunfire with the rebel rear guard. George Sinclair of Company, 89th Illinois Infantry, described the day's events in a letter to his wife, Frances:

The next morning we were sent out a foraging with the whole brigade as a guard, we drove in their pickets about ten o'clock and skirmished with them, the rebs, constantly until four in the afternoon. The loss being trifling on both sides, perhaps a half dozen killed or wounded on either. The loss seems light to speak of in a constant skirmish kept up half a day, but light as it was it will make many a cheerful family desolate. ⁸

Civilians along the march route to Murfreesboro did not greet the men warmly. The area was a stronghold of secessionist sentiments. The men, therefore, felt few qualms about appropriating items of interest from local civilians, and in some cases vandalizing items too bulky to carry off. Such activities were not without possible hazards, though, as George Sinclair noted in a letter home:

We encamped within a quarter of a mile of the village. Then serving this place as we did Nolensville. A little accident happened to our company from the effects of sacking, as they found some whiskey and abused it and one of our men fell into the opening for the bridge at Triune [John Blayney of Company C- editor's note]. He died that night, we buried him at midnight. It seemed mighty hard to lay him here away from home or friends. When we laid this night in our wet blankets it put me in mind of the old woman's cure for a cold not very pleasant though. ⁹

The Division remained in Triune on December 28th. Willich's brigade was selected to determine the enemy's direction and destination. Willich reported to General Johnson that Bragg was headed for Murfreesboro, proceeding along the Bole Jack Road. The next day the Division left Triune, although Col. Philomon Baldwin's Third Brigade was left in Triune as a precaution. When the advance column arrived at Wilkinson's Crossroads at 8 PM on December 29th, Johnson sent word back for Baldwin to bring his brigade forward. The Division camped at Wilkinson's Crossroads on the night of the 29th and waited for Baldwin's arrival. ¹⁰

Pickets were posted whenever the army was in close proximity to the enemy. The picket line consisted of three parts: an outermost line of sentries (who were posted about 20 paces apart), a middle line of picket supports, and an inner line of picket supports. Men on picket duty served two hours on the front line, then two each at support and reserve lines. Men in the reserve line could sleep, although they were expected to rise up at the first sign of trouble. Men in the forward line were expected to challenge persons approaching the line. Any challenged person failing to halt was to be shot, even if part of a larger force. Pickets were expected to stand their ground even at risk of certain death, because even in dying pickets could perform the necessary task of warning their comrades of the enemy's approach. Regiments from a brigade took turns on picket duty. In pleasant weather the men loved such duty, for it excused them from drill and routine chores. Picket duty during the Stones River campaign would have been an onerous chore, what with the bitter cold and the on again, off again rain. ¹¹ George Sinclair said of the weather that night:

To make things pleasant we were allowed no fire and it rained very heavy during the night. In the morning I found myself laying right in a pool of water as each hollow between the corn ridges was full. As soon as we began to stir about in the morning, the ground was a perfect mush. ¹²

Baldwin's brigade rejoined the Second Division early on the afternoon of December 30th. At that time the Federal Army moved forward in line of battle. General Johnson's Second Division (of which the 89th Illinois was part) was placed in reserve behind the divisions of General Phillip Sheridan (on the left) and General Jefferson C. Davis (on the right). At about 2 PM on the 30th General Johnson was ordered to be prepared to wheel to his right, for the corps of Confederate General Hardee (the author of a famous drill manual used by officers on both sides during the Civil War) had been sighted there. General Johnson had previously been ordered to oblique to the right in order to protect General Davis' right. General Johnson in turn ordered his own General Kirk's Second Brigade to protect the Second Division's exposed right flank.

That night the Second Division stopped at a point about 3 1/2 miles west of Murfreesboro. General Johnson was alarmed by rebel movements and ordered General Willich to line up the First Brigade (the 89th's brigade) on General Kirk's right. Willich's brigade was therefore positioned on the far right of the Union line, angled back from the main line to protect the Union right flank. The 39th and 32nd Indiana were in the forward position, with the 49th Ohio and Battery A of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery to their rear. The 15th Ohio and the 89th Illinois were behind the 49th Ohio and the Ohio Light Artillery battery, on the Union line's extreme right. ¹³ The right flank of the Union line crossed Franklin Road near its intersection with Gresham Lane. The Confederate forward line (composed of General McCown's division of Hardee's corps, brigaded by the men of Generals Rains, Ector, and McNair) was positioned at a slight angle astraddle Franklin Road. Pickets were posted on both sides: the men had again been ordered to camp without fires. ¹⁴

Rosecrans and Bragg both spent the entire day on December 30th preparing themselves and their men for the battle everyone knew was coming. In an odd twist of fate, the opposing generals decided on nearly identical plans of battle: an assault would be launched against the enemy's right, while simultaneously engaging his center. As the enemy's right flank was (hopefully) turned, the friendly right flank would hold its ground at all hazards. If everything went according to plan, the enemy would then be caught between the friendly stationary right flank and the friendly moving left flank and center, which were to swing shut on the enemy like a gate. Once enveloped, the enemy could either surrender or be cut to pieces. To carry out his plan, Confederate General Bragg had stationed General Breckinridge's corps on his right, General Polk's corps in the center, and General Hardee's corps on the left. Rosecrans had positioned Crittenden on his left, Thomas in the center, and McCook on the right (General Johnson's Second Division was part of McCook's corps). Hardee and Polk were to be Bragg's hammer, while Breckinridge would hold his ground and act as Bragg's anvil. Crittenden and Thomas were to act as Rosecran's hammer, while McCook would stand fast and act as Rosecran's anvil. It is difficult to say what might have happened if the two opposing plans had been put into effect at approximately the same time. It seems possible that the armies might have deadlocked, had the stationary right flanks of each army held their ground as planned. If, on the other hand, the stationary right flanks of each army had collapsed, it is possible that the world might have witnessed the spectacle of two mighty armies chasing one another's tails. ¹⁵

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It was a moot point in any case. Rosecran's men, after a miserable, fireless night, were allowed to start fires and cook their breakfasts. Rather amazingly, most of the Union line had taken no special precautions that night, in spite of the extreme proximity of the enemy (Grant's army had been similarly unprepared for the assault by Albert Sidney Johnston's army at Shiloh earlier in 1862). General Kirk asked for a check of brigade outposts, but no signs of enemy activity were reported. General Sheridan and his subordinate, General Sill, however, were disturbed by the apparent complacency of many of their fellow Union officers. Sheridan ordered two regiments forward to reinforce his division, then personally visited each of his regiments in turn, waking his colonels and making certain that all of his men were armed and ready for battle long before daybreak. ¹⁶

General Willich took no special precautions with his First Brigade that evening. A division adjutant making an early inspection found Willich eating breakfast. When the adjutant reminded him that General Johnson wanted the men up and armed before daylight, Willich replied that, "They are so quiet out there that I guess that they are all no more here." Willich then finished breakfast and rode off to get last-minute instructions from General Johnson. Willich couldn't have been more wrong: the rebels were definitely still there. At about 6:30 AM startled pickets on the Union right saw a sight which must have chilled their blood: 4,400 rebels of McCown's division emerging from the early morning mist like a gray tidal wave. While most of the Union line had been sipping coffee and munching on breakfast, McCown's men had been formed up and sent quietly forward, fortified only by a small ration of whiskey. ¹⁷ George Sinclair described what happened next:

In the morning, well we laid till we had slept ourselves out, it being early light, our officers not calling into line of battle and starting three hours before daylight as was the custom at Louisville and Nashville, when we were perfectly safe and secure from all harm. But right here under the nose of the enemy we were allowed to get up at our leisure. We not supposing that there was anyone to disturb us within a mile and a half at least. Some of the men had just put on their coffee to boil, others starting a fire and getting ready for breakfast when we heard light skirmishing on our flank and immediately the firing grew heavier and we were ordered into line. The men were just forming when a little fellow from a company on our left in our regiment came running toward me and away from the firing. Thinking that he was getting scared rather early, I tried to stop him but says he, "I'm shot in the bowels, I can't." Just at that moment another one sings out, "I've got one," putting his hand to his head and even then I would not believe that they were anything more than spent balls that were overshot from where they were at it on the left of us. But in a jiffy of time the balls were zipping past us from nearly all sides and the men were tumbling pretty fast. Then we began to realize that there was an enemy firing at us for just then our battery men, what there was left of them, gave four shots of grape and canister and left as there was no horses hitched up to the pieces. ¹⁸

As McCown's men emerged from the mist, the men of the 89th Illinois were preparing breakfast. Musket fire suddenly sounded to the front of the 89th's position. Very shortly after that, the men of General Kirk's Second Brigade rushed through the ranks of the 89th, followed closely by McCown's rebel advance column. Panic might have ensued if not for the quick thinking of the 89th's Colonel Hotchkiss. He ordered the men to lie down, partly for protection from rebel musket fire, partly to forestall any panic reaction. George Sinclair described what happened next:

We then had the order to lay down and down we went, the balls whistling over our heads like mad. When we lay we could not see as far as the rest of the regiment or the brigade. And they discovering the enemy advancing and the fourth brigade had just been surprised who laid just as near the rebs as we did, came running into us pall-mall. So they on the front of our brigade getting first sight of danger were the first to get out of the way. ¹⁹

Once his field of fire was cleared by Kirk's fleeing brigade, Colonel Hotchkiss gave the order to fire. The men of the 89th Illinois rose up and (at a range of about 50 yards) delivered a volley that momentarily halted the advance of McCown's men. An exchange of gunfire followed, but rebel numbers rather quickly forced a withdrawal by the 89th. Sinclair later wrote this about Colonel Hotchkiss' conduct during this trying time:

Well we laid there for a few moments like good fellows. Our colonel looking for some command from our brigadier general [author's note: August Willich], who by the way was taken prisoner at the onset, but not getting any command, let us lay there, he sitting on his horse, our adjutant being wounded and unhorsed, the major unhorsed and the bullets whistling by ike hail by him. He was a brick, I tell you, and by his actions gave a great deal of confidence to his men. I thought as I saw him sitting there that my life was worth no more to me than his was to him. Just then the adjutant general rode up and said to the colonel who sat on his horse quite near our company, "Order a retreat, Colonel, for God's sake: give your men a chance for their lives!" ²⁰

An observer at the scene, Capt. Alexis Cope of the 15th Ohio Infantry, later wrote:

There had been no attempt to reform our regiment and so far as one could see, the other regiments of the brigade were in the same state of disorder. The exception was the 89th Illinois. It appeared to be compact and in perfect order. It was commanded by Charles T. Hotchkiss, its colonel, who was mounted and was coolly conducting its retreat. ²¹

Colonel Hotchkiss ordered the men to fall back about 400 yards in a northerly direction to a lane. The rebel advance continued, and the men of the 89th were directed to fall back still further, this time to a thicket about 500 yards distant. Companies C and K traded fire with the rebels while the rest of the men fell back across Overall Creek. ²² Sinclair described the regiment's effort to withdraw while under fire:

So the order was given and as we rose up the enemy was within twenty yards of us and as they caught sight they fired a murderous fire into our ranks completely riddling the regiment. We had an open field to cross of about forty rods and it was impossible to keep a retreat in good order as all of the old regiments had left the field before us and was running in all directions. So we did the best we could to get to the first fence where there was a second growth of timber and under- brush. ²³

It had been Colonel Hotchkiss' intent to reform the regiment there; during the withdrawal, however, five companies melted away in the general pandemonium. Hotchkiss therefore reformed his five remaining companies (C, G, H, I, and K) with a few companies each from the 49th and 15th Ohio regiments which were also in the thicket. ²⁴ Sergeant Sinclair described the action which followed:

Here a part of us rallied about fifty with our colonel and we were nearly the last ones that crossed. It was clear and the rebels were in a steady column, three brigades deep, their banners a flying. Here I took a deliberate aim at the banner carrier. The banner was a triangle supported by a round frame. I believe it was the state seal of Arkansas. But that was the second time that I had covered him with my musket and failed to bring him down and a good shot at that, but I am satisfied that I could not shoot in that direction without hurting somebody. So we fought from fence to fence and tree to tree. Our men falling all around, some in front now one beside me then one would cry out from behind. Oh, it was awful to think of, but somehow or other I did not anticipate or even fear a shot. And I can ascribe it to no other than an all-seeing and kind Providence that guided my foot- steps that eventful day. Well so we fought rallying a few men here and there. We waiting until they would come near enough for a good shot and they had to shoot at random to clear the thickets ahead so by this means our loss was slight after we got shelter and theirs was heavy at one field in particular, they laid in great number completely covering the ground. ²⁵

The experience of Private Alfred D. French of Company A was fairly typical of the men who had proven unable to remain with Colonel Hotchkiss and the five companies described above:

A little past six I was cooking my breakfast (bacon and coffee), the orderly sergeant sitting beside me.  We heard a terrific yell right close.  He said to me, "That sounds like a charge."  We jumped up and here came the enemy, on the double quick.  We were surprised.  I had my equipment on, and my gun by my side, so I got in a couple of shots, but all was confusion, and there was nothing to do but to get back as fast as possible, WHICH I DID [French's emphasis]. After a while I saw a regiment that was in good order, and I asked one of their captains if I might fall in with them; so I kept with them the rest of the day. About 5 o'clock I saw a member of my company, and went back with him to the regiment.²⁶  

The unexpected and unpleasant collapse of the Union right, combined with the unexpected resistance of remnants of the Union Army like Colonel Hotchkiss' motley crew, had one unexpected but welcome benefit: it threw the advancing men of McCown's division off course. Instead of inclining to the northwest as Bragg's "swinging gate" plan required, McCown's men had pursued the retreating Federals westward towards Overall Creek. Precious time was lost while the other elements of the rebel advance figured out what had happened and realigned themselves as neatly as possible so as not to lose all progress. ²⁷

A force of rebel cavalry appeared to the right of Colonel Hotchkiss' motley crew, while a force of rebel infantry with a supporting battery advanced on their left. Colonel Hotchkiss ordered the men to move by the left flank, towards the northeast, so as to avoid being cut off completely from the main body of the Union Army. The men were halted in a position in the woods on the south side of the Wilkinson Pike and ordered to open fire. The volley temporarily slowed the rebel advance. ²⁸ George Sinclair described this moment in a letter to his wife, Francis:

At this wood we made a stand with fifty or sixty of the 32nd Indiana with the 93rd Ohio to support us, but as the rebs came in sight through the cornfield, these bold Ohioans or Buckeyes run before they fired a shot at us, leaving the railroad boys to stand the charge and we did it, too, driving the rebs in turn across the woods and holding them in check for half an hour, until they got a battery to bear on us then as they advanced we were ordered to retreat not wishing to expose the strength of our force to them in that quarter. So we continued fighting and retreating in good order until we drew the enemy under the cover of General Rousseau's guns, who had the left of the right wing. Then the battle raged the opposite way, we driving the balance of the day. You ought to hear the colonel of the 93th Ohio abuse his men for running when new recruits would stand. In fact were we the only regiment in our brigade that held together as a regiment and kept in good order and under command. ²⁹

It was during this exchange that Capt. Henry S. Willett, commander of Company H, was shot dead. After a particularly heavy barrage of rebel cannon and musket fire, Colonel Hotchkiss ordered the men (who were nearly out of ammunition) to the rear, where they were able to rearm themselves and rest momentarily. Colonel Hotchkiss had during this time period received only one order- the hasty admonition to fall back- from any higher-up. ³⁰ General Willich, while returning from his last-minute conference with General Johnson, had ridden into a group of Ector's Texans and been captured. General Kirk had also been unable to rally his brigade: he had been hit in the thigh by a rebel Minie ball and then taken prisoner by the rebels. ³¹

Hardee's hammer would have pushed the routed Federals back against Breckinridge's anvil if not for the division of General Philip H. Sheridan. Sheridan was ordered to hold position along the Wilkinson Turnpike (the Wilkinson and Nashville Turnpikes formed two sides of a vee as they ran from the northwest into Murfreesboro, the Wilkinson being the southern leg of the vee). Sheridan's line was at a right angle to the rest of the Union line, which ran basically from the Wilkinson to the Nashville Turnpike (the Union main line faced southeast, towards Murfreesboro). Sheridan's men (assisted by a portion of Davis' men) faced off for several hours that morning against Hardee's assault. Sheridan's men were posted behind the numerous boulders and stands of cedar trees which dotted the area. Artillery batteries blasted the opposing infantrymen and one another at close range, while musket fire was so intense that both sides began to run dangerously low on ammunition. Sheridan finally had to withdraw around 11AM (when the men of the 36th Illinois tried to draw .67 caliber ammunition from Sheridan's wagons, they found that only .58 caliber ammunition was available). The determined stand of Sheridan and his men against nine rebel brigades had stalled the rebel advance and prevented the "swinging gate" of Bragg's plan from swinging completely shut. ³²

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In the meantime, Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps had been pressed into service as a line of defense for the Union left wing. The divisions of Van Cleve and Sheridan were the legs, and the Union main line the base of an isoceles triangle which ran from the Wilkinson Turnpike on the south to the Nashville Turnpike on the north. A strong Confederate push against Van Cleve threatened to collapse the Union left flank. Bragg asked Breckinridge (on the rebel right flank) to send up two brigades to help Polk in his assault on the stubborn Union center. Breckinridge refused, however, as he thought (mistakenly) that he was about to be assaulted by Crittenden's corps. By that time, however, Van Cleve had already been called back to help strengthen the Federal right. ³³

Rosecrans took advantage of the rebel missed opportunity and massed a number of Union batteries and infantry brigades in the trees on a wooded ridge along the Nashville Turnpike. Rosecran's cause had been greatly assisted by Capt. Gates P. Thurston, whose quick thinking saved a Union ammunition train from capture by the rebels. The appreciative Rosecrans cited Thurston for conspicuous gallantry and promoted him to Major (and made Thurston his senior aide-de-camp). Ammunition from the saved train would later feed the massed cannon on the ridge, and help decide the struggle for Murfreesboro. ³⁴ The 89th Illinois, which had previously been ordered to retire to the rear in order to replenish its ammunition supply, was there when the rebel cavalry tried to take the ammunition train. George Sinclair described the scene:

We soon had enough to do again as the rebel cavalry had got in our rear and attacked our ammunition train, but were soon repulsed. Although they waved a large white flag, we paid no attention to that as it was an old story that white flag, for we could see them rush right in and capture the team and hurry them off. But our cavalry soon overtook them and recaptured everything, punishing Mr. Rebs for their audacity. ³⁵

By 2 PM Bragg had decided to make a last fierce push to collapse the Federal line. He elected to attack with the two brigades that Breckinridge had denied him earlier that day (Bragg had been infuriated by Breckinridge's refusal: now Breckinridge's men would pay the price). At 4PM the two brigades went forward against the Federal left, their instructions to overwhelm it and to drive it back against the Federal center and right. It was Bragg's last desperate attempt to swing the Confederate gate shut. The object of the Confederate assault was a slightly elevated, heavily wooded four acre tract at the point where the Union line jacknifed. In their reports Union officers called it "the Round Forest "; the men who held it called it "Hell's Half-Acre." It was here Rosecrans had massed all his available brigades, and backed them with what batteries could be spared from the rest of the Union line.

The rebels attempted several times to capture the Round Forest. Assaults had to proceed across a mostly open field on which lay the Cowan property. By the time of the assaults on the Round Forest, the property consisted of a heavily damaged main house, plus some outbuildings and fences, all of which prevented the rebels from advancing in a solid and orderly line. The advances, therefore, had to proceed in piecemeal fashion, brigade by brigade, rather than in one grand assault. Each advance was made towards the massed Union men and guns, and each was swept by a withering fire of musketry and guns from the Round Forest. The advancing Confederates were quite literally mowed down, some regiments losing as many as six, even eight color-bearers. Bragg's strategy, needless to say, failed to carry the Round Forest (it had no chance of success). ³⁶

The 89th Illinois was in reserve during the Confederate attempts to capture the Round Forest, but the men had no trouble following the direction and intensity of the assaults. George Sinclair had this to say on the subject:

About two o'clock, we were taken back on the reserve but it was not much reserve for the firing was incessant from all directions, the booming of the cannon was tremendous and the clattering of musketry was awful to listen to, to say nothing about the damage it must do. I tell you that there has been nothing on this continent that can compare with this as a battle, all of our old soldiers agree in saying this. ³⁷

At this point night was falling, and both armies had been engaged in active struggle for ten hours. As Bragg would comment at a later date:

Both armies, exhausted by a conflict of a full ten hours duration, rarely surpassed for its continued intensity and heavy losses sustained, sunk to rest with the sun. ³⁸

When the sun set on December 31st, 1862, the rebels had had by far the best of the day's struggle. A heavy mist hung over the battlefield, while the moon coursed into and then out of the clouds. The temperature plummeted, adding to the misery of the wounded, most of whom still lay on the battlefield. The rumble of horse-drawn ambulances could be heard as stewards attempted to retrieve those men they could safely fetch. ³⁹ The 89th Illinois had rejoined the First Brigade earlier in the day, and was posted as a reserve behind the extreme right of the Federal line. The regiment spent the night in that position, under orders once again not to light fires. ⁴⁰ Alfred D. French noted that the men were suffering as a result of rebel successes earlier that day:

They also got our tents, baggage, and food supplies, leaving us with just what we had on our backs.  Now, was that not pretty tough for our first day's fighting? ⁴¹

George Sinclair would later describe this night as the worst New Year's Eve he ever hoped to experience:

I thought that night the longest Old Year out and New Year in that I ever watched for. Although I had not slept three hours in the past three nights, it was so cold and wet that I could not sleep a wink. We laid in a cedar swamp or glade among big rocks and mud between them. And being allowed no fire, there was not much comfort to be taken in our position. ⁴²

Rosecrans called in his corps leaders for a discussion. He proposed a retreat. At some point, however, he mistook torches carried by his own cavalry for a movement of rebel cavalry, and decided Union forces had been enveloped. So certain was he that his army was trapped that he counseled his assembled generals to "prepare to fight or die." ⁴³ The 89th Illinois from its reserve position that evening had witnessed the movement of cavalry which had so worried Rosecrans. George Sinclair recalled:

There was soon work found again for we expected an attack in considerable force on our extreme right. But when we got there it was so near night that there was nothing more done excepting some pretty hard cavalry fighting out on an open field in our sight. The night turned in cold and frosty, and we were lying on our arms all night. Our rations ran out the day before so you may imagine that we were rather hungry, fighting and running from here to there all day long. ⁴⁴

Rosecrans therefore ordered Van Cleve's division to dig in on the east bank of Stones River early on January 1st, 1863, which would put Van Cleve in a position to enfilade Bragg's right. Bragg, who had been positive Rosecrans would withdraw during the night, would now wake to find his own position threatened by entrenched Federals on the east bank of Stones River. The new Federal position would seriously hinder any further rebel attempt to overrun the Round Forest. Rosecrans on the 1st also took other steps to consolidate his own position. He had regained much of his composure now that he knew the horsemen seen on the previous night had been mostly his own troopers. He made no move against Bragg on the 1st, but also no longer felt inclined to retreat (Rosecrans had the previous day witnessed the decapitation by rebel cannonball of his friend Julius Garesche, an event which must have greatly contributed to his loss of composure). ⁴⁵

The 89th Illinois was provided with limited food rations early on January 1st. George Sinclair described the not-completely satisfying situation:

About midnight a provision train came in with a supply and about three thousand troops, a part of Thomas' division. Near morning they issued two crackers and a small piece of meat that was salty as could be to the men with quarter rations of coffee and no water within a mile of us. ⁴⁶

Alfred D. French and some men in his vicinity were able to supplement those food items with others:

I found some nuts under a black walnut tree, which I cracked and ate as I got a chance; also in some way, our commissary got hold of a load of corn, and each man was given one ear. ⁴⁷

Bragg, therefore, spent the first day of 1863 planning an assault that he hoped would drive Van Cleve's entrenched division back across Stones River. Bragg's plan called for four of Breckinridge's brigades, supported by two artillery batteries, to assault the entrenched Federals shortly before dusk (in his choice of Breckinridge's men yet again it can seen that Bragg was not a man who could forgive and forget). Once the position was taken, Breckinridge's men would immediately prepare for a Federal counter-attack, which would probably not be possible due to gathering darkness. At 3:30 PM on the afternoon of January 2nd, 1863, Bragg ordered an artillery barrage along General Polk's front at the center of the Union line. This barrage was an attempt to confuse the Federals as to the real focal point of the coming rebel attack, which was of course the entrenchments of Van Cleve on the east bank of Stones River (Van Cleve's men were at this point being led by Colonel John Beatty, as Van Cleve had been wounded earlier).

At 4 PM, thirty minutes after the start of the rebel artillery feint, Breckinridge's four brigades were ordered forward. Breckinridge, when told he was to retake the position occupied by Van Cleve's men, had been dismayed. The guns he knew were still massed in the Round Forest could potentially threaten any force assaulting Van Cleve. General Polk agreed with Breckinridge, but their misgivings failed to dissuade Bragg. Bragg had been seized with the temporary battle madness which would several otherwise competent rebel generals during the war (Robert E. Lee was no exception). Bragg was convinced that a determined attack by good Southern troops across open ground, supported by minimal friendly artillery, could carry the day against entrenched Federal troops supported by well-prepared and well-placed Federal guns. It was a conviction that would fail Lee at Gettysburg in seven months time, and Hood at Nashville two years hence, and it was not going to work for Bragg at Stones River, either (it seems only fair to report that a number of otherwise competent Union generals also on occasion fell victim to this malady, among them Grant, Sherman, and Howard). ⁴⁸

So Breckinridge and his men advanced at 4PM. Bragg thought that a successful advance at that time would give Breckinridge time to consolidate his position before the Federals could regroup and counter-attack. The advance of Breckinridge's 4,500 men in two columns across an open field towards Van Cleve's entrenchments, their bayonets fixed and battle flags flying, must rank as one of the most stirring sights of the entire war. Then, rather amazingly, Breckinridge's men began to actually drive Van Cleve's men from their entrenchments.

At this point fate stepped in (as it did on several occasions for poor luckless Bragg) and conspired to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Breckinridge's men, flush with their unexpected success, didn't stop at Van Cleve's protected position as Bragg's plan dictated. Instead, they began enthusiastically pursuing Van Cleve's fleeing men. Van Cleve's men headed across Stones River towards the shelter of the Round Forest. In their pursuit Breckinridge's men ran out of the range of their own ten guns and into range of the 57 guns Rosecrans had managed to mass in the Round Forest. The Federal batteries suddenly opened fire, and 1,500 rebels were cut down in a manner of minutes, casualties of the tremendously concentrated Federal barrage (observers put the rate of Federal fire at one hundred cannon shot per minute). Each of the advancing rebel brigades lost at least half its men in that murderous barrage; Donelson's Tennessee Brigade was literally cut to pieces. The rebels had no choice but to fall back: to stay in range of the Federal guns meant sure and sudden death. ⁴⁹

The men of the 89th Illinois had acted with the First Brigade as part of the reserve force during January 1st and 2nd. In the late afternoon and evening of the 2nd it acted as guard for the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, one of the batteries responsible for Breckinridge's destruction, and the men witnessed the awful carnage the federal artillery wreaked on Breckinridge's men. ⁵⁰ George Sinclair described the action:

The enemy made several spirited attacks at several points today trying to find a weak one and to charge on our batteries, but were repulsed every time going off like losers. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery distinguished themselves acting like old heroes, repelling a charge on their battery five times during the day. But just at sundown was the hardest and hottest charge that they had made during the battle. I have since found out that General Breckinridge led it himself and that if they did turn our left flank it was because, I can assure you, that they fairly acted like devils incarnate. But it was repulsed as spiritedly on our side and with more hours and much damage done, for we drove them nearly two miles, they fighting in their retreat gallantly, but we gained the day fairly, for we captured three long thirty-two pound guns (a part of the famous Washington Battery of New Orleans) and a stand of rebel colors. These cannons were much heavier than any we had on the field, our largest being twelve pounders. Our brigade was the one that made the last charge, we being brought from the right wing to support the left as they were hard pushed. I tell you it was exciting to see the boys bring off the batteries and take in the prisoners, the heavens and earth fairly shaking with the dins. ⁵¹

Alfred D. French also participated in that last charge, and described it in this way:

Our brigade was placed in front, and Colonel Gibson in command said to us, "Boys, I expect we will be called on to make a charge, and if so, I want every man to feel that the result of this battle depends on himself alone, and fight accordingly."  Scarcely were the words spoken when General McCook, bareheaded and swinging his sword, shouted, " Colonel, take your brigade and meet them on the charge!"  Then there WAS [emphasis French's] something doing .  I cannot describe it, but we broke the Confederate ranks, and won THE BATTLE OF STONES RIVER [emphasis French's]. ⁵²

Van Cleve's men rushed forward and reoccupied the position they had lately abandoned. The failure of Breckinridge's assault left Bragg in a precarious position. The Federals were back on the east bank of Stones River, again able to enfilade any attempt to overrun the Round Forest. Bragg's men were tired, cold, and very much disheartened after days of hard fighting, freezing rain, and battlefield reverses. Stragglers were leaving Confederate lines in growing numbers. The rain was now coming down hard, threatening to make Stones River unfordable. Too, Bragg was aware that Rosecrans would shortly be receiving (or might have already received) reinforcements.

Rosecrans, meanwhile, had ordered Van Cleve's division to recross Stones River while they still could. This put Rosecrans' full force head to head with the badly depleted divisions of rebel Generals Cheatham and Withers (Generals Cleburne and McCown had been sent to help cover Breckinridge's retreat). Cheatham and Withers were convinced their positions were untenable. With the assent of General Polk, they composed a letter to Bragg which expressed their desire to fall back, as they feared a "great disaster" if they should be compelled by Bragg to hold their ground or, even worse, to advance (both men had witnessed the destruction of Breckinridge's division). Polk added to the letter his opinion that he feared "the consequences of another engagement at this place," and his belief that the results of another failed assault "might be very disastrous."

Bragg was awakened at 2AM on January 3rd, 1863, to read this missive. The man who had punished Breckinridge by sending his division to near-certain destruction reacted predictably: he ordered his uneasy generals to hold their positions "at all hazards." ⁵³ Bragg decided on the morning of the 3rd to reverse himself and begin an orderly withdrawal from Murfreesboro (after having ordered his generals less than 12 hours previously to hold their positions "at all hazards"). Captured Union papers had given Bragg an accurate idea of the size of Rosecran's force, while inaccurate intelligence reports had led him to believe more reinforcements were on their way to bolster Rosecrans' position (they were not). Bragg's confused but relieved generals quickly gave their assent to the withdrawal they had suggested the night before.

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The rebel evacuation of Murfreesboro began about 11PM on January 3rd, 1863. Freezing rain was still falling, depressing even further the spirits of Bragg's men, who felt they had given as good as they had received (they had). They didn't understand why they were the ones who had to fall back. The jaws of the trap Bragg had envisoned had very nearly snapped shut on Rosecrans (the only things that had prevented disaster were Sheridan, Rosecran's "Rock of Stones River," the overenthusiasm of Bragg's own men on several occasions, and the 89th Illinois' initial resistance to the first rebel assault on the first day of the Stones River contest). Yet it was now Bragg's men and not those of Rosecrans who were slipping away like thieves in the night.

The men of both armies, meanwhile, had suffered through a miserable night the evening of January 2nd and morning of the 3rd, as the temperature plummeted and a cold, hard rain fell incessantly. ⁵⁴ George Sinclair described the awful weather in a letter to his wife:

We laid on the battlefield that night, it commencing to rain at eight o'clock. Raining hard all night, nothing occurred of importance during the night until four o'clock in the morn, then we marched back to our position on the right wing through mud and water knee deep, which was no fun with these government shoes on. And I like a fool left a good new pair of boots in my knapsack at Nashville, not wanting to carry them and the shoes were so much easier to march in, in dry weather. ⁵⁵

The rain stopped around 7 AM on January 4th. By noon the sun was shining and the men's spirits were lifting. There had been no firing so far that day, the men had surmised because it was a Sunday. Then the news came down that the rebels had withdrawn. George Sinclair described what happened next:

No firing today it being Sunday was the supposed cause, we had not heard the report of evacuation. Charlie Toops came over to see how I had come out of the fights and he told me the news as he had been out a mile beyond our lines. In the morning early when we found that the rebels had gone, there was a detail of men from each company of each regiment to go out and look up their dead and wounded, if any could be found. I was one of those being anxious to go over the field of our retreat and see the damage done to us also theirs, if possible, but theirs had been taken care of and they had three days position of that part of the field to bury dead in which of course they did some but after all I could and did count three rebs for every Union soldier on that ground. There was some awful sights and every one of our men was stripped of their clothing and shoes more or less and those of their own that had anything of any worth taking. ⁵⁶

Rosecrans'army walked into Murfreesboro nearly on the heels of Bragg's men, but no pursuit was attempted. Bragg would claim Stones River as a victory, because his men had killed, wounded, or captured more than 13,000 men (out of a Federal army that had totaled 43,000 men). Bragg's men had also captured 28 Federal guns. Rosecrans also claimed victory. His men had killed, wounded, or captured more than 10,000 men (of a total rebel force of nearly 38,000 men). More to the point, it was Rosecrans and his men who slept in Murfreesboro the morning of January 4th, 1863, while Bragg and his men slogged through the freezing rain on their way to Tullahoma, Tennessee, their ultimate winter camp. ⁵⁷

George Sinclair was pleased to report to his wife that the Confederates had taken good care of the Union wounded in their midst:

I must say and I am glad to do so, that they treated our wounded men and prisoners with every attention possible under the circumstances not taunting them with hard names or anything of the kind, but treating them as welcome guests. And in one case that I heard of, two rebels went out and built a fire and laid down by one of our wounded men that couldn't be moved until his wounds were dressed, stopping with him two nights in succession adjusting his head covering, covering him with blankets, fixing him drink and food. This I have from some of our men who was taken prisoners and sent to the hospitals to take care of the wounded. By the way, every house was converted into a hospital for miles around. ⁵⁸

Sinclair also came across evidence of the hard work that had been done by the 89th Illinois in helping to hold back McCown's rebel assault force on the opening day of the battle:

Coming across a field where we made one of our rallies and the ground was literally covered in rows of dead men. We never thought that we did such execution, but the work was inevitably ours as no other part of the army was near that spot and to make it look far worse, the hogs of which there are a great number running about, had eat some of the bodies half up. ⁵⁹

He had somewhat earlier also felt compelled to satisfy his curiosity about a matter which had been the subject of much discussion within the Union ranks:

I satisfied myself about the rebels getting whiskey on going into the battle, for I went out on the field after last night's fight and took a canteen off from a dead rebel and it had whiskey and water mixed. And a prisoner told me that he knew that they had work before them on Wednesday morn when they issued whiskey rations to the men. It seems to be the motto of the rebs to get the men drunk and to keep the officers sober and ours to keep the officers drunk and men sober. ⁶⁰

Sinclair and his fellows in the 89th Illinois had no doubts as to who should be blamed for their being taken by surprise on the first day of the battle: Major General Richard W. Johnson, their division commander:

Now I blame our General for his neglect of caution if not of duty in allowing us to be surprised in any case, but before hand I should say, he had no right to move his division right in amongst the enemy without knowing their whereabouts and did he know them. He was so much more to be blamed for not cautioning his brigadiers to be on the lookout for a surprise, as we was the attacking party and should have caught them a napping were it possible. ⁶¹

If Sinclair was right (and Henry M. Cist, in his book, Army of the Cumberland, agrees with Sinclair), then Major General Johnson should have had a lot to answer for. His 2nd Division suffered 2,560 casualties during the Stones River campaign, many of them during McCown's bloody assault on the morning of December 31st. Johnson lost 10 officers and 242 enlisted men killed, 95 officers and 972 enlisted men wounded, and 17 officers and 1,284 enlisted men captured or missing. Brigadier General Willich's brigade (to which the 89th Illinois belonged during this campaign) suffered 1,164 casualties- half of Johnson's total, although there were three brigades in Johnson's division. The 89th Illinois itself suffered 150 casualties at Stones River- 10 dead, 45 wounded, and 94 missing or captured. The dead, who were all killed during McCown's assault in the early morning hours on December 31st, included Captain Henry S. Willett of Company H, Private Benjamin Oakley of Company D, Private James Nichols of Company E, Privates Moses Beaver and Elijah Youlin of Company F, Privates David Bestor, James W. McLaughlin, and DeWitt Scudder of Company G, Corporal William H. Litsey and Private Henry Huggins of Company H (Private William Holden of Company I was originally feared dead or captured, but later was found to have skedaddled shortly after the contest began). ⁶²

In the end, neither Generals Bragg nor Rosecrans would prove able to successfully wage a modern-style war. Like many other Civil War generals, Bragg and Rosecrans were unable ultimately to adapt to their rapidly changing environment. Weapons, tactics, and even attitudes were evolving in the bloody crucible of civil war. What had begun as an affair between gentlemen, fought for the sake of honor, had by the time of Stones River already come to be seen as "war and not popularity-seeking," as General Sherman would rather bluntly state it a bit later in the war. New weapons and new tactics were giving war a new face. The second half of the Civil War, and all wars to come, would no longer be affairs of honor (if they had ever truly been such): they would be essentially matters of logistics. ⁶³